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Abstract 
The boom of electronic commerce technologies in recent years has drastically increased 
the demand for an effective electronic method to pay or be paid. The currently 
predominant method is online card payment, in which the cardholder is not present at the 
point of sale. However this method is accompanied by huge vulnerabilities and also serves 
as a low-risk avenue for fraudsters to steal card details with the intent to defraud online 
merchants. These merchants are those who mostly bear the overall risk and consequences 
because they cannot provide a document signed by the legitimate cardholder. Several 
attempts and proposals have been introduced to solve this problem. However, many have 
failed to be adopted, while those that have been adopted have not been able to adequately 
solve the problem. The card payment industry is fully aware of the problem and its 
consequences, but it has abdicated responsibility for fraud in this type of transaction, and 
declines to guarantee the “card-not-present” fraud solutions that have been proposed 
during the past ten years. Instead, the industry has chosen only to accept responsibility 
for fraud arising from the “card present” environment, which is of low risk because it uses 
chip-and-pin technology. As a result, many merchants have withdrawn from online 
business for fear of losses, while consumers are sometimes turning back to alternative 
payment and traditional “bricks-and-mortar”-style shopping, for fear of identity theft. 
In light of these problems and challenges, this research adopted a practice approach to 
investigate the causes and consequences of card-not-present fraud, the associated 
infiltration techniques, and the impact on the development of e-commerce, in order to 
unveil and establish an understanding of the background and characteristics of card-not-
present fraud, its causes, its penetration techniques and aftermath. 
This research examined the result of the investigation, and proposes a feasible solution 
known as 3W-ADA Sentry System, built out of the framework of analytic geometry to 
counter threats of card-not-present fraud and related identity theft by introducing a non-
electronic and low-cost dynamic tokenization process for card-not-present authentication. 
This proposal could eventually help to restore the security of online card payment 
authentication, restore the trust of participants, and improve the development of electronic 
commerce. However, due to limitations inherent in this research, it provides instead 
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recommendations concerning the additional work that would be required to turn the 3W-
ADA Sentry into an Association or Scheme to promote its global adoption and its 
compatibility with the infrastructures and systems of relevant organisations. 
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1. PART 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Worldwide interest in electronic commerce has dramatically increased in recent years. 
The reasons for this includes: 
 The rapid growth of the internet and electronic commerce technologies. 
 The benefits of buying from a universal marketplace. 
 The need for effective methods for making real-time electronic payments online. 
 The benefits of saving online merchants the cost of making expensive investments 
in ‘bricks and mortar’ businesses. 
However, this interesting phenomenon is accompanied by a significant number of 
unresolved impediments, vulnerabilities and threats. These collectively establish a low-
risk and anonymous route by which to carry out online card payment fraud. This has 
motivated criminals to deploy a range of methods to steal sensitive card information with 
the intent to commit card-not-present fraud at the expense of the merchant and cardholder. 
In its broadest sense, every e-commerce technology can be thought of as a double-edged 
sword, with the possibility to both solve a problem and create a problem. The internet, as 
a key component in electronic commerce, is fundamentally an insecure technology. This 
fact has triggered a technology-war-: and a rivalry between problem-solving and problem-
creating internet technologies. Card payment is the predominant method of payment on 
the internet. However, it is impossible to transfer the chip-and-pin card payment 
authentication technology used in the ‘card-present’ environment to the card-not-present 
environment, which still relies on remote authentication with vulnerable and static card 
details.  
As a result, in most reported card-not-present fraud, cardholders and their issuers are 
always protected, but the online merchant suffers the loss. This is because the merchant 
cannot provide a signed contract of authorisation by the cardholder, due to the fact that 
the card is not present at the point of sale (because the payment is completed electronically 
and remotely). In spite of that, none of the existing card-not-present solutions is 
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adequately solving the problem. Many merchants disappeared from e-commerce after a 
short period, when they could no longer tolerate the losses. 
Many consumers do not want to use their card online because it is widely believed that 
card details are stolen by online criminals. This has had an adverse effect on the 
development of e-commerce.  
For electronic commerce to develop without difficulties, online merchants need to be 
reassured that those making payment over the internet are really who they claimed to be. 
Card holders need a guarantee that their card details will not be stolen by online criminals 
in order to commit identity theft, and card issuers need assurance that they are not 
vulnerable in electronic commerce activities. In all of these considerations, concerns have 
been raised about the levels of trust that exist in electronic commerce and card-not-present 
transactions. 
This research will unveil the major causes of card-not-present fraud, and will also try to 
solve the problem by introducing a low-cost and non-electronic method of dynamic 
authentication using the theory of analytic geometry. This is a feasible solution to card-
not-present fraud, and aims to improve the security and trust of online card payments and 
strengthen the development of electronic commerce. 
1.2 Problem statement 
This research is sponsored by Paymenex Limited, a British corporation which has its head 
office in London and regional offices worldwide. 
1.2.1 About the sponsor 
According to Paymenex Limited (2012) “Paymenex is a universal electronic payments 
technology company that facilitates real time electronic payment between consumers and 
businesses and provides a global switching of electronic money transactions, payment 
processing, and real time gross settlement (RTGS) for financial institutions worldwide 
through its advanced network Paymenex TransNET. 
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Paymenex TransNET is an open membership and low-cost multichannel interchange 
network operated by the consortium of Paymenex Regional Administrators (PRA) 
worldwide and used by its members to deliver a range of bespoke electronic money 
account and payment systems to their customers such as: merchant acquiring, payment 
processing, electronic bill presentment and payment, gift and loyalty card management, 
RTGS, switching, and a versatile mobile technology with quadruple augmentation of 
mobile banking, mobile wallet, mobile payment and mobile loyalty capabilities called 
“xWallet Mobile”. 
Paymenex contracts or partners with local technology companies in several countries to 
serve as the Paymenex Regional Administrator, overseeing the activities and 
administration of Paymenex members and agents. They frequently deliver statistical 
reports and analysis to Paymenex Limited to support strategic planning and business 
development (Paymenex Limited, 2012).  
The mission of Paymenex is to become a leading provider of a sustainable and low-cost 
global interchange network, connecting financial institutions and licensed organisations 
on a secure transaction platform. However, the achievability and sustainability of this 
mission faces threats, including system and process vulnerabilities, exploitation, and 
illegitimate manipulations of system features (Paymenex Limited, 2012). 
1.2.2 Background to the problem  
The most common solution offered by Paymenex TransNET enables merchants enrolled 
by Paymenex members, to accept payments made with a Paymenex card online. The 
cardholder is not present at the point of sale. This is known as a card-not-present 
transaction. 
The anonymity of this environment has been exploited by cyber-criminals who steal card 
information with the intention to use it to make fraudulent online payments. 
Making payment with a Paymenex card requires the cardholder to enter his card and 
billing address details in an online form. This method of payment has long been the 
traditional method of online card payment, and is also used by Paymenex competitors, 
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including Visa and MasterCard. However, with technology advancement, criminals have 
deployed a range of technologies to exploit this process. This poses a threat and has 
created a huge problem for merchants using the online payment services offered by 
Paymenex, Visa, MasterCard and other companies offering similar solutions. 
The business model of Paymenex is designed to give buyers and sellers peace of mind in 
online transactions. It does this by eliminating the process and rule of charge-back in 
completed transactions by accepting the consequences, and absorbing the risk and losses. 
Being currently so exposed to system and process vulnerabilities, exploitation, and 
illegitimate manipulations of system features. Paymenex wishes to implement a solution 
that will prevent fraudulent transactions from taking place on its network. 
To enable it to meet its mission and objectives, Paymenex seeks: 
 Background research into the processes involved in online card payments to 
establish the causes of fraudulent transactions arising in this environment; how 
and why they are possible on the Paymenex network.  
 A feasible solution that will thwart the threats posed by this fraudulent activity. 
1.3 Research question, purpose and scope 
The card payment industry classifies card payment methods as either card present or card-
not-present. The only difference between these classifications is the presence of the 
physical card: in card present the cardholder physically gives the card to the merchant to 
process a payment, while in card-not-present the cardholder only provides the card details 
to the merchant. 
Card-not-present (CNP) transactions include all remote card payment methods where the 
card is not physically present at the point of sale (POS), including card payment made on 
the internet, by telephone, by fax, by email and all other methods of transmitting the card 
details to the point of sale or shop for the purpose of payment. However, this research is 
specifically limited to the investigation of the causes and consequences of fraud arising 
from card payment made on the internet and its impact on e-commerce development, as 
set out in the following research question, investigative purpose and scope. 
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1.3.1 Research question 
 What are the causes and consequences of online card-not-present fraud and what 
is the impact on the development of e-commerce? 
1.3.2 The research purpose 
The purpose of these research was to: 
 Investigate the processes involved in online card-not-present transactions and 
their related fraudulent infiltration techniques. 
 Investigate the magnitude of impact that such fraudulent activity has upon e-
commerce development. 
 Find and develop a solution to combat the online card-not-present fraudulent 
infiltration techniques, thereby minimize the causes and consequences. 
1.3.3 The research scope 
The research was carried out with the following scope and sequential order: 
a) An investigation into the e-commerce systems, process and life cycle of an online 
card-not-present transaction to understand the causes and consequences of the 
associated fraud. 
b) Critical analysis of the significance posed by the associated fraud to identify the 
impacts it imposes on the development of e-commerce.  
c) Evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing online card-not-present 
fraud solutions and justification of the need for an improved and effective solution 
compatible with the current methods of card-not-present fraud infiltration 
techniques. 
d) Development and evaluation of a solution proposed to combat the causes of card-
not-present fraud. 
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1.4 The research motivation 
My research into card-not-present fraud is based on three primary motivations and one 
secondary motivation. These are detailed below. 
1.4.1 Primary motivations 
Reviewing and updating existing research 
Previous research has been carried out (Aguoru, 2007) which has identified card-not-
present fraud as a major problem that requires immediate attention. Though the research 
produced a solution called SMSV, the solution did not meet the sponsor’s requirements 
and acceptability criteria because the computer timestamp method used in generating the 
random code suffers from insufficient entropy, which threatened the security of the code. 
Also the random code communication depended solely on an SMS message, meaning 
that, if a mobile network signal was not available or reachable at any point in time, the 
solution was not be accessible. Hence, further research is required to meet the sponsor’s 
requirements and acceptability criteria, which includes security and availability. 
Victimized merchant  
My first online business as a young entrepreneur started in 2002 in the city of London. 
During this period, online payment was new and the most widely used online payment 
methods were card payment, PayPal, and e-gold. Because PayPal is not globally available 
and many businesses in developing countries cannot obtain a merchant account to enable 
them to accept Visa and MasterCard payments because of bad credit or inaccessibility, I 
decided to take advantage of this problem to stand as a middleman between these 
businesses and their payment methods.  
It was a business-to-business type of e-commerce model: the concept was to provide a 
third-party card-not-present payment processing system for businesses who could not 
obtain a merchant account from their bank, and could not access PayPal or alternative 
payment methods. I stood as the primary merchant account holder. Businesses who 
subscribed to my service were the secondary- or sub-merchants, because they depended 
on my merchant account to process payments online. In turn, I was dependent upon and 
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liable to, my bank in offering payment services to users. So the services my business 
provided were similar to the electronic money and payment services of PayPal. 
Within one year of successful operation, this business model was exploited by online 
criminals who frequently used stolen card details to send money between themselves or 
make payment for goods and services that did not exist.  
The darkest side of the business started when an illegitimate hosting company from 
outside the United Kingdom started making high volume transactions and sales. I was 
excited, as I thought business was booming - but in fact it was sinking.  
On settlement day, I transferred the cleared balance to the fraudster’s designated bank 
account outside the United Kingdom. However, before the second month’s settlement, I 
started receiving endless chargeback letters from my bank, asking me to provide a signed 
agreement from the cardholder, and obviously I could not provide this because the 
transaction was completed remotely and entirely online. 
Due to the volume and value of the transactions, my merchant account was terminated 
without notice, and the bank account was debited by over £14,760. This fund included 
my business fund and the funds of other legitimate sub-merchants who ended their 
business with me when they could no longer process payment on my system. 
I lost my personal funds, I was dragged into further debt trying to pay back all other 
legitimate sub-merchants, and my bank could not help me. 
I was highly dissatisfied with Visa, MasterCard, and my bank, and this formed the 
beginning of my thinking about card-not-present fraud and how it works.  
Insufficient academic research 
The most commonly known research degree is the Doctor of Philosophy, or PhD, which 
entails undertaking research for its own sake. The professional doctorate degree consists 
of practitioner research at doctoral level that enables the opportunity for researchers to 
combine academic, taught components with specific professional practical applications 
that are directly or indirectly relevant to their professional interests (Drake & Heath, 
2011). 
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Research into card-not-present fraud is seen as a business activity for people involved in 
the process of accepting card payment online - for instance, the merchants, card issuers, 
acquirers and cardholders. Therefore this research sets out to bridge the gap between the 
academic and business worlds, and provide a mixed-methods approach to investigation 
into card-not-present fraud. It benefits from academic, taught components, and from 
professional business practices, in reaching its findings, and it is hoped that the project 
will encourage further academic research in this field. 
Academic Requirement  
This research is an academic prerequisite required by the board of examiners of the 
University of East London as a partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
East London for the degree of Professional Doctorate in Information Security. 
1.4.2 Secondary motivation 
Curiosity, excitement and commitment  
The secondary motivation is my interest and excitement in building a problem-solving 
system in information technology, as well as my curiosity to find out how such a systemic 
problem could exist for so long without an effective solution. I combine this interest with 
my commitment and responsibility to solve the problem of my sponsor. 
1.5 Related work and research 
This section provides a summary of research that has already been carried out in the field 
of card-not-present fraud, along with its limitations, and omissions, and compares it with 
the research carried out in this project. This review and comparison identifies and groups 
the related works in two categories: findings and solutions.  
1.5.1 Findings of related research 
There are several research publications that deal with the issue of card fraud, the security 
of e-commerce technology, and its security solutions. It is generally established that card-
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not-present fraud, in the early years of electronic commerce, was minimal. But with the 
development of internet technologies and increased level of buying and selling online, 
card-not-present fraud has completely overtaken other types of card fraud, with a share 
of more than 54% of the total card fraud in the United Kingdom and in most leading 
economies. This is despite the different solutions that are being regularly introduced by 
many organisations (Semmens, 2002; APACS, 2012). 
According to Bryan-Low (2011) and Masters & Boxell (2011), 2% of the British 
economy is being drained by internet crime and the consequences are largely borne by 
businesses. There has been a call for urgent action from government, private and public 
sectors to “stem the rising of fraud”. Governments have focused on law enforcement 
agencies to combat crime rather than trying to find a more effective and secure way to 
carry out payment operations online. 
In discussing the trend of identity theft, Hoffman & McGinley (2010) said that financial 
gain has always been the most common motivation in such crime. Its history can be traced 
back to the biblical story of the twin brothers, named Jacob and Esau, the sons of Isaac 
and Rebecca. The news that Jacob was to inherit Isaac’s wealth motivated Rebecca to 
take advantage of Isaac’s bad eyesight and present Esau to Isaac in Jacob’s place, in order 
to mislead Isaac into promising his wealth to Esau. In contrast with the past, the 
development of the internet has allowed identity theft to extend its capabilities 
electronically. 
1.5.2 Solutions from related research 
Recent studies, Crossley J. (2009) and Murdoch & Anderson (2010) examined 3D Secure, 
popularly known as “Verified by Visa” and “MasterCard secure code”, which was 
introduced by the card scheme more than a decade ago as a card-not-present fraud 
solution. This has remained the foremost solution promoted by the card association.  
The studies found that 3D Secure technology has its own vulnerabilities, and that its lack 
of usability accounts for 30% of sale losses as a result of customer’s inability to 
successfully complete an order in which it us used. The static nature of the password used 
during a 3D Secure authentication and the redirection to third-party websites poses a 
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threat to card-not-present transactions, because the static information is vulnerable to 
theft. In addition many customers suspect a spoofing attack when 3D secure redirects 
them to another site. 
According to a fraud review, (Card Technology Today, 2002) the use of the verification 
code - usually found on the signature strip on the back of a payment card, and also known 
as the card verification value (CVV) - and the billing address verification service (AVS) 
to authenticate cardholders during online payment has been in use for a while. However, 
this process is just as vulnerable as other static information used in online payments.  
Other solutions that have failed, or are vulnerable, include the Secure Electronic 
Transaction (SET). This is not satisfactory because of the computational cost, message 
overhead and additional requirement of public key infrastructure (PKI). Solutions that 
rely upon data mining or behavioural analysis fail because the characteristics of online 
buyers and sellers change over time. 
The research carried out by Aguoru (Aguoru, 2007) produced a solution by adding a one-
time code authentication step in the card-not-present transaction process. However, this 
method suffers from insufficient entropy in the generation of the code, which posed a 
security threat. In addition, since the solution depended on a mobile network to 
communicate the one-time code, the solution could only be implemented whenever a 
mobile network was present. 
Other research has focused on card-not-present fraud in the context of other online fraud, 
its impact and range of solutions, their vulnerabilities and why they failed. However, card-
not-present fraud continues to be seen as a huge problem among the participants, and 
none of the related work has identified a satisfactorily solution to the problem, card-not-
present fraud still requires more attention and a feasible solution. Further research towards 
this end is required. 
As the internet and electronic commerce technologies grow, criminals introduce new 
technologies to exploit them. New research is therefore continually required to update 
existing research with current information. This research project therefore carefully 
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summarises newly discovered causes and consequences of card-not-present fraud, and 
presents a solution to address these.  
1.6 Contribution to knowledge 
In researching and developing a solution to the sponsor’s problem in the following ways, 
this project represents a significant contribution to knowledge in this field.  
1.6.1 Presentation of a philosophy of identity theft and card-not-present fraud 
The project analyses and reports on the background, evolution and current trend of 
identity theft. It describes its advancement from “high-risk” physical theft and non-
electronic impersonation to current “low-risk” electronic impersonation enabled by 
modern technology.  
Today’s criminals engage in a high level of psychologically manipulative activity to steal 
sensitive information electronically, with the intention to commit online card fraud for 
financial gain without exposing themselves to physical risk. 
As the development of information and communication technologies continues, the social 
engineering technologies used to support this crime similarly transform into sophisticated 
and flexible tools. Most social engineering tools are developed to solve a problem, but 
fraudsters exploit these technologies to carry out criminal act. 
1.6.2 Development of an academic framework for future research 
Electronic commerce technologies rely on software. The quality assurance of a software 
project requires a continuous process of monitoring, maintenance and validation 
throughout its life cycle. As information communication technologies become ever more 
complex, and sophisticated, the task of fully understanding them also grows. This task 
requires continuous research, validation and evaluation, to expand upon previous 
knowledge, and to replace legacy systems with ones that are fit for purpose. 
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Little academic research has explored card-not-present fraud in e-commerce payment 
systems, and there has been no conclusive investigation from an academic perspective of 
causes, consequences and solutions in this area. Rather, according to Murdoch & 
Anderson (2010), certain heavily promoted card-not-present solutions escaped academic 
scrutiny and evaluation because of their practical, rather than theoretical, nature. 
This research fills the gap between theory and practice, by bringing together current 
business and academic perspectives on electronic commerce and card-not-present fraud. 
It identifies predominant and relevant social engineering technologies in use today, and 
the consequences they have on the development of electronic commerce. The proposed 
framework aim to serve as a blueprint for future academic research in this field.  
1.6.3 Introduction of a non-electronic and low-cost CNP fraud solution 
Having established a current philosophy and framework of card-not-present fraud, its 
infiltration processes, its impact and consequences, this research goes on to propose a 
feasible solution designed in line with the current trend of card-not-present fraud. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system is a low-cost dynamic authentication system designed to 
solve the problem of card-not-present fraud by leveraging the Cartesian two-dimensional 
coordinate system. 
The Cartesian two-dimensional coordinate system identifies a unique point in a plane, 
relative to a pair of numerical coordinates known as the origin. Such a unique point serves 
as an authentication token for a card-not-present transaction. 
The token generated by the calculation of the intersection of the X, Y axis is also used to 
protect an account holder’s privacy online. Asking for the account holder’s name and 
billing address by “Verified by Visa” and “MasterCard SecureCode” during online 
authentication exposes the account holder to the threat of identity theft. The 3W-ADA 
Sentry system avoids this vulnerability by uniquely identifying and authenticating the 
account holder in card-not-present transaction without revealing the account holder’s 
personal information. A detailed specification and design documentation for this solution 
is provided in the relevant sections of this research. 
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1.6.3.1 Variation between existing solutions and the proposed new solution 
The main problem of the card-not-present transaction is achieving an authentication 
solution that is not vulnerable to theft.  This research compares the different 
characteristics of existing solutions and the new solution.  
Cheswick, et al (2003) describes authentication, from the perspective of network 
security, with up to three main factors, as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship and strength of authentication factors 
 
One-factor authentication: “What you know”  
The most common type of one-factor authentication is usually a static password. The 
easier a password is, the more a user is likely to use it. But the easier a password is, 
the more vulnerable it is. The more complex a password is, the more difficult it is to 
remember, so a user is more likely to write it down. The more a password is written 
down the more vulnerable it becomes. Therefore, neither a complex nor an easy-to-
guess password is secure enough on its own merit for online authentication. 3D Secure 
is an example of a card-not-present solution using static password. 
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Two-factor authentication (2FA): “What you have” 
The two-factor authentication sometimes called 2FA or multi-factor authentication, is 
an additional layer of security after the basic username and password and is often 
dynamic. It introduces the “What you have” concept and this can take different forms. 
For example, using a personal authentication card, electronic token devices, or a code 
card. The two-factor authentication process adds an additional level of security to 
authentication. Its main disadvantage is that users find the extra authenticate step to 
be tedious and time consuming, as they expect to be able to login quickly to access 
their secure area. Two-factor authentication also costs businesses additional resources 
to implement (Altinkemer & Wang, 2011). 
Three-factor authentication: “What you are” 
Three-factor authentication adds an additional level of security by using the “What 
you are” concept. This uses personal attributes for authentication, including biometric 
fingerprinting, iris scanning and voice recognition technologies. Each additional step 
creates an additional layer of security, additional time taken to complete a given 
authentication session, and additional delay caused to users, and involves additional 
resources to implement and manage (Altinkemer & Wang, 2011). 
Characteristics One-Factor Two-Factor Three-Factor 
Data Static/digital Dynamic/digital Static/physical 
Type 
Username, 
password 
Card, device, token 
Attributes, i.e. 
Biometric 
Environment 
Login, Access, 
CNP 
Login, Access, CNP Login, Access, CNP 
Vulnerability  High Low Low 
Security Low High High 
CNP solution 3D Secure 3W-ADA Sentry  
 
Table 1: Authentication factors assessment chart 
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1.6.3.2 Static vs. dynamic authentication data 
Most existing card-not-present fraud solutions rely on one-factor authentication. 
However, the factors are either a static data type or decision made by probability based 
on past history. This research shows that such factors do not add acceptable value to 
security requirements and instead exposes personal data to risk.  
Static data types includes card numbers, serial numbers, CVV, card expiry date, billing 
address, date of birth and 3D Secure passwords. In addition to the fact that these details 
are static and vulnerable to identity theft, they also expose customers’ privacy to other 
types of online fraud by making their personal details available on the internet. An 
instance taken from the 3D Secure popularly known as “Verified by Visa” and 
“MasterCard SecureCode”, revealed that this approach, while attempting to solve the 
card-not-present problem, created more problems by putting the personal details of online 
shoppers at risk. Using the past transaction history of a card to make decisions is not 
reliable because cardholder’s circumstances can change over time as a result of economic 
changes or fraud within the existing card history may not be detected. 
In contrast, the 3W-ADA Sentry solution replaces the use of personal details with a 
personal authentication code drawn from the concept of analytic geometry, and thus 
makes the personal authentication code dynamic, flexible to use, low cost, and non-
electronic to implement and manage. 
1.6.3.3 Security of card and personal information in a CNP environment 
Most card-not-present fraud originates from card-not-present transactions carried out by 
the legitimate card holder. This is because cardholders are significantly exposed to 
identity theft each time they pay online. Fraudsters tends to use sophisticated technologies 
to monitor the personal computers of their victims. This includes installing spyware 
remotely through an email or web link. Once a personal computer becomes vulnerable 
via this spyware installation, whatever data that passes through the screen of the personal 
computer, including key strokes, are remotely monitored by the fraudster. The more a 
cardholder pays online the more vulnerable his card and personal details become.  
 
 16 | P a g e  
 
The wide use of personal information, including full name, billing address, and 
sometimes, date of birth by current solutions poses a great security risk and opens doors 
for other types of impersonation. In contrast, the 3W-ADA Sentry exchanges the 
requirement for personal information with a time limited dynamic token, while 
maintaining the profile of the customer. In the event of an interception, the interceptor 
can only capture the authentication token, which is already expired and meaningless.  
1.6.3.4 Benefits of replacing existing solutions with 3W-ADA Sentry  
The benefits of replacing the existing card-not-present solutions with the solution 
introduced by this research, are grouped under two headings: 
Protection of personal identity online 
Full name and billing address are normal prerequisites to complete a card-not-present 
transactions and as the number of online shoppers increases, this also increases the 
volume of personal information submitted online. This has motivated criminals to 
implement various identity theft techniques to remotely steal personal and card 
information without the knowledge of the victim. 
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Figure 2: Identity theft technique 
 
Replacing the existing card-not-present solutions with the 3W-ADA sentry solution will 
prevent customers from entering their personal information online to pay and thus reduce 
identity theft of personal information. 
Security and authentication to prevent fraud 
Existing card-not-present solutions authenticate customers with static information 
transferred over an insecure network, which is therefore vulnerable to identity and 
impersonation because criminals can intercept the static information and use it to make 
fraudulent payments online. 
Replacing the existing card-not-present solution with the 3W-ADA sentry solution will 
add an additional one-time dynamic token which even if intercepted cannot be used to 
make a successful payment online. 
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1.7 The research approach and context 
The method of this research is guided by the flowchart illustrated in Fig. 3 and the 
research approach framework in Table 2. The research result helps to understand the logic 
and preparation of a specification requirements for a new solution. The research approach 
is divided into three sequential categories: 
1.7.1 Investigation 
In this category, this research will investigate the online card-not-present transaction 
process and related fraud techniques, to find out the causes, consequences and impact on 
the development of electronic commerce. 
1.7.2 Evaluation 
In this category, this research will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
solutions to establish where and why they failed. 
1.7.3 Solution 
Finally, the result of the investigation and the evaluation of the existing solutions will 
determine, and stand as the blueprint for, the development of a new solution which will 
be beneficial to electronic commerce development, and provides a framework for future 
research on the topic. 
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Figure 3: The research plan flowchart 
 
To support the above flowchart, the approach is described further in Tables 2 and 3. These 
provides a guideline for achieving the objectives of each area. 
 
Stage Area covered by research Research approach 
1 
Understanding the process and problem 
of card-not-present transaction, the fraud 
infiltration techniques, the strength and 
Interview, literature review, case 
study and an observation of a card-
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weaknesses of the existing solutions and 
the problem requirements. 
not-present transaction including 
existing hypothesis. 
2 
Evaluation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing solutions. 
Checking the fraud infiltration processes 
and techniques.  
Identification of the impacts on the 
development of e-commerce. 
Identification of the causes of the 
problem and the area which need to be 
addressed.  
An empirical testing of the existing 
solutions with different types of cards 
in legitimate and illegitimate 
perspectives to understand their 
strength and weaknesses to 
determine the modus operandi and 
level of the infiltration processes of a 
successful fraudulent transaction. 
Further literature review, interview 
and case study.  
3 
Design and justification of the solution 
and its framework. 
Implementation of the prototype of the 
proposed solution.  
Evaluation of the new solution  
Detailed specification requirements 
and design of the solution including 
the use of UML, Use Cases, Class, 
sequence and functional diagrams. 
User Acceptance Testing, and 
evaluation of the prototype and 
documentation.  
4 Reports and Thesis write up. Thesis write up and documentation. 
 
Table 2: The research approach framework 
 
 
Research 
Method 
Stages Research method logic 
Research and 
literature 
review 
1, 2, 3 and 4 
Preliminary research carried out to have a clear 
understanding of the problem and its characteristics by 
collecting and analysing journals, articles and resources 
relating to e-commerce card payment from reliable 
sources. 
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Also review of the official documentations and reports 
carried out by APACS The UK Payment Association. 
Review of report from the stakeholders. 
 
Interview 1, 2, 3, and 4 
Interview with the sponsor - Paymenex Limited, selected 
internet merchants from United Kingdom, Panama, USA, 
Canada, Ghana, and Cameroon, Regional 
Administrators of Paymenex Limited in 8 countries, staff 
from other card transaction network organisations, 
acquiring bank and Card holders to establish facts about 
the problem, perception and what they feel about e-
commerce. 
Case Study 
 
1 and 2 
Case study of the sponsor including selective case 
studies from other organisations. Reports from UK 
Payments Association. 
Feedback 
 
2 and 3 
Feedback from user acceptance testing and where 
necessary, including during the testing and evaluation of 
the prototype. 
 
Table 3: The research method logic 
 
1.8 Research Structure 
The Research is structured in five parts as follows: 
Part One: This part provides an overview of the research, its objectives, approaches, and 
methodologies. After reading this part, the reader will be equipped with the research 
question, purpose, scope and approach, including the overview of the research sponsor, 
motivation and problem statement. 
It also outlines previous work and research in this area, the contribution of this research 
to the knowledge and understanding of e-commerce, card-not-present transactions, 
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related fraud and the perspective of its behavioural impacts among participants of 
electronic commerce. 
Part Two: The aim of this part is to present the background of studies found in literatures 
relating to card-not-present fraud, its causes, consequences and impacts on electronic 
commerce, including all components related directly or indirectly to card-not-present 
fraud or its solution. After reading this part, the reader will understand the background of 
card-not-present fraud, infiltration process, causes, existing solutions, its relationship 
with identity theft, and the impacts on electronic commerce development. 
Part Three: This part presents the background information and framework of the 
proposed 3W-ADA Sentry solution, including its concept, justification, and SWOT 
analysis. It further describes the overall roadmap of the solution development, from 
software requirements specification to design and user acceptance testing. After reading 
this part, the reader understand the background, design and implementation of the 
proposed solution. 
Part Four: This part of the research presents the verification, validation and evaluation 
of the solution, drawing on reports from the software requirements specification, user 
acceptance testing, and live business application. After reading this part, the reader will 
understand how the solution is validated, verified and evaluated. 
Part Five: This part of the research presents a summary and conclusion of the research, 
and suggestions for the direction of future research in related areas.  
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2. PART 2 – BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the most critical requirements of electronic commerce is the need to exchange 
payment electronically. According to Kim, et al. (2010), the development of electronic 
commerce will be strengthened if trusted and secured payment systems are implemented. 
It is a general perception that trust is an intangible, vague concept - but a critical element 
that must be incorporated into electronic commerce without which the merchant is ruined 
(Beatty, et al., 2011).  
According to Sullivan (2010), as the perception of risks and threats continues to increase 
in electronic commerce payment technologies, the need for information security and 
assurance of trust on the internet continues to be seen and acknowledged as a critical 
requirement. 
As shown in a recent research (Montague, 2011), online card payment is the foremost of 
electronic commerce payment systems. It is classified by the payment industry as card-
not-present (CNP) because the merchant is not in possession of the physical card when 
the payment is processed or the physical card is not present at the point of sale. 
However, according to Bhattacharyya, et al. (2011) and Gold (2014), the level of credit 
and debit card fraud has drastically increased in the recent years. Criminals have learnt 
new and sophisticated technologies to harvest large quantities of card-related for several 
reasons which includes selling the data in the commodity market or using card details to 
commit card-not-present fraud. 
Recent research (Gold, 2014) has shown how the vulnerabilities and flaws in online card 
payment have been exploited by fraudsters and online criminals who impersonate others 
to commit card fraud. Such fraud takes advantage of the current use of static payment 
card details and the weaknesses in the card payment approval process, which have been 
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established as unsafe and vulnerable to fraud. There are adverse effects, as a result, upon 
online merchants and consumers (Asokan, et al., 1997). 
There is a need, therefore, for payment systems that users can trust, and that remove the 
perceptions of vulnerability, fraud and threat that are associated with payment systems 
used in electronic commerce (Bharat, 2013). 
Authentication in CNP environment, to assure non-repudiation and legitimacy of 
payment, is the biggest challenge faced by online merchants. It requires maximum 
attention because the consequences of fraud, and of breach of security arising from this 
process is continuously growing and impeding the trust of merchants and consumers 
participating in e-commerce. The basic starting point of establishing trust online has been 
eroded (Suh & Han, 2003, p. 136; Yu-Hui & Stuart, 2007, p. 21). 
Consumers making card payments online are apprehensive about the safety of their card 
details transmitted over the internet, and about the reliability of the merchant, while on 
the other side of the internet, merchants accepting card payments online are apprehensive 
about the legitimacy of the card details being received. Both parties cannot verify if the 
other party is who he claimed he was. Electronic commerce is an emerging technology 
but the unavailability of an acceptable and trusted payment system has adversely 
impacted its future development (Zhou, 2004; Laudon & Traver, 2004; Abrazhevich, 
2004). 
While it is widely believed that visible improvement in payment security strengthens trust 
among participants, it is also a fact that the security of an e-commerce payment system 
and the resulting trust of users boosts the development of e-commerce. Therefore, the 
perception of users, and their beliefs concerning the security of electronic payment 
systems, is a key element in the trend of e-commerce technology (Wilson & Abel, 2010). 
It is important to understand who pays when a fraudster purchases goods and services 
online using stolen card details (Montague, 2011). Players in the card payment industry 
promote a range of solutions, including 3D Secure, to prevent online payment fraud, but 
they are careful to avoid the burden of the consequences of such fraud.  In most cases, it 
is the merchant who bears the loss resulting from card-not-present fraud. In contrast, the 
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card payment industry and card issuers guarantee most card-present payment, which 
carries the lowest risk because it uses chip and pin technology that demands the presence 
of the physical card and knowledge of the corresponding PIN. 
2.2 Information 
Information has different meanings in different contexts. However, by taking a logical 
approach to information we can express or identify information in three principal ways: 
information as a process or data; information as a knowledge or meaning; and information 
as a thing or entity. Sometimes, information can be expressed in ways that are hard to 
measure. It can also be expressed in many formats, and converted from one format to 
another (for example, from waveform or analog to symbol or digital). In recent years, the 
trend in information communication technology has been to use digital or electronic 
information, usually held or accessed through computer systems or other electronic 
devices (Buckland, 1991; Anderson & Johannesson, 2006). 
2.2.1 Value of information 
As more information and data goes online, information is increasingly becoming a 
primary strategic asset that requires satisfactory administration in achieving 
organisation’s objectives. However, within the business world, many organisations 
understand and treat information as an overhead cost, to be managed secondarily 
according to available resources, and in the event that a business is going through difficult 
financial times, information protection activities are among the first aspect to be reduced. 
(Quigley 2005; Porters & Millar 1985; Davenport & Cronin, 1988). 
According to Bowonder & Miyake (1992), research has confirmed that information adds 
potential value to every individual and organisation. Several analyses have described the 
importance of information from many perspectives including: 
 Information is the lifeblood of an organisation (Scarrott, 1985). 
 Information adds value and enhances products’ usability and meaning (Davenport 
& Cronin, 1988). 
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 Information is and organizational strategic asset (Quigley, 2005). 
Irrespective of these wide and coherent descriptions and appraisals of information, the 
decision makers of many large organisations see the management of information as less 
important and therefore fail to adequately recognise information as an asset that adds 
significant value to their day-to-day business operations. This is the case, even though 
information is the key element of consumer-merchant interaction, via electronic 
commerce. 
2.2.2 Information Security and Assurance 
Andress (2011) defined Information Security as the protection of our data, information 
and its systems from unauthorized access, theft, disclosure, usage, damage, modification 
and interruption, while (Gifford, 2009) summarised information security as the process 
of ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. 
Aguoru (2007) advanced a concept of information security using the catchphrase “Let 
likes be secured by likes” and argued that information security means using confidential 
data and strategy to secure confidential data and strategy. 
Information Security and Information Assurance (IA) have their own individual 
meanings, even though they are wrongly used interchangeably. Information security deals 
with the protection of information, while information assurance, as its name implies 
encompasses all the roles of information security, information current state and 
information security countermeasures with descriptive sub-sets as illustrated in 
McCumber INFOSEC Model of Information Assurance. These form the building blocks 
to establish trust and confidence that the information is actually protected (Voas & 
Wilbanks, 2008, p. 10; Maconachy, et al., 2001, p. 306). 
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The modifications resulted in the inclusion of subsets with the three designated domains 
of the model as illustrated in the following table: 
 
Security Services Information State Security Countermeasures 
a) Availability 
b) Integrity 
c) Authentication 
d) Confidentiality 
e) Non Repudiation 
a) Transmission 
b) Storage 
c) Processing 
a) Technology 
b) Policy and Practice 
c) People 
 
 
Table 4: Subset of Information Assurance Model 
 
2.2.3 Trust 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines trust as “a firm belief in the reliability, truth, or 
ability of someone or something”. While this definition is a common interpretation of 
trust, in the context of computer science it is difficult to measure reliability, truth, and 
ability. 
According to Bidgoli (2006, p. 67), “Trust is a willingness of a party, called a trustor to 
depend on another party called a trustee, for an action that is important for the trustor”. 
Trust in face-to-face interaction between the trustor and the trustee is significantly 
different to the trust in electronic and remote contexts, where the trustor and trustee are 
not face-to-face. Hence, building trust in electronic commerce without face-to-face 
interaction is a huge problem affecting the electronic commerce, and the greater the level 
of risk perceived in the interaction, the greater the level of trust required (Rocco, 1998). 
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According to Song, et al. (2007), there has been a tremendous surge in the use of the 
internet to exchange information following the spread of internet technologies. However, 
exchanging information online involves risk and threats of imprecise and bogus 
information, which raises huge reliability and trust concern among trustor and trustee. To 
prevent transmission of ambiguous, forged and untrusted information, system 
administrators must strengthen their information communication systems including user 
authentication systems. 
2.2.4 Research insight of Information and Trust in electronic commerce 
Information security, information assurance and trust have been identified as key factors 
in, and critical requirements of, electronic commerce systems, to assure information 
reliability, general performance, and acceptability among trustors and trustees. 
Unfortunately, the aspect of electronic commerce components involving online card 
payment systems have long-standing trust problems and difficulties. These problems and 
difficulties have resulted in the increasing incidents of online card fraud and identity theft, 
largely facilitated by the absence of physical interaction and an unacceptable level of trust 
that exists between the trustor and trustee. 
Aligning trustor and trustee in the context of online card payment is difficult, as both the 
cardholder and the merchant have behavioural elements of trustor and trustee, and these 
are interchangeable depending on the activities and their context within the information 
system at any given time. During online card payment, the cardholder (acting as the 
trustor) must establish an acceptable level of trust with the merchant (acting as the 
trustee), which will motivate the willingness of the cardholder to transfer his card and 
personal details to complete an online payment. Conversely, when accepting an online 
payment, the merchant (acting as the trustor) must also establish an acceptable level of 
trust with the cardholder (now acting as the trustee) which will motivate the willingness 
of the merchant to accept the online payment, submitted remotely, with the belief that the 
payment is not fraudulent. 
The information systems in use by the trustor and trustee in electronic commerce, 
including the electronic payment systems, have long been exploited by criminals in 
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different ways. The resulting perception of risks, threat, and fraud has intensified and 
influenced the trust of the parties involved. 
 
2.3 Background to Electronic Commerce (E-Commerce) 
Electronic Commerce or e-Commerce technology began in the 1960s during the 
development of the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) for the exchange of electronic 
transactions and business information between computers over a network without human 
intervention. There have been transitions in the meaning and use of the term “electronic 
commerce” within the past 40 years, during which time it has applied chiefly to 
technology that facilitates information exchange and business transactions – for example, 
purchase orders (Botha, et al., 2008, p. 434; Laudon & Traver, 2004, p. 337; Anumba & 
Ruikar, 2002, p. 267). 
However, there were compatibility issues with the data format and protocols used by 
different businesses in this channel, so it was not possible for many organisations to send 
or receive EDI communications to and from other organisations. This was a challenge 
faced by EDI until the development and publication of the first version of ASC X12 in 
1982 by the Accredited Standard Committee as an American national standard, chartered 
in 1979 by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) (McKay & Piazza, 1992). 
The meaning and use of electronic commerce expanded during the development of the 
Mosaic web browser at the National Center for Supercomputer Applications of the 
University of Illinois USA, and the introduction of different types of electronic payment 
cards and vouchers, Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) and Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) applications in 1990s (NCSA, 2009). 
2.3.1 The trend of electronic commerce 
Today, electronic commerce largely means the buying and selling of goods, services, and 
the exchange of values and business transactions electronically with the use of computer 
systems and technologies such as the World Wide Web, telephone and facsimile. 
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Electronic commerce is a very popular activity on the internet. It has transformed the 
traditional face-to-face buying and selling marketplace, or "bricks and mortal" into a 
world of virtual, ubiquitous marketplaces of convenience, or "brick and click" 
(Gunasekaran, et al., 2002; Bushry, 2005, p. 3). 
Sellers can not only sell their products and services through their established high-street 
shops, but can also achieve a virtual shop (available always and everywhere) with the 
power of the internet, by simply adding some images and descriptions of their products 
and services to a website application, and with the integration of a payment processing 
gateway to accept payment electronically. The worldwide access to information offered 
by the internet technologies has greatly widened the market reach for sellers to showcase 
their products and for buyers to search for products and services beyond their 
geographical location (Bhasker, 2006). 
Electronic commerce or “e-commerce” derived its name from the traditional word 
“commerce” which generally encompasses exchanging, coordinating, buying and selling 
of goods and services. The term “electronic commerce” covers the use of any electronic 
methods in commerce, instead of face-to-face interactions, for example, the internet 
network and the World Wide Web (Mohapatra, 2012). 
2.3.2 Types of electronic commerce 
Organisations and individuals participating in electronic commerce activities rely heavily 
on the internet network and information systems. The internet and the World Wide Web 
offers an important network between the seller, the buyers and other coordinators to 
enable electronic communication of information. 
According to Mohapatra (2012, p. 77), the most popular type of e-commerce categories 
are Business-to-Business (B2B), Business-to-Consumer (B2C) and Consumer-to-
Consumer (C2C). Other less common types include Business-to-Government (B2G) 
which refers to e-commerce dealing between companies and the government, and 
Business-to-Employee (B2E), which covers companies dealing with the employees such 
as requisitioning of supplies by employees. The channels of electronic commerce have 
extended to mobile devices, for which the term Mobile Commerce or m-Commerce 
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applied. In m-commerce, transactions take place through a wireless mobile device -for 
example, smart phone and tablets. 
Business-to-Business (B2B) e-Commerce: Holzmuller & Schluchter (2002, p. 2), in 
discussing Business-to-Business (B2B), stated that organisations that are involved 
directly or indirectly in the buying and supplying of business products and services or 
other business activities that coordinate inter-organisational operations over an internet 
network, are participating in a business-to-business type of electronic commerce. 
In the Business-to-Business category of e-commerce, companies are dealing directly with 
other companies. This can mean companies who are wholesale suppliers or manufacturers 
supplying their goods and services to other retailing companies who deal directly with 
the consumers, companies supplying their raw materials to the manufacturers, to support 
product, and organisations proving business services, for example, technology 
infrastructures, corporate financial services provided by banks and accounting firms. 
Business to Consumer (B2C) e-Commerce: Business-to-Consumers (B2C) is 
consumer-oriented, and the most common category of electronic commerce, in which 
companies sell their products and services directly to individual consumers rather than 
companies. Business-to-Consumer can be further broken down into direct and indirect 
marketing, full and partial virtual marketing, proactive or reactive marketing, and 
electronic intermediaries business to consumer categories depending on business 
strategies (Bushry, 2005; Hu, et al., 2004, p. 177). 
Consumer to Consumer (C2C) e-Commerce: Consumer-to-Consumer e-commerce 
involves buying and selling between a consumer and another consumer such as an online 
auction. A popular online auction e-commerce is eBay. Other examples include social 
network websites, which allow consumers to interact with other consumers to exchange 
ideas and services (Mohapatra, 2012). 
2.3.3 Key essentials of electronic commerce 
This research has broken down the essential processes of electronic commerce into three 
key categories, as follows. 
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2.3.3.1 Business Model and Workflow Management System  
The business model is an essential element of electronic commerce. A business model 
covers all aspects and methods of generating revenue, arrangement of the organisation, 
and all methods of generating values through the internet. In particular, it provides a 
blueprint of what the electronic commerce business is all about, and its core operations. 
This includes the purpose, business strategies, offerings, process and procedures, to 
clearly depict how an organisation will capture its value and revenue (Jansen, et al., 2007). 
The workflow management system is a coordinated process of activities or operations 
that are connected to achieve a business goal, including all day-to-day processes and 
procedures. Hence, workflow is a synonym for business process (Van der Aalst & Van 
Hee, 2006). 
2.3.3.2 Shopping Cart and Content Management System  
According to Zheng, et al., (2009) Online Shopping Cart and Content Management 
System are a web based infrastructure powered by the internet to manage products and 
customers online in today’s evolving e-commerce. Shopping cart software continues to 
advance to include many components that add flexibility to e-commerce. The most 
common features and components of a shopping cart includes: 
 Catalogue and content management system used to add products images, 
descriptions, and prizes. 
 Customer Relationship Management System used to manage customer 
information and orders. 
 Payment system used to integrate online payment methods, such as credit card 
and electronic cheques. 
 Shipping method used to manage the different available shipping methods, such 
as, standard, express and courier. 
 Order Management System used to manage orders. 
 Communication System, which this includes email and chat abilities used to 
communicate effectively with customers. 
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As this technology is becoming sophisticated and complex, and the number of people 
joining the online trend grows, fraud and internet crime also continue to grow. E-
commerce operates remotely on the internet, which makes it almost impossible to verify 
the legitimacy of who is selling and who is buying. As a result, the security of a shopping 
cart infrastructure must be designed to protect both sellers and buyers from hackers and 
fraudulent activities - for instance, unauthorised access, card-not-present fraud and 
eavesdropping. 
2.4 The B2C e-commerce transaction flowchart 
According to a recent research (Aguoru, 2007), to complete a purchase, including 
settlement of payment, in an electronic commerce transaction, the following parties are 
usually involved. 
The Card Association or Network 
Also called the card scheme, this is usually an organisation that operates an interchange 
or financial payment network. They process, clear and settles all transactions on their 
network on behalf of the card issuers and the acquirers - for instance, Visa, Paymenex, 
MasterCard, and American Express. 
The Card Issuer  
This is usually the bank or other financial institutions approved by the card association to 
issue cards. They maintain and manage the monetary value of the card and the paying 
party. 
The Acquirer or Payment Service Providers (PSP) 
This is usually any financial institution or payment service provider approved by the card 
association to process payment on behalf of the merchant. They act as the process gateway 
of the merchant to the interchange network and the point of contact between the merchant 
and the cardholder in settlement. In addition, they often provide merchant accounts. Some 
payment service providers require you to obtain your merchant account from your bank, 
while they do only the payment processing. 
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The Merchant  
This is usually the seller: any individual or business with a valid merchant account issued 
the acquirer or payment service provider which enables him to accept payment. 
The Cardholder  
This is usually any person with a credit or debit card issued by a card issuer against his 
name. All cards are linked to an electronic financial account through which it will access 
funds for payment – for example, bank account, or electronic money. 
The diagram below illustrates the process of an electronic commerce payment. The 
successful transaction flows from No. 1 to No. 14. If repudiation occurs, the additional 
process from No. 15 to No. 17 follows subsequently, which often results in chargeback, 
usually at the disadvantage and loss of the merchant. 
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Figure 6: The Ecommerce transaction flowchart (Aguoru, 2007) 
NO ACTION DESCRIPTION 
1. Cardholder browses the merchant’s shop, and chooses an item to purchase, and 
moves to the checkout page. 
2. Cardholder submits card details and any other required information set out on the 
merchant’s website - for instance, billing and delivery address and dynamic token 
to enhance security. 
3. The Merchant forwards the information submitted by the cardholder to his acquirer 
or payment processor to obtain approval. 
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4. The Merchant’s Acquirer routes the authorisation request through the network of 
the card association to the card issuer, (The Card Association will identify the card 
issuer). 
5. The Card issuer makes a decision to either decline or approve the authorisation 
request, and route the response back to the Acquirer through the network of the 
card association. 
6. The Card Issuer Debits the Cardholder Account. 
7. The Acquirer sends back the request to the merchant to enable him complete the 
order. 
8. The merchant displays or sends the order decline/approval to the cardholder. 
9 In the event of tangible goods, the merchant hands over the item to the courier 
service for delivery, (Digital Goods are usually delivered electronically). 
10. The Courier Service signs accepting the goods for delivery to the cardholder. 
11. The delivery company delivers the goods to the cardholder, who is the buyer. 
12. The Cardholder signs the receipt of the goods. 
13 The Card Issuer and the Acquirer clear and settle the transactions through the 
card association who act as the middleman. 
14. The Acquirer pays the merchant. 
  
 ADDITIONAL PROCESS IF THERE IS REPUDIATION OR FRAUD 
15. The Cardholder contacts his card issuer (financial institution) to deny having 
placed the order, or if the goods received are not as described on the website, 
(This usually occur when cardholder notice an irregular debit on his account 
statement). 
16. The Card Issuer opens an investigation into the transaction through the card 
association by filing a dispute. 
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17. The Acquirer contacts the merchant and requests for a proof that the legitimate 
cardholder actually placed the order, (this is usually a request of a signed proof of 
payment). In most cases, the merchant cannot provide a signed agreement 
because the purchase was made online, and this results in the Acquirer debiting 
the merchant account in a process called chargeback, which sometimes includes a 
chargeback administration charge. 
 
Table 5: Legend of e-commerce transaction flowchart 
2.5 Electronic commerce: pros and cons to businesses 
Businesses now do not need to make expensive investment in setting up retail shops on 
the high street and recruiting employees to manage different department of the shop. 
Rather shops are represented online by putting some webpages together, adding some 
products and the shop is open for business, the job that would have been done by staff is 
handled automatically by technology or managed by staff working from home. Electronic 
commerce also reduces the cost and time of processing, distributing and making 
information and products available where and when it is needed, businesses is open to 
sell their goods and services anywhere in the world and can operate from the comfort of 
their homes. 
Despite the benefits of electronic commerce, it has some technological and non-
technological limitations that have impacted on the growth and acceptance of electronic 
commerce. Selling entirely online means that the seller must also have corresponding 
electronic method to accept payment online, and in most events where a cardholder denies 
having placed an order or payment online, the card issuer files a chargeback to the 
merchant’s acquirer who consequently revises the transaction and debits the merchant 
irrespective of if the merchant has already delivered the goods. Cardholders often deny 
having made payment online in some scenario where their card details where stolen and 
used online without their knowledge to place fraudulent order.  
Other limitations includes non-availability of globally accepted security standards, legal 
and ethical issues, acceptable system security, and trust; while the non-technological 
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limitation includes the consumer perception of the insecurity and trust of electronic 
commerce which affects many consumers to shop online (Anumba & Ruikar, 2002). 
2.6 The electronic commerce pros and cons to consumers 
According to Rainer and Cegielski (2011), electronic commerce technology has provided 
enormous benefits to mankind by placing national and international markets at the 
doorstep of every household: easily reached and accessed from anywhere and anytime, 
consumers do not need to be in the shop physically to buy their needs, goods and services 
can be purchased and paid for entirely online and have it delivered to the consumers’ 
doorsteps.  
Goods and services are easily searched for using the search engines, consumers do not 
need to parade through the streets to search for required goods or services from shop to 
shop, and by using the internet consumers can search, find, buy and get it delivered 
without leaving his location. Electronic commerce saves consumers the time and cost of 
transportation to shop locations - one could imagine the time, risk and cost to travel from 
United Kingdom to Japan simply to purchase an item.  
Despite these benefits, electronic commerce is a double-edged sword as it also has range 
of disadvantages to the consumer. The cardholder making payment remotely is worried 
because his card details could be stolen online to commit fraud or concerned about placing 
an order with a fraudulent online merchant or criminal who actually will not deliver the 
purchased goods or services. 
Shopping online does not allow the buyer to feel the real physical goods, rather goods are 
represented with electronic photographs and they might not appear in real life as they 
look on the photograph. Other disadvantages includes delivery time which can take some 
time as opposed to buying and taking your goods with you instantly (Aguoru, 2007). 
2.7 Electronic Commerce payment systems 
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According to Aguoru (2007) the more e-commerce activities is completed entirely on a 
remote network, the more it has its full claim as electronic commerce, and to support the 
buying and selling of goods and services completely done on the internet, buyers should 
have a means of sending payment electronically from a remote and anonymous location 
over the network and the sellers also should have the corresponding system to accept such 
an electronic payment as a means of exchange of value.  
This raise a great concern of the level of security that exists in each phase of the process 
because money and goods are transferred without any physical contact of the buyer and 
the seller and the slightest recognition of the possibility of the absence of security, trust, 
confidence and adaptability in the payment system weakens the process thereby creating 
adverse impact on the e-commerce infrastructure, hence, several key factors must be 
assessed and considered before payment system is accepted or deployed, these key factors 
includes, Technology, Economic, Social, Institutional and Regulatory (Kuo, et al., 2002). 
 
Electronic payment systems evolve comparably with the evolution of e-commerce, giving 
rise to the institution and advancement of different electronic payment methods by many 
organisations who issue them with a promise and agreement to exchange them with a 
legal tender, such as, (electronic money or e-money, e-gold, digital money, digital cash 
and e-Vouchers), Credit and Debit Card, Electronic Cheques, and Store Values. However 
their sources are rooted in the traditional payment method used in face to face payment: 
for instance cash, cheque, bank transfer and credit or debit card which remain the first 
and dominant use of e-commerce payment systems.  
 
Features Credit Card 
Debit Card 
E-money/ e-
cash 
Electronic 
Cheque 
Store Value 
Place of Use Online and offline Online Online Online/Offline 
Data required Card and 
personal details 
Account ID Bank Account 
No/Cheque No 
Card details 
Data Format Static Static Static Static 
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Issuers Financial 
Institutions 
Operators Banks Store 
Acceptability 60 10 12 18 
Anonymity Partially and 
Entirely  
Entirely Partially and 
Entirely 
Partially and 
Entirely 
Merchant 
Acquiring 
Yes No Yes No 
 
Table 6: Characteristics of electronic payment systems 
 
2.7.1 Electronic payment card system 
Payment card is the most popular and dominant of electronic payment systems in today’s 
e-commerce, tracing its root more than 100 years ago when consumers and businesses 
dealt with cash, cheques, and non-electronic courtesy cards issued in a paper form 
specifically for entertainment and holiday, until 1966 when Bank of America Service 
Corporation established a general purpose card later renamed to Visa and other banks 
formed the Interbank Card Association as a competitor and later renamed as MasterCard. 
Both Associations remain the dominant operator of card networks (Baxter, 1983). 
Other card associations or payment networks includes; American Express, Paymenex 
TransNET, Discover Network, JCB, Diners Club, and many more. Which continue to 
evolve with different features and innovations, in line with technology advancement.  
The popularity of the internet and electronic commerce have greatly influenced the radical 
changes. From the manual payment card to electronic payment card, a payment card is a 
method of holding financial account data electronically in a piece of cardboard paper, or 
plastic in a format readable or accessible by payment processing systems when making 
electronic payment. Such method is acceptable by merchants as a method of exchange of 
values. 
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Following the trend of technology, methods of holding the financial account data on a 
piece of card continue to grow from manual laser printed and encoded magnetic strip data, 
to chip-based smart contact, contactless or proximity cards, making it more flexible and 
convenient for consumers to access their funds anywhere and anytime. 
In a payment card transaction, the physical cash note or coin is not exchanged, but the 
data stored in the payment card is used to access cash value in a form of electronic money 
and exchanged electronically through a computer network remotely or face to face. It is 
because such electronic data has the feature of unlimited replication through electronic 
channel, this makes payment card vulnerable to misuse and impersonation.  
2.7.1.1  Types of payment card 
Different types and features exists in electronic payment cards in circulation following 
the boom of electronic commerce, but the most widely used types of card are largely 
dominated by the payment cards operated on the Visa and MasterCard networks. 
Credit card: This type of card is issued by financial institution with features to offers a 
line of credit to their customers, which allow them to pay for goods and services online 
or offline in store with a repayment plan, and interest calculated on the annual percentage 
rate. In some cases cardholders can be allowed to withdraw cash from Automated Teller 
Machine (ATM) at the payment of surcharge. Both cardholder and merchant pay more to 
use or accept payment made with this type of card. 
Debit card: This type of card is issued by banks and usually linked to a traditional bank 
account allowing the bank account holder to spend from a bank account balance, it is free 
to use for payment especially when paying within the country, and cost less to merchants 
to accept payment made with this type of card. The Debit card initiative was launched in 
United Kingdom in 1987 and developed as a more convenient alternative to traditional 
cheque payment. Since cardholders can access money or manage bank accounts at any 
ATM accepting the brand anywhere in the world (Anderson, 2008). 
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Prepaid card: This type of card is prepaid with certain limit and can be reloaded and 
used to make payment, or withdraw cash from ATM. This type of card is usually for 
people who do not have access to credit or debit cards or travellers. 
Store value and gift cards: This type of card is issued by chain or departmental store 
operators and accepted specifically in their store. It is used as a marketing strategy to keep 
customers coming back and can only be used to buy goods or pay for services. Most store 
value and gift cards cannot be used at ATM for cash withdrawal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Format of a Credit or Debit Card (APACS, 2005) 
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Figure 8: Format of a Dinners Club and American Express Card (APACS, 2005) 
 
2.8 Card-not-present fraud in e-commerce transaction 
According to the Nilson Report (HSN Consultants Inc., 2013), world card payment 
transactions hit a total of £13,823 trillion pounds in 2012, with an estimated 11.4% 
increase from the previous year, and the fraud losses from this volume in same year hit 
£7.21 billion also having an estimated 14.6% increase from 2011. Within this total losses 
card issuers suffered 63%, while acquirers and merchants lost the other 37% which are 
significant to payment made through the card-not-present transactions channel and this 
has increased the overall fraud losses as percentage of volume.  
Approximately 50% of European internet users do to not usually agree to shop or make 
card payments online because they believe that their card and personal information will 
not be adequately protected by the online vendor, and a recent survey conducted by Visa 
on 15 financial Institutions in the European Union confirmed that card-not-present 
transaction on the internet accounts for almost half of all complaints and fraud reports 
(Philippsohn & Thomas, 2003). 
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The European Union’s law enforcement agency (Europol) similarly reported that card-
not-present transactions in the European Union accounts for 60% of all types of card fraud 
valued at 900 million euros (Europol, 2012). 
There has been significant global growth in card payment transactions where neither the 
card nor the cardholder is present at the point of sale, generally referred to as ‘card-not-
present’ (CNP). Such as, online, telephone and fax card payments, as the number of online 
buyers continues to soar, unexpectedly, the accompanying identity theft and card fraud 
also continue to have equivalent growth, as the technology continues to become more 
flexible, compact and complex. 
According a recent report (Europol, 2012), card details are the perfect unlawful product 
of the internet because they can be electronically transferred and replicated, and criminals 
have benefited from this information digitalization which offer them low risk but 
profitable criminal activities, motivated by the nature of card-not-present transaction 
usage especially the authentication. 
Authentication and authorisation in card-not-present transaction only verifies the 
correctness of the card details, as opposed to the authentication and authorisation of card 
payment made when the card and the cardholder is physically present at the point of sale, 
which verifies the personal characteristics of the card and cardholder. 
The ability to verify that the card information submitted over a remote network is done 
by the legitimate cardholder therefore remains the authentication goal and a huge problem 
to all merchants who are accepting card-not-present payment, and this has resulted in a 
high level of migration of card fraud operations from the “card present” environment 
which appears to be more complex and difficult due to chip and pin technology to “card-
not-present” where process is very flexible and the risk-level very low (Hunter, 2006). 
Accordingly to Anderson (2008), the potentials of the internet anonymity, complexity of 
internet tools, flaws in card fraud solutions and low level of compliance with 
fundamentals of card authentication, integrity and non-repudiation as the key essentials 
to e-commerce security created a low-risk and flexible channel for many fraudsters to 
carry out identity theft and impersonation which facilitates the placement of fraudulent 
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orders with merchants who operates remotely, main aim includes to exploit these low risk 
and flexible avenues to carry on their fraudulent activities for financial gain, (Hunter, 
2004).  
The process and method of card-not-present authentication used in attempt to legitimately 
identify ourselves during online transaction is still a long established problem and the 
related vulnerabilities have increasingly been exploited by fraudsters. Ironically, the chip 
and Pin technology has been seen as secure a authentication tool to protect cardholder at 
the point of sale using PIN verification system, but this trend has its drawbacks and 
problems. Specifically, a rise in the instances of fraud occurring in card-not-present 
scenarios such as online, phone and mail order purchases which is continuously posing a 
tremendous threat to participants for several years, and regrettably, the chip and pin 
technology has done nothing to combat this type of fraud (Furnell, 2006). 
Card-not-present fraud is understood to be the biggest type of card fraud ever in the 
history of card payment and the consequences are building up into a perceptible impact 
on transacting parties and the world economy. 
The accounted development of card-not-present fraud in leading economies over the past 
years, and the associated impacts outstretched the need for a feasible framework or 
solution because it has raised persistent concern and dissatisfaction among the merchants 
and cardholders to doubt the robustness, flexibility and benefits of electronic commerce. 
2.8.1 Card-not-present fraud losses in Australia 
The location of Australia is somehow said to be isolated from the prying eyes of card 
fraud taking place in other parts of the world, however, with trend of information and 
communication technology which enables electronic transactions and payments through 
the computer network, Australia is no longer privileged. Rather, card fraud has become a 
huge problem for Australian law enforcement agencies (Smith, 1997). 
According the Australian Institute of Criminology (2011) credit card fraud increased 
approximately 70% since 2006 valued at $56,512,389 Australian Dollars and 
$110,500,699 in 2009. 
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Year / 
Category 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 Rate 
 No A$ No A$ No A$ No A$ 
Aust Card 150,646 39,959,984 220,053 63,491,661 332,396 2,162,968 121% 106% 
O/S Card 47,795 16,552,405 79,929 25,131,480 110,065 28,337,731 130% 71% 
Total 198,441 56,512,389 287,896 88,623,141 442,461 110,500,699 123% 96% 
 
Table 7: Australia Card-not-present fraud 2006 – 2009 (Smith, n.d.) 
 
 
Figure 9: Australia Plastic Card Fraud by Type 2009 (Smith, n.d.) 
The Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) reported a surge in card-not-
present transactions up to 2010 where an estimated $100 million Australian dollars has 
been defrauded through card-not-present transaction, which currently account for over 
50% of other types of card fraud. 
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In a recent release (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2013) card fraud in 
Australia show a year-on-year drop for the first time in 2012, card-not-present fraud 
dropped by 8% and this drop is attributed to the increase in the use of the 3D Secure – 
MasterCard SecureCode and Verified by Visa. 
 
 
Figure 10: Australian Scheme Credit, Debit and Charge Card Fraud 2012 (Australian 
Payments Clearing Association, 2013) 
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Figure 11: Fraud per every $1,000 transacted on Australian payment card (Australian 
Payments Clearing Association, 2013) 
 
2.8.2 Card-not-present Fraud losses in Canada 
According to the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (2013), Card-not-present fraud is 
recognised as one of the developing card fraud types in Canada and in 2011 the Canadian 
Banking Association (CBA) reported that the card-not-present fraud accounted for $259, 
498.535.00 showing an increase from the previous year, while 2012 also shown a 3.50% 
increase from 2011. 
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Figure 12: Credit Card Fraud losses in Canada 2011-12 (Canadian Anti-Fraud 
Centre, 2013) 
 
2.8.3 Card-not-present fraud losses in United States 
United States generates 23.5% of the world’s card payment transaction volume, even 
though it still accounts for 47.3% of world’s card payment fraud losses. The majority of 
this can be attributed to the absence of chip and pin technology, hence, fraudsters 
counterfeit payment cards to defraud merchants at card present environment, and because 
the United States is leading in buying, selling and accepting card payment online, it also 
record the highest volume of card-not-present losses (HSN Consultants Inc., 2013). 
2.9 Card-not-present fraud losses in United Kingdom 
According to APACS (2012) lost and stolen type of card fraud has been the highest 
problem and pressing card fraud in United Kingdom within the 1990s when e-commerce 
technology was still at its infancy, and the number of people buying online was very low. 
However, in 2004 the fraudulent activities and losses arising from the card-not-present 
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transaction surged and overtook other types of card fraud and established itself as the 
more important type of card fraud with the value of losses having a continuous annual 
increase until 2009. 
 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of Card fraud losses split by types (APACS, 2010) 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Percentage of Card fraud losses split by types (APACS, 2012) 
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The following table presents the analysis of card-not-present fraud losses in United 
Kingdom from 1995 to 2012: 
FRAUD TYPE YEAR LOSSES (in million Pounds) Rate % 
Card-not-present 2014 479.0 +6% 
Card-not-present 2013 450.4 +16% 
Card-not-present 2012 245.8 +11% 
Card-not-present 2011 220.9 -03% 
Card-not-present 2010 226.9 -15% 
Card-not-present 2009 266.4 -19% 
Card-not-present 2008 328.4 +13% 
Card-not-present 2007 290.5 +37% 
Card-not-present 2006 212.7 +16% 
Card-not-present 2005 183.2 +21% 
Card-not-present 2004 150.8 +24% 
Card-not-present 2003 112.1 +11% 
Card-not-present 2002 110.1 +15% 
Card-not-present 2001 95.7 +31% 
Card-not-present 2000 72.9 +149% 
Card-not-present 1999 29.3 +115% 
Card-not-present 1998 13.6 +36% 
Card-not-present 1997 10.0 +54% 
Card-not-present 1996 6.5 +41% 
Card-not-present 1995 4.6 84% 
 
Table 8: Card-not-present fraud losses on UK-issued cards – 1995 - 2014 (APACS, 
2005); (Financial Fraud Action UK, 2014). 
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Figure 15: Card-not-present fraud losses on UK-issued cards 2002-2012 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Card-not-present fraud losses on UK –issued cards 2004 - 2014 
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According to the Financial Fraud Action UK (2009) Card-not-present fraud losses have 
been on annual increase for 13 years non-stop, Hence, from approximately £4.6 million 
in 1995 to a staggering £328.4 million in 2008, and it is responsible for about 65% of all 
types of card frauds in United Kingdom, but these losses have to be understood in the 
perspective of a high level of growth in card-not-present spending over the past ten years, 
especially over the internet. 
2.9.1 Card-not-present fraud level controversy 
It is been claimed over the past five years that card-not-present fraud dropped for 
successive years in the United Kingdom between 2009 and 2011, and the UK Card 
Association claimed that the reasons behind what is perceived to be a continuous decrease 
includes, the increasing use of sophisticated fraud screening detection tools by retailers 
and banks, as well as the growth in the use of American Express SafeKey, MasterCard 
SecureCode, and Verified by Visa, by both online retailers and cardholders (Financial 
Fraud Action UK, 2009) 
In another review the Australian Payments Clearing Association (2013) also confirmed 
that card-not-present fraud losses dropped by 8% in 2012 following the increase in the 
use of the 3D Secure solutions provided by the card association. 
In United Kingdom, in 2009 probably opened the door for good news as card-not-present 
transaction fraud losses experienced its first reduction in 13 years with a 19% fall from 
2008, while the year 2010 and 2011 further recorded a 15% and 03% fall respectively, 
however, the percentage of these reductions reflected a diminishing result compared to 
the level of reduction in 2010, but this was overlooked, surprisingly, card-not-present 
returned back again with an 11% increase in 2012 from 2011 (Financial Fraud Action 
UK, 2013). 
Today, “Fraud the Fact” report published by Financial Fraud Action UK (2014) shows 
that; the annual incremental losses from card-not-present fraud in the United Kingdom 
has recorded what is seen as the third consecutive year of increase. 
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Even though it was reported that the increase in the use of the 3D secure influenced the 
level of card-not-present fraud reduction, it should also be recognised that the 3D Secure 
solution has been around for the past 10 years, and while it has been in use since then, it 
failed to sufficiently reduce the card-not-present fraud. Adding that criminals exploited 
the static data vulnerabilities in 3D Secure which made it virtually impossible to shield 
from threat of phishing attack.  
On the other hand, according to a survey (Network Security, 2000) by a UK credit rating 
agency – Experian, it is believed that only 57% of businesses reports occurrences of credit 
card fraud, meaning that 43% of credit card fraud occurrences are not reported or taken 
into account. 
Nonetheless, in a recent review of E-finance & payments, Law & Policy (2012), the 
incidence of card-not-present fraud losses have fallen in the past few years, but this might 
be misleading, despite the fact that the statistics might be seen as encouraging and a fact 
to claim that card-not-present fraud solution has been finally achieved.  
However, what appears as a problem solved is simply a camouflaged weakness, and the 
less reassuring reality of card-not-present solutions, because numerous indirect factors 
that affected the trend of card-not-present transaction in the recent years following 
technology advancement were not recognised in the report. 
Despite other factors that may have caused the reduction of the card-not-present fraud in 
United Kingdom, the recent 11% increase in card-not-present fraud in 2012 confirms that 
the review of E-finance & payments, Law & Policy (2012) might be accurate and a 
remarkable warning to merchants selling online about an unresolved problems of card-
not-present fraud. 
2.9.2 Undisclosed factors behind the drop in card-not-present fraud losses  
This research analysed the undisclosed key contributors to the recent reduction in card-
not-present fraud in the following classes. 
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2.9.2.1 Aggressive measures of handling card-not-present transactions 
Card issuers and financial institutions have been taking drastic and radicalized measures 
in the verification and declining of transactions, especially transactions happening outside 
the United Kingdom and this results in only 10% of declined transactions being actually 
fraudulent. Obviously this stultified strategy to card-not-present fraud reduction may 
indeed reduce fraud and impact on the statistics of fraud losses, but it is also causing great 
dissatisfaction to cardholders, affecting the interest in electronic commerce card payment, 
loss of revenue to participants, and cost the card issuers in administrative resources (E-
finance & payments, Law & Policy, 2012).  
2.9.2.2 Introduction of Alternative Payments 
For decades payment card has been the primary and dominant method of online payment. 
The benefit of making payment without carrying cash and accepting payment instantly 
and remotely from anywhere in the world without the need for a face to face interaction 
contributed to its success. However, in recent years, merchants and customers are shifting 
to alternative payment methods. The primary reason for this movement are security 
concerns with online card-not-present payment, access to merchant account services 
which enables merchants to accept card payment transactions, and high fees or charges. 
In research about securing online credit card payment (Hwang, et al., 2003), 
approximately 60% of adults in United States of America do not usually transact on the 
web because of privacy and security reasons, even though it is claimed that 93% of 
payment is done through credit card. However, the Information Technology Association 
in their own findings confirmed that 74% of United States residents believe that their 
personal information could be stolen when used online during card payment. 
 And the same conception is perceived by 50% of European internet users who would not 
want to use their card and personal details online for fear of the unknown (Philippsohn & 
Thomas, 2003). 
Alternative payment methods such as Paymenex, ACH, xWallet, PayPal and Skrill have 
taken precautions from the concern of consumers in online card payment and 
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implemented a different concept of alternative payment method that protects personal 
information, while many alternative payment methods use credit or debit cards as funding 
source, but the card and personal information are provided once during initial setup and 
verification. Once verified, the customer can continue to make payments online without 
entering his personal or card details in subsequent online payment, other alternative 
payments are totally introducing a “no credit or debit card payment” alternative, but 
funding to the payment account is through cash payment at agent locations or through a 
cash payment networks. 
There are several reasons for the introduction of alternative payment methods and the 
phenomenon varies and depends on political, economic, social and ethnic backgrounds, 
some of the common reasons are as follows: 
Security and identity theft  
Most card payment methods still rely on collecting sensitive personal and card 
information online. The level of personal information that payment processors or 
gateways collects varies, sometime, date of birth and bank account information are 
requested in a bid to strengthen the authentication. However, most customers are reluctant 
to give away their card and personal information online for fear of fraud and identity theft. 
Therefore, prefer to pay with alternative method where personal and sensitive information 
will not be revealed during online payment. Oddly, Paymenex Panama LLC (2013) 
reassuring its customers of online payment with Paymenex card stressed that “Customers 
do not need to enter the names of their ancestors to pay online”. 
For the past few years the process of not asking customers to enter their personal details 
online has been seen as a competitive advantage for payment service providers who do 
not always ask customers to enter their personal information and at the same time have 
their own strategic framework to authenticate customers online. 
Card-not-present fraud losses and chargeback risk  
The merchants are becoming weary of online fraud since most accounted online card 
fraud are pushed to them, hence, merchant seek low-risk and secure alternative to accept 
payment online. 
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Bespoke payment methods 
Merchants prefer to have as many methods of payment as possible to be able to reach out 
to more customers and increase their sales, especially those who cannot get their own 
debit or credit card can choose to pay with alternative payment methods, this is a common 
trend for merchants selling internationally who usually seek to provide payment method 
that is local and accessible to all classes of customers, irrespective of the geographical 
locations. 
Access to Merchant Account 
Many merchants cannot be able to open their own merchant accounts to enable them 
accept card payment. This problem is usually affected by bad credit reports, geographical 
location, or the selling of prohibited products. 
So merchants in this situation seek for alternative methods to accept payment.  
No Credit and Debit Card Solution 
Problems of credit cards are enormous, these includes: chargebacks, fraudulent 
transactions, no guarantee of processed payment, high processing fee, merchant account 
fee, deferred settlement of processed payment. Therefore payment service providers try 
to implement alternative payment methods that will reduce the listed problems as much 
as possible to give them a competitive edge. 
Source of Revenue 
Processing payment and helping online sellers to accept payment electronically is a 
business model with many revenue channels, businesses can start their own business 
operations as a payment service provider with prime objectives to process or facilitate 
electronic payments and impose processing, refund, setup fees or gain from providing 
foreign exchange if providing services in multi-currency. 
Flexible payment option for customers 
Adding several alternative payment methods to an online shopping cart system offers the 
customers the opportunity to choose from a variety of payment alternatives instead of 
forcing customers to stick to card payment. Basically, a company is providing alternative 
payment services if they allow customers to pay and be paid through computer systems, 
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and within recent years the number of alternative payment service providers has increased 
significantly with different processes and concepts of processing payment. Some of the 
alternative payment providers are shown on the following table. 
 
Paymenex Ukash 
Skrill MTN Money 
Airtel Money PayPal 
Sofort iDeal 
Sporopay WebMoney 
Giropay BPay 
xWallet CashU 
Alertpay Direct Debit 
Astropay ELV 
Bitcoin Zong 
Mi-Pay Text2Pay 
TigoCash PayForIt 
 
Table 9: Alternative Payment Providers 
 
2.10 Causes of card-not-present fraud 
This research classifies the causes of card-not-present fraud into three main categories 
that are inspired by a range of motivating factors.  
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2.10.1 Identity Theft 
Identity theft has received many definitions from different people and in different context, 
but most can be streamlined to two words: “stealing” and “impersonation”.  
According to Matejkovic & Lahey (2001) identity theft is defined “as the obtaining and 
use of another individual’s personal identifying information such as names, date of birth, 
social security numbers, card and account information to obtain access to that individual’s 
account or credit, or to establish new accounts or credit in the victim’s name without his 
involvement or knowledge, and the use of those accounts and/or credit to obtain goods 
and/or services”. In another context, Gonzales & Majoras (2007) argued that, “Identity 
theft is the misuse of another individual’s personal information to commit fraud”.  
Archer, et al., (2012) defined identity theft as “the unauthorized collection, possession, 
transfer, replication, or other manipulation of another person’s personal information”. 
Identity theft also means stealing with intent to impersonate and commit fraud without 
victim’s consent or knowledge.  
Eisenstein (2008) said that the perception of identity theft is new and many researchers 
have called for more research on the topic, however, the research of Hoffman & 
McGinley (2010) and Kaminsky (2000) confirmed that the history of identity theft can be 
traced back in sixth century BC to the biblical story of twin brothers named Jacob and 
Esau born to the family of Isaac and Rebecca, but the news that Jacob was to inherit 
Isaac’s wealth motivated Rebecca to take advantage of Isaac’s bad eyes sight by devising 
a strategy and presenting Esau to impersonate Jacob with hairy look purposely to mislead 
Isaac into believing that Esau is Jacob and giving away his inheritance to Esau. The 
parallel with the how the development of the internet technology has made identity theft 
to extend its capabilities electronically is clear. 
Identity theft practices can occur in many contexts, either identity theft by visual and 
physical object representation or digital and electronic information representations. 
Visual and physical objective representation is where people can present themselves or 
object in place of others or other objects, for instance in the biblical story above, Esau 
presented himself to Isaac claiming to be Jacob because Isaac’s bad sight cannot allow 
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him to visually differentiate between Jacob and Esau. This type of identity theft carries 
the highest risk because the impersonator must be present at the scene for a face-to-face 
interaction that exposes the impersonator to physical risk if caught in the act. While the 
digital and electronic information representations involve the use of electronic data to 
impersonate others and require no physical or face-to-face interaction. This type of 
identity theft carries low or no risk because the impersonator can operate remotely from 
an unknown location out of the scene, and this benefit has fuelled and diverted criminals 
to this concept of identity theft thus making identity theft a household name in every 
digital economy. 
This research believes that the background of identity theft discussed by Eisenstein (2008) 
hovered around identity theft by digital and electronic information representation which 
is now the background concept of card-not-present fraud including most impersonations 
carried out online or through electronic systems. 
This research classifies the motivation of identity theft into three main categories: 
Reproducing Identity: This category of identity theft can aim at taking advantage of 
a good attribute of another by reproducing or mimicking the same attribute. For 
instance, in a recent news the UK Border Agency (2013) announced that a Nigerian 
woman without the right permission to live in the United Kingdom had impersonated 
the identity of a Dutch woman in an attempt to fraudulently obtain the right to live in 
the UK and gain employment as a support worker at a UK Care Home. The aim is to 
deceive the employer into believing that she is a Dutch woman with same rights as 
every other European Union citizen, instead of her original identity as a Nigerian 
woman. Motivation of this impersonation can be attributed to obtaining necessary 
immigration permissions and financial interest.  
Financial and Resources Gain: This type of identity theft targets financial 
instruments like card details which are commonly used to commit card-not-present 
fraud by placing illegitimate orders with online merchants. This type of criminal 
activity is the most commonly known motivating factor for identity theft and the 
activity that has contributed to widespread identity theft.  
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Crime: It should also be noted that not all identity theft are intended for financial or 
resource gain, some identity theft can aim at masquerading the legitimate identity to 
commit crime. For instance, Mr. Jones presenting himself as Mr. Philips to commit 
murder, the motivation can be to label Mr. Philips as a murderer or to evade the 
responsibility of murder.  
In a recent research Anderson, et al. (2008) argued that identity theft received radical 
advancement following the recent trend of electronic payment. Buyers and sellers depend 
on data linked electronically to a financial account to buy or sell goods and services 
without seeing each other physically. Therefore, fraudsters adopt many methods to 
capture these data from their victims that they will use fraudulently to imitate the link.  
Identity theft has developed into a household brand with many domains, such as identity 
theft techniques, identity theft technologies and identity theft fraud. This development 
stimulated in the discovery and phenomenon of information technology that relies greatly 
on digital information to accomplish major tasks and its existence has transformed 
information security into a key requirement in computer science. 
Using names and card numbers keyed in with computer input devices is now one of the 
solutions for credible online card payment identification, because every competent person 
in such an area with same information can do same as the bearer.  
Online card-not-present payment depends on data submitted online irrespective of the 
physical appearance of what represents the data, and an e-commerce transaction can be 
completed entirely online this way as opposed to by card present payment which requires 
the physical card, PIN and or signature of the cardholder exchanged in a face-to-face 
environment, and the development of identity theft is driven by this vulnerability. 
In today’s evolving digital world, causes of card-not-present fraud continue to increase 
with the trend and complexity of technology and the learning development of users. 
Fraudsters stole card details of others to commit card-not-present fraud, therefore, there 
will be virtually no card-not-present fraud without an associated identity theft process, as 
internet fraud is growing in complexity and in the level of occurrences, identity theft as a 
major facilitator is expanding in responsiveness.  
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In a recent research, Bohn & Mason (2010) has shown that naming conventions are social 
artefacts suited for the social events, nevertheless, names usually are no longer effective 
to distinguish their bearers among a large community or public because many people will 
respond to the shout of the word “Dad” or common names like “John” or “Smith” in 
public places. At the same time, the adoption of using unique numbers on credit card 
numbers to identify its bearers in online card payment at first makes it meticulously 
unique, but as technology develops, the argument shows that, if knowing card numbers 
is to be evidence that puts any person that knows it as the bearer, then, there must be a 
dynamic method or different secret numbers for every other person to whom one’s 
identity is to be proven at any point in time, because the person to whom one’s identity 
or credit card number is proven to, will know the card number at same point in time which 
automatically makes him also the bearer of the same card number. 
Card details entered on the internet for payment travels through different computer nodes 
from the originating computer or device to the destination server making it vulnerable to 
interception or theft, hence the more a card’s details is used to pay online the more it loses 
its credibility . Many organisation's strategy of information security management is very 
poor and vulnerable, not only in compliance with the security technology trend and 
policy, but in some cases dubious employees pose a great deal of concern in identity theft 
within the organisation, giving rise to high risk of unacceptable information compromise. 
However, salvaging this situation on the card-not-present environment, the cardholder 
needs a different secret number each time he is required to identify himself to the 
merchant because using the card information over and over again to pay online reduces 
the reliability and trust of the card and this forms a major part of the identity theft and 
fraud resulting from online card payment. 
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Figure 17: Flaws in remote Identification with static numbers 
 
If Mr. A is attached to the identity No: 12345 which identify him remotely to Mr. B (i.e. 
merchant), Then Mr. B will know the identity No: 12345 to verify that it is actually Mr. 
A at the point of verification and this automatically put Mr. B as the second bearer of the 
same Identity No: 12345. And if Mr. B so wishes, he can use the identity No: 12345 to 
identify himself to Mr. C that he is Mr. A which will also position Mr. C as the third 
bearer and it can loop infinitely thereby multiplying the bearers of one identity. 
And if Mr. D (i.e. a fraudster) intercepted the communication or is listening to Mr. A 
when he was verifying himself to Mr. B, then, Mr. D will know the identity No: 12345, 
and can use it in another sequence to identify himself as Mr. A to Mr. B and Mr. C. 
In the above illustration, the legitimate identity bearer – Mr. A, made only two 
identification actions to Mr. B on two occasions shown with the green arrows, but three 
additional identification actions were made shown in red arrows, one identification action 
by Mr. B who supposed to be a trusted party in the process and, two by Mr. D, who is a 
thief. Mr. B and Mr. D succeeded with their identification attempts to their other parties 
to impersonate Mr. A commonly because the identification number is static and valid for 
subsequent uses to give chances to Mr. B and Mr. D. 
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The identity No 12345 used in an online environment is in no way a true likeness of the 
bearer, rather it is an artificial identity to represent the bearer on the computer system, 
and as with every other data that can be replicated endlessly, the same identity can be 
replicated to act as an online identity for a million people as long as they are in possession 
of the said identity number. 
Mr. A could have been salvaged supposing the identity No. 12345 was invalidated 
immediately after he completed the first successful identification to Mr. B and replaced 
with a new identity No. 67890. In such a case, Mr. B and Mr. D would have not 
succeeded in their impersonation attempts because they will still be presenting the 
Identity No. 12345 which has been cancelled. 
Identity theft can be accomplished by the application of different forms of stealing, 
whether carried out electronically or manually. Any method deployed to steal the identity 
of another with intent to impersonate automatically becomes a method of identity theft. 
As it is widely accepted that technology is a double-edged sword, it has greatly facilitated 
most of the methods of identity theft used nowadays. 
2.10.1.1 Methods of identity theft and infiltration techniques  
The identity theft types can be classified into two bases, (1) Physical-Low Tech Base theft 
– the thefts that requires physical confrontations, and (2) Technology-High Tech Base – 
the thefts that are done through the use of computer systems. 
 
NO PHYSICAL LOW-TECH TECHNOLOGY HIGH-TECH 
1 Dumpster Diving Phishing 
2 Shoulder Surfing Hacking 
3 Mail Theft Spyware & Trojan 
4 Skimming Pharming 
5 Buying Stolen Data Telephone Scam 
 66 | P a g e  
 
6 Lost and Found Eavesdropping 
7  Bogus E-Commerce Shop 
 
Table 10: Bases classification of identity theft methods 
 
Phishing 
Phishing is a form of technical manipulation and spoofing or social engineering that 
impersonates identity of others to trick users into divulging sensitive information such as 
account and credit card numbers in response to a communication request, commonly by 
email and web link. It is a sort of Internet attack that imitates a legitimate website for the 
purpose of obtaining confidential information of others (Abdelhamid, et al., 2014).  
Identity theft is perceived by criminals and thieves as an extension of the old idea of 
exploitation. In phishing attacks criminals masquerade with the identity of others to fool 
others into spontaneously releasing their sensitive information (Kruegel & Kirda, 2006). 
Phishing attacks are seen as epidemic to internet users and criminals continue to use 
several phishing technologies to trick users into giving out their sensitive information 
(Hamid & Abawajy, 2014). 
The long existing method of phishing is the spam email and web link, but as technology 
advances, more new sophisticated methods of phishing are discovered, for instance the 
server-exploit phishing attack. 
Email and Web-link Phishing 
This is the most common type of phishing, originated from email communication which 
directs the victim to a web link where the fraudsters collect the user’s sensitive 
information. 
In this scenario, the victim will receive a spoofed email purporting to be from a legitimate 
or trusted entity, for example, the bank or credit card company, asking the user to click 
on a web-linked embedded in the email to verify his account information. However, the 
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web-link will redirect the victim to a constructed form which looks exactly the same as 
the legitimate entity. 
Victims who actually have arrangements with the impersonated entity are usually trapped 
because they believe that they are dealing with the legitimate entity. 
 
 
Figure 18: Email or web-link Phishing flowchart 
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Figure 19: Email screenshot Received in 2008 by Kingsley Aguoru 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Web-Link Redirection Page 
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Server-Exploitation Phishing  
Server exploitation is gaining unauthorized access to a server belonging to other entities 
and using it to host malicious software to gather sensitive information, disrupt services or 
commit crime. Cresson Wood (2003) said that the password is the first line of defence 
that can prevent abuse of access to computer systems, while Vu, et al (2007) confirmed 
that username and password offers lesser security than other authentication systems such 
as biometric systems. 
Fraudsters deploy many techniques to capture or reset server access information to enable 
them gain access to the server. 
Criminal Hackers and Crackers 
Hacking is a very broad domain and a practice that takes a lot of time to learn. It has 
several categories of individual concentration, the common categories of hackers include: 
Security experts, Criminal hackers, Script kiddies, Ideological hackers, corporate spies 
and many more. However, among these categories, criminal hackers hack commonly 
because they want to perpetrate theft or cause damage, they include those criminals that 
hacks into the computer systems of several financial institutions and payment processors 
to steal card and personal information (Strebe, 2002). 
According to Computer Fraud & Security (1999), the criminal hackers can also be known 
as the crackers because they use sophisticated technologies to crack passwords and break 
into systems. 
Motivation of criminal hackers’ activities can include curiosity, vandalism, extortion, 
fraud and many more. 
Spyware and Trojan 
According to recent research (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010) spyware and Trojan 
horses are malicious software that targets user’s computer with the intention to collect 
confidential information on the user’s computer without his knowledge. It gives hackers 
access to computer systems and enables them to carry out range of activities in the 
infected computer which includes: stealing of sensitive information, modification, 
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Pharming 
Pharming and Phishing share some characteristics, but they are still two different types 
of identity theft. The Pharming method is more complex; it involves the modification of 
files stored in users’ computers, including website addresses and internet protocols (IP), 
with the intent to redirect them to a different website where information will be collected, 
or where the user is deceived with the presentation of wrong information or notices. It is 
also called domain spoofing (Rodriguez, 2009; Biegelman, 2009). 
This is one of the vulneraibilities of 3D secure, because when a 3D secure authentication 
is invoked and the user is redirected to another site, they often suspect pharming attack 
and in some cases will stop payment. 
Telephone Scam 
Not all cold calls actually intend to do business with your organisation, or offer you a 
consumer service. Some are intended to obtain your confidential information, such as 
card details, by offering you some cheap services and asking you to guarantee it with 
your Debit Card. For instance, by promising to reduce your cost on gas, insurance or 
electricity supply by some percentage, they will inform you that your card will not be 
charged now to increase your confidence. 
Eavesdropping 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines eavesdrop as “secretly listen to a conversation”, 
and in the context of identity theft, criminals physically or remotely listen to users’ 
conversations on the telephone or internet - for instance, while making a card payment 
over the telephone in a public place, or on the web by sniffing through the network and 
intercepting the communication in transit. 
Dumpster Diving or Bin Raiding 
Some methods of identity theft are self-created, some fraudsters are interested in 
searching through the bin at residential homes or offices for useful personal information. 
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 In recent research (Zhang & Li, 2005) fraudsters targets customers’ bins for credit card 
information with the intent to commit crime because many residents do not use paper 
shredders at home or take sufficient further steps to make sure they destroyed all 
unwanted banking or financial documents beyond recognition. 
Bank account and credit card statements contains full name, address, account numbers 
and balances of the account holder and when disposed into the bin without adequately 
destroying the ability to recognise the information, it automatically poses a threat to self-
caused identity theft and becomes a handy tool for the fraudsters to commit identity theft.  
 As Biegelman (2009) said, “Enterprising criminals were more than willing to "get down 
and dirty" in the trash looking for and often finding valuable information” 
Shoulder Surfing 
“Who is watching you from behind?” it has been a known advice from financial 
institutions to their customers, to cover the visibility of their transaction on the Automatic 
Teller Machines (ATM) while they input their PIN to authenticate themselves, or while 
entering their card details on the internet in a public place. According to (Huston, 2009), 
shoulder surfing is a method of identity theft that is concerned with the direct observation 
of one’s activities, with the intent to copy confidential information.  
The value added feature of smartphone camera introduced within the recent years has 
been seen as beneficial and a handy tool to capture information and events without much 
preparation, on the other hand, it has served as a handy tool to shoulder surfers to take 
snap shots or record sensitive information from their victim activities. 
Mail Theft or Redirection 
This type of identity theft aims to steal letters from postal delivery box by fraudulently 
applying for post office mail redirection service using the identity of others. The aim is 
to redirect and then read mails of their intended victim in search of sensitive information 
for fraudulent activities. Residents who are moving homes are the most vulnerable to this 
type of identity theft. 
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Skimming and Scanning 
The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2013) said that “Card skimming 
is the illegal copying of information from the magnetic strip of a credit or ATM card. It 
is a more direct version of a phishing scam”. 
Criminals use pocket-sized skimming devices to record card information of their victims. 
The information stolen in this way is used to produce fake credit cards for fraudulent 
activities (Biegelman, 2009). 
Lost and Found 
Just because many criminals have turned to technology to steal personal information and 
sensitive data does not mean that the old style has vanished. Some low-tech fraudsters 
still rely on pickpocketing and physical theft to steal personal information especially 
information contained in mobile devices, laptops, wallets and diaries. Misplaced personal 
information can also be found by a criminal: lost and found card and bank account 
information has been a self-caused easy access to identity theft (Biegelman, 2009). 
Buying Stolen Data 
Some criminal hackers concentrate on finding ways to hack into the system of financial 
institutions or payment services providers in search of active credit card numbers to steal. 
Their intentions include obtaining card information and selling them to other criminals 
who will carry out the actual fraudulent transactions. For example, in the United States, 
vulnerabilities in CardSystem Inc. caused a hacker to access over forty million credit card 
information (Computer Fraud & Security, 2005, p. 1). 
Bogus E-Commerce Shop 
Just as the cardholders are unwilling to provide their card information to an online 
merchant for payment because they believed their card information might be stolen by 
the merchant, some bogus merchants can offer their products at very low prices to attract 
online shoppers to their website to place orders; however, once the order is placed and 
card information received, the bogus merchant will notify the online shopper that the item 
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ordered is no longer in stock meanwhile the customer’s card information has been 
received and ready to be used fraudulently. 
2.10.2 Growth of Internet Users 
Aside from the causes attributed to identity theft and the vulnerabilities or flaws that exist 
in the card-not-present payment process, the number of card holders shopping online has 
seen rapid growth in parallel with the evolution of e-commerce technologies. 
According to the Office for National Statistics (2010), household internet access in the 
United Kingdom developed rapidly and accounted for 73% of UK households in 2010. 
75% of users’ activities on the internet are finding information about goods and services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: UK household internet access 2006 to 2010 (Office for National Statistics, 
2010) 
 
Year Per 
cent 
No of Households 
(millions) 
Percentage change on 
previous year 
2006 57 14.3 - 
2007 61 15.2 7 
2008 65 16.5 8 
2009 70 18.3 11 
2010 73 19.2 5 
2011 77 -- 8 
2012 80  3 
2013 83  3 
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Figure 22: UK Household internet access 2006 to 2010 (Ofcom, 2011) 
 
As more business operations continue to shift to the internet for various operational 
reasons, the value of online card payment and associated fraud losses continue to soar 
thereby increasing the vulnerability of e-commerce participants and the exploitation of 
identity theft technologies in a bid to steal card information. According to (APACS, 
2010), there has been a tremendous growth of card-not-present spending by consumers in 
recent years as a result of the evolution of e-commerce and growth of internet users in 
United Kingdom. 
2.10.3 Exploitation of Trust among parties 
The anonymity of the internet has affected the level of trust that exists among the e-
commerce parties because there is an absence of physical contact. In recent research 
(Palvia, 2009), the background of a long-term business relationship in online business 
transactions is built around trust. The absence of trust is a high level warning that must 
not be ignored because trust is one of the important factors in establishing a reputable 
online relationship. 
Internet technology has developed its features and capabilities as a major factor and key 
for the introduction and trend of e-commerce. However, this development could be 
adversely meaningless and a threat in some greater level if there is no acceptable level of 
trust among all entities involved in e-commerce. The existence of an ineffective trust 
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relationship is one of the factors that can cripple e-commerce development (Ahmad, 
2008). 
The problem of trust in e-commerce plits opinion. While some are finding ways to 
improve the trusts to boost e-commerce acceptability, a recent study (Xu, et al., 2008), 
has contradicted this belief and argued that trust is not on its own sufficient to enhance e-
commerce acceptability, but suggest that parties look for a new method. 
In a review of trust in an e-commerce context (Nieschwietz & Kaplan, 2003) state that, 
“trust refers to a consumer’s willingness (the trustor) to give Web sites (the trustee) 
personal and financial information in exchange for goods or services and promises to 
follow stated policies and procedures”.  
2.10.4 Flaws in card-not-present systems and solutions 
As with the popular belief that no technology is 100% secure, the little insecurity of such 
technology could be thwarted and exploited by fraudsters for many reasons. In a recent 
report (Nirshan, 2000), the same systems that created good and new opportunities for e-
commerce have also created new opportunities for online fraud. 
Many technologies have been developed as solutions to secure online payment during e-
commerce transaction. However, no technology has effectively prevented the fraud 
resulting from online card payment. 
2.10.4.1 The CVV and the AVS  
The Card Verification Values (CVV) and the Address Verification System (AVS) was 
developed by the card association to create an authentication process in online card 
payment as fraud threats heightened. The CVV aimed to verify the 3 or 4 digits on the 
reverse of the card, while the AVS is set to verify the numeric values of the billing 
address. 
However, the CVV and the AVS verification did not raise merchants’ trust because both 
are as flawed as every other piece of static information used repeatedly online: they are 
vulnerable to all types of identity theft. As with the card number, the CVV and AVS do 
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not change frequently, and such changes mostly occur during moving home or card 
replacement. Without any of these, they remain the validation integer for the CVV and 
AVS until such a time the address or card change (Card Technology Today, 2002). 
This research also found that the Address Verification System is not widely used in all 
card-not-present environments, so the added validation of this value will not be taken into 
account in card-not-present channels that failed to implement this additional verification 
parameter. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: CVV and AVS Validation Flowchart (Aguoru, 2007) 
 
The integer 456 165 12 represents the CVV and AVS of the cardholder and is used during 
card-not-present transactions as an additional feature to verify the cardholder. However, 
the static nature of the CVV and AVS place them in the same threat category as the card 
information. The CVV and AVS remain 45616512 until such a time the card is replaced 
or the cardholder’s billing address changed: in the event of any identify theft incidence, 
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for instance, phishing, spyware, or hacking, the stolen information remain valid for the 
criminals to commit card-not-present fraud (Aguoru, 2007). 
2.10.4.2 Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) 
The Secure Electronic Transaction, popularly known as SET, is open encryption and 
security to protect credit card payment promoted by VISA and MasterCard designed to 
restore trust among e-commerce participants.  
SET’s main strength is the use of cryptographic protocols and dual signatures to assure 
confidentiality, maintain payment integrity and authenticate participants.  
The six core participants of SET are:  
The Cardholder buying on the internet.  
The Merchant selling on the internet.  
The Acquirer processing card transactions for merchants. 
The Payment Gateway - an interim processor working on behalf of the merchant and the 
acquirer in processing transaction messages. 
The Issuer who issued the card to cardholder.  
The Certification Authority - which provides cryptographic certifications for the 
cardholder, merchant and payment gateway to assure that they participated in the 
transaction. 
The Secure Electronic Transaction protocol addressed the following problems in card-
not-present transaction. 
Integrity and Confidentiality of Information: Secure Electronic Transactions assure 
the integrity of information across the network by ensuring that payment and order 
information is not altered. To maintain the trust of cardholders in card-not-present 
transactions it is important to ensure that the credit card information travelling over the 
network is protected and received by the intended recipient by the use of digital signature 
and certificate. 
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Cardholder and Merchant Authentication: buying and selling over a remote network 
without seeing each other reduces trust among the buyer and the seller. SET use certificate 
authority to reassure the cardholder that the merchant is authorised by the financial 
institution to accept credit card payment for orders, and on the other hand, the merchant 
is reassured that the cardholder is authorised to use the credit card account by the use of 
a digital signature and certificate. 
According to (Kahate, 2003) and (Manzoor, 2008), assuming the three parties are in 
possession of digital signatures and certificates issued by the Certification Authority, a 
Secure Electronic Transaction would have the following sequence. 
Cardholder (Ordering Process): The Cardholder’s credit card details forms the 
Payment Information (PI) and the Order details form the Order Information (OI) and 
when hashed it will produce the Payment Information Message Digest (PIMD, and Order 
Information Message Digest (OIMD). Both are further hashed to produce the Payment 
and Order Information Message Digest (POMD). The Cardholder will finally encrypt the 
POMD with his private key to produce the Dual Signature (DS) and because the POMD 
contains the Payment Information and Order Information is now called Dual. 
The Cardholder then delivers the Order Information (OI), Payment Information Message 
Digest (PIMD), and the Dual Signature (DS) to the Merchant and further delivers the 
Payment Information (PI), Order Information Message Digest (OIMD) and Dual 
Signature (DS) to the Payment Gateway. 
Merchant (Processing Order): The processes described in the diagram shows that the 
merchant never receive the Payment Information (PI) and so the threat of dubious 
merchants stealing payment information (credit card details) is clearly eliminated.  
The merchant computes his Order Information Message Digest (OIMD) and the Payment 
Information Message Digest (PIMD) sent by the cardholder to produce his own Payment 
and Order Message Digest (POMD (1)) and further decrypts the Dual Signature (DS) to 
produce the Payment and Order Message Digest (POMD (2)).  
 80 | P a g e  
 
The merchant finally compares the POMD (1) and POMD (2) and if both match, the 
merchant approves the Order. However, if both do not match that is a warning that 
cardholder did not authorise the order and so merchant declines the order. 
 
 
Figure 24: SET Ordering and processing flowchart 
 
Despite the security strength promised and established by SET, it still has its weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities. 
A recent study (Zhang & Li, 2005), has revealed that the exploitation of card fraud has 
been increased by the security weaknesses in card payment processing systems following 
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the monotonous use of exposed static card details in the authentication of cardholders. 
This is notwithstanding the introduction of the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) 
protocol to swap card details during payment addresses. Regrettably, SET failed to be 
exceptionally satisfactory because of computational cost, message overhead and 
additional requirement of public key infrastructure (PKI). The studies of (Bella, et al., 
2002) and (Herreweghen, 2000) further summarised some challenges faced by SET 
including; multiple nested encryption, duplicate message fields, sheer size. SET is secure 
to some extent and vulnerable to others because a successful transaction verified by SET 
does not give the SET gateway the legal guarantee that the cardholder authorized the 
transaction since ensuring non-repudiation in e-commerce transaction requires more than 
digital signatures. 
2.10.4.3 Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
The Secure Socket Layer or SSL is a cryptographic protocol developed by Netscape 
Corporation to secure data in transit between two or more communication end points - 
for instance, client-side and server-side. While it has become more convenient to do 
business online, it has also become more difficult to ensure reliable and secure data 
exchange and communications. 
2.10.4.4 3D Secure 
The 3D Secure technology popularly known as Verified by Visa or MasterCard 
SecureCode was developed by Arcot Company for the card associations to protect 
cardholders during card-not-present transactions. It has received numerous accreditations 
and recommendations within recent years as one of the leading solutions for card-not-
present transactions because the 3D secure solution uses the services of an intermediary 
in the process of authenticating the merchant and the cardholders.  
During card-not-present transactions, the cardholder would be redirected to his issuer who 
will ask for a password to authenticate the cardholder. With 3D Secure, enrolment is 
required both by the merchant and the cardholder, the cardholder is required to create a 
 82 | P a g e  
 
password after confirming his name, date of birth and card information (Card Technology 
Today, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 25: Example 1 of 3D Secure enrolment 
 
 
Figure 26: Example of 3D Secure enrolment  
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The two diagrams above illustrate the 3D Secure enrolment processes from two banks 
showing the actual information collected during 3D secure enrolment. It is clear that 
whoever has the card and personal information is able to enrol the card in the 3D secure 
program. Therefore, assuming that a criminal already has the personal information of the 
cardholder, and later received the card information before the legitimate cardholder 
enrolled his card in the 3D secure program, the criminal is able to enrol the card and 
choose his own password even before the legitimate cardholder does, this also confirms 
the fact that even though the 3D secure protects cardholders from card-not-present 
transaction fraud to an extent, it still has significant vulnerabilities which argues its ability 
to adequately solve the problem of card-not-present fraud.  
According to Lomax (2006), Verified by Visa, MasterCard SecureCode and JSecure 
programs promise additional levels of authentication using the password provided during 
the card enrolment through an intermediary. However, it is vulnerable to identity theft as 
are all static passwords used on a remote network. 
Also the circumstances surrounding the framework of 3D Secure often triggers confusion 
to cardholders because whenever 3D Secure system is invoked during card-not-present 
transactions, it will direct the customer to another website or call another web address 
that is different from the current web location of the customer, and it is virtually 
impossible for the customer to verify that the web address is actually a legitimate website 
for the 3D secure password verification. This is because it is similar to the concept of 
identity theft techniques used by criminals to harvest cardholders’ information. Therefore 
in this process, many customers will stop and close the browser when this happens and 
this will mean the merchant losing the business, and if the customer continues, he might 
probably be redirected to a phishing website, hence recent research argued that the 3D 
secure solution escaped academic scrutiny (Murdoch & Anderson, 2010). 
2.10.4.5 Telephone Fraud Screening 
Research has shown that within the recent years, banks have adopted the use of 
aggressive measures to verify card-not-present transactions, this usually occur when a 
cardholder placed an order online, the bank would try to call the cardholder using the 
 84 | P a g e  
 
telephone number held on file - in some cases it will be an automated call. This call is 
to verify that you made the payment, and this enables cardholders to confirm that they 
made payment with their card online or to decline having made any payment. Usually 
if the banks failed on several attempts to reach the cardholder on phone to verify the 
transaction, the card in question will be suspended and any future transactions will be 
automatically declined until the bank is able to speak to the cardholder. It is believed 
that even though this telephone screening methods helps to reduce card-not-present 
fraud, it also have significant issues which includes. 
Cancellation of legitimate payments 
Nine out of every ten cross-border card-not-present transactions are cancelled 
because banks believe the transactions to be fraudulent. This is most common when 
a cardholder travelled outside his usual country of resident and used his card to make 
payment from abroad, banks would follow their normal fraud screening telephone 
call and because the cardholder is abroad, he may not be able to respond to the call 
or be aware in any way that his bank tried to contact him. The cardholder will usually 
notice that something is wrong when he tries to use his card again to make a payment 
or withdraw cash abroad and all attempts failed or are declined (E-finance & 
payments, Law & Policy, 2012). 
Cardholder dissatisfaction  
Cardholders are often disturbed by the regular unscheduled telephone calls from 
banks trying to validate payments done online or getting their card blocked while 
they are abroad limiting their access to cash. Many cardholders get stranded abroad 
because their cards were used outside their normal country of residence and so their 
bank restricts access to their account through the card. 
2.10.4.6  Neural Network Credit card fraud detection 
The aim of neural network credit card fraud detection is to analyse transactional history 
of an account and provide a risk analysis report in a form of score which will enable 
decision making on a transaction The check includes a background check on and 
evaluation on spending pattern, previous history of reported fraudulent activities, location 
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of the order and comparing shipping address with the billing address, the major process 
of the neural network detection is gathering data and comparing the data with the existing 
pattern to identify variation, in some cases where the amount used fraudulently from the 
card falls within the existing spending pattern, or fraud that occurred within the location 
of the legitimate cardholder, this will affect the score and may not give an accurate report 
or correct decision (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994; Aguoru, 2007; Patidar & Sharma, 2011). 
2.11 Impact of card-not-present fraud on e-commerce development 
There is a belief that e-commerce contributes to the development of every economy that 
adopts it in its business operations. This belief is motivated, among other things, by the 
cost effectiveness in the implementation of e-commerce technologies that makes it easier 
for every organisation to start selling online without delay in a global marketplace as 
opposed by the brick and mortar type of business that has more investments cost 
requirements and reaches only an aspect of the marketplace. However, there are huge 
impediments that generate adverse impacts on the development of e-commerce: these key 
impediments can be categorised as physical, technological, and socio-economical (Molla 
& Licker, 2005). 
According to Wales (2003) and Walton (2005), card-not-present fraud is an unresolved 
problem faced by e-commerce participants, but consumers, often cardholders are largely 
protected against any financial loss because there is no signed receipt by the cardholder 
to authorise transactions done through this method, and contrary to popular belief, it is 
not the card issuer that has to bear the burden either because the issuer is an intermediary 
party between the cardholder and the merchant and simply acts as the facilitator in 
transaction processes and arbitrator in the event of dispute, but the risk and 
responsibilities of fraud in e-commerce card-not-present transaction are mostly the 
burden of the merchant. The merchant bears the full risk and losses of dispute if the 
legitimate cardholder repudiates the card-not-present transaction and this has resulted in 
many e-commerce businesses disappearing after some time. In addition, the level of 
repudiation and chargeback in card-not-present transactions is very high because the 
merchant has traded with cardholders they cannot physically ask to sign the authorisation 
of the order, and so cannot provide a signed receipt to confirm that the legitimate 
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cardholder made the transaction. In such cases the bank cannot guarantee that transactions 
done without a signature of authorisation is genuinely initiated by the legitimate 
cardholder and so are generally good about responding to challenges and giving refunds, 
but it would be better for all e-commerce participants if the number of fraudulent card-
not-present transactions could be reduced. 
The biggest problem with electronic commerce technology is the security of all the 
systems and processes to prevent unauthorised access and fraudulent transactions, the 
impact of card-not-present fraud in electronic commerce is enormous because this type 
of fraud directly affects the financial resources and reputation of the business, some of 
the common impacts can be classified as follows: 
Financial Loss 
Card-not-present causes the merchant to directly lose the full cost of the items and in 
some cases additional charges in administering the charge-back process. This 
incidence starts with a criminal placing an order with the online merchant with a 
stolen card, and the merchant would process and ship the ordered items in good faith 
believing the order is a legitimate order placed by the card holder, sometimes it takes 
up to two months for a dispute to be opened against an order requesting the merchant 
to provide a signed document showing that the legitimate cardholder place the order, 
even though the full money will be debited from the merchant, the disputing authority 
is not concerned about returning the goods which has already been shipped to the 
criminal. Therefore, the merchant will lose both the cost of the item shipped including 
any shipping cost and most times with additional charge. 
Low Sales 
Because of the financial losses involved when card-not-present fraud occurs, 
merchants are reluctant to approve transactions, especially transactions with higher 
amount and orders placed from abroad. Merchants will consider what they will lose 
in the event the order becomes fraudulent, and in most cases the merchant cancels 
high valued orders that are paid online and orders placed from abroad and this affects 
the volume of sales a merchant will generate because the cancelled orders will be a 
mix of legitimate and illegitimate orders. 
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On the other hand, some customers terminate their orders halfway when 3D Secure is 
invoked because of a suspicion of phishing attack or when the payment process 
implemented by the merchant to enhance security is more complex and ambiguous. 
Restrictions and Reputation Impairment  
Acquirers have charge-back measuring criteria for merchants. This process allows the 
acquirers to review each merchant’s account based on the number of fraudulent 
transactions received and this is considered on case by case basis, merchants with 
frequent and rampant occurrences of charge-backs or fraudulent transaction reports 
often lose their reputation with their banks and most like will have their merchant 
account terminated. In some cases this might mean a complete inability to process 
payment online if the merchant does not have an alternative method to accept payment 
online. 
Trust 
This research has extensively analysed the effects and importance of trust in electronic 
commerce. It is understood that trust affects how cardholders participate in electronic 
commerce and how merchants approve orders placed online because they have 
insufficient level of trust about electronic commerce, especially card-not-present 
transaction, this is because the problems and fraudulent activities occurring in 
electronic commerce is visibly causing adverse effects, for this reason many 
cardholders choose to return back to the traditional method of buying from a local 
store where they will be physically present with the seller while merchants are 
migrating to alternative payment methods. 
If e-commerce is to be fully embraced with trust and reliability with other internet 
technologies, then the merchants need to be reassured that the people on the other side of 
the internet making card payment are really who they say they are, so that the payment 
they received online will not be disputed which will indirectly steal their goods. If 
cardholders are to trust the trend of e-commerce, then they need to be reassured that their 
privacy and the confidentiality of their card and personal details are protected and the 
person receiving their data are to be trusted to prevent criminals stealing their sensitive 
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information. Also, the card issuers need to know that the transaction between a cardholder 
and the merchant is not fastening them into carrying burden of negative consequences 
(Card Technology Today, 2002). 
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3. PART 3 – 3W-ADA SENTRY SYSTEM  
3.1 Introduction to dynamic authentication 
Giot, et al. (2009)  and Cheswick, et al. (2003) identified three key factors widely 
recognized to authenticate human to a computer: 
 Knowledge or what you know: known as one-Factor authentication method, uses 
a static password known to the user, – for instance, password or PIN. 
  Possession or what you have: known as two-Factor authentication method, uses 
a one-time password or token that changes in each authentication session, – for 
instance, one-time password, or token. 
 Inherence or what you has: known as the three-Factor authentication method, 
uses personal attributes of the user, - for instance, biometric information. 
There is no decisive list of dynamic authentication method, it is said to have been 
achieved when a two-factor or more methods are implemented using any technique (Liao, 
et al., 2006). Dynamic authentication is seen as a long-term solution that meets the 
requirement of a strong authentication, the method uses a new authenticator that is valid, 
unique and significant to an authentication session between the claimant and the verifier 
(Grance, et al., 2010; Li & Zhou, 2010).  
According to (Aguoru, 2007), to achieve a dynamic authentication method that meets the 
requirements of a two-factor authentication, the approach must adhere to the following 
rules: 
 Use of one-factor authentication through a communication channel to setup an 
authentication session with the server or verifier. 
  Use two-factor authentication through an isolated channel to generate an entirely 
new authenticator that is relevant to the authentication session already established 
using a logic that is known to the user and server. 
 Ability to send the generated authenticator to the server or verifier to authenticate 
the user. 
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3.1.1 Random number generator (RNG) 
According to Omer (2007), Random Number Generator (RNG) is seen as a cryptographic 
application for dynamic authentication, the aim is to dynamically and uniquely produce 
an uncertainty, unpredictability and irreproducibility to authenticate a user. There are two 
common categories of random number generator; the True Random Number Generator 
(TRNG) and Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). 
True Random Number Generator achieves its randomness through an external device or 
real world event, for instance, radioactive decay, atmospheric noise or thermal random 
noise and this process has high entropy but its procedure can be difficult, inefficient or 
expensive to build. True random number generator includes, dice roll, hardware token, 
USB security token and Smartcard token devices. 
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) uses a computer software algorithm of a 
mathematical formula that is deterministic to generate its sequence of randomness. The 
implementation is easier and cheaper, and operation is efficient, however the entropy 
output is low. Some mathematical formula for PRNG includes; Analytic Geometry, 
Definite integrals, Timestamp, hashing, Integration and other formula or logic that can 
produce randomness using computer software. 
3.1.2 Hardware dynamic authentication method (True Number Generator) 
In recent years, several dynamic user authentication schemes have been proposed for a 
secure channel between participants on client-server model environment, and several 
modifications also proposed in response to the weaknesses discovered in the existing 
schemes. These schemes uses smartcard, USB and other token devices equipped with 
cryptographic technology to generate its token. It is classified as True Random Number 
Generator, aimed to strengthen the use of password in one-factor authentication model 
introduced by Lamport in 1981. (Fengtong & Xuelei, 2012). 
In 2004, Das, et al. (2004) introduced a dynamic ID-based user authentication method 
using smart card, the method is divided into three phases comprising registration, 
authentication and password-change. It does not maintain a verifier table, but allows users 
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to choose and modify their password, this scheme is proposed to protect users against 
identity theft and resist reply and forgery attacks. Awasthi (2004) claimed that the scheme 
introduced by Das, et al. (2004) is completely insecure, and using it is like accessing a 
system without a password. I-En, et al. (2005) proposed a slight modification of the 
registration and authentication phases to strengthen the weakness discovered in the 
scheme. 
In 2009, Wang, et al. (2009) claimed that the scheme proposed by Das, et al. (2004) and 
enhanced by I-En, et al. (2005) did not achieve mutual authentication, therefore, could 
not resist identity theft attacks. And further proposed a more efficient and secure dynamic 
ID-based remote user authentication scheme that claimed to maintain all the merits of the 
existing schemes. Other proposals and modifications of existing proposals in the same 
domain are schemes contributed by Juang & Wu (2009), Li, et al. (2013), Aljawarneh, et 
al. (2010), and Fengtong & Xuelei, (2012). 
Keystroke dynamic authentication method derive its authentication value through the 
process of analyzing the way  a user types at a computer by recording the keyboard strokes 
many times and attempt to identify them based on habitual rhythm patterns of their style 
of typing (Joyce & Gupta, 1990). In 2011, Giot, et al. (2011), shows that the main 
drawback of keystroke dynamic authentication lies on its requirement for a large number 
of data during enrollment which makes it restrictive and barely usable.  
3.1.3 Software dynamic authentication method (Pseudo Random Number 
Generator)    
The GSM mobile network has been seen as a useful and mobile tool for our daily 
interactions, several approaches to dynamic authentication have adopted the use of short 
message services (SMS) to deliver a one-time password (OTP) to mobile phone over 
GSM network as an effective channel to meet up with the requirement of two-factor 
authentication (Elderawy, et al., 2012; Trupti & Manisha, 2012; Aguoru, 2007). 
In 1981, Lamport & Ashenhurt (1981) proposed a description of a secure method that 
assumes a secure one-way encryption function.  This proposal claimed that even if there 
is an interceptor, the security of the authentication between user and the computer is not 
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compromised. However, high hash overhead, necessity for password resetting, and the 
storage of verification table are the three main shortcoming of this proposal (Liao, et al., 
2006). 
 
 
Legend: 
HW = Hardward;  ETPY = Entropy; SW = Software; CTB = Compartible;  COMP = Compute; DYM = Dynamic; 
ON = Online; OFF = Offline; MD = Mode. 
Table 12: Characteristics comparison table of dynamic schemes 
Research focus on dynamic authentication has been expressively on access to user 
protected areas – for instance online banking, none of the proposals has shown a 
systematic method of implementing any of the schemes on card-not-present envrionment. 
Therefore, implementation of dynamic authentication on card-not-present transaction has 
been insignificant not represented.  
In 2007,  Aguoru (2007) proposed a scheme that uses a mathematical algorithm to 
generates a one-time numeric password that is delivered to the user’s mobile phone when 
the user invokes an authentication session by submitting a Paymenex account serial 
number during card-not-present transaction, but this scheme could not pass the User 
Scheme/Characteristic 2FA Type ETPY Comp DYM Cost Setup CTB MD 
Das, et al. (2004) Yes HW High High Yes High Slow No On 
Wang, et al. (2009) Yes HW High High Yes High Slow No On 
I-En, et al. (2005) Yes HW High High Yes High Slow No On 
Juang & Wu (2009), Yes HW High High Yes High Slow No On 
Li, et al. (2013) Yes HW High High Yes High Slow No On 
Fengtong & Xuelei, (2012) Yes HW High High Yes High Slow No On 
Elderawy, et al (2012) Yes SW Low High Yes Medium Slow No On 
Trupti & Manisha (2012) Yes SW Low High Yes Medium Slow No On 
Aguoru (2007) Yes  SW Low Low Yes Low Fast Yes On 
Lamport & Ashenhurt (1981) Yes SW Low High Yes Low Slow Yes On 
3W Sentry Yes SW High Low Yes Low Fast Yes On/Off 
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Acceptance Test (UAT) of the sponsor, because  of the overhead cost associated with 
SMS delivery at every authentication session, and  mobile network unavailablity. 
This research describes an effective way to use the analytical geometry technique to  
generate random number online or offline, and how to implement it on card-not-present 
environment to enhance the scheme proposed by Aguoru (2007). In this process,  the 
random number can be calculated offline using the PAC card when the mobile network 
is not available. 
Scheme/ 
Security/Function 
ENVI RA PH MIM MA VT Setup CNP 
Das, et al. (2004) One Yes Yes Yes No No Slow No 
Wang, et al. (2009) One Yes Yes Yes No No Slow No 
I-En, et al. (2005) One Yes No Yes No No Slow No 
Juang & Wu (2009), One Yes No No No No Slow No 
Li, et al. (2013) One Yes No No No No Slow No 
Fengtong & Xuelei, (2012) One Yes No No Yes No Slow No 
Elderawy, et al (2012) One Yes No No Yes Yes Slow No 
Trupti & Manisha (2012) One No No No Yes Yes Slow No 
Aguoru (2007) One  No No No Yes Yes Fast Yes 
Lamport & Ashenhurt (1981) One No No No Yes Yes Slow No 
3W Sentry Two No No No Yes No Fast Yes 
 
Legend: 
ENVI = Environment;  RA = Reply Attack; PH = Phishing Attack; MIM = Man-in-the-middle Attack;  MA = Mutual 
Authentication; Compute; VT = Verifier Table; CNP = Card-not-present. 
Table 13: Security and functionality comparison table of dynamic schemes 
The reasons for using the framework proposed in 3W-ADA sentry system is to propose 
an enhanced model which allows to maintain an offline random number generator, this 
generator will not require the need of a mobile phone or SMS delivery to initiate or 
completes the proposed dynamic authentication method. This process will prevent the 
shortcomings of the related SMSV solution. And the justification is presented in Part 
3.2.7 of this research document. 
 94 | P a g e  
 
3.2 An Overview of the 3W-ADA Sentry System 
The Who-Where-When Account Dynamic Authentication Sentry system (3W-ADA 
Sentry system) is a pseudo-random number generator based dynamic authentication 
system with the mathematical formula approach of a coordinate or analytic geometry. 
The two-dimensional coordinate system identifies its unique point in a plane by a pair of 
numerical coordinates popularly known as Cartesian coordinates, the identified unique 
point is used by the 3W-ADA Sentry System to formulate its one-time dynamic 
authentication token. 
The token generated by the calculation of the intersection of the X, Y axis also alternates 
the requirement of account holder’s personal information online, for instance, asking for 
account holder’s name and billing address in online card payment, which exposes account 
holder to the threats of identity theft and phishing. However, with the alternation of the 
requirement to enter personal details while making payment online with the 3W-ADA 
Sentry System, the account holder’s personal details and privacy are protected and at the 
same time, the dependability of the authentication is not broken because the account 
holder is in each instance uniquely authenticated with a one-time authentication token 
making each authentication unique and feasibly prevents the threat of identity theft. 
The main benefits in choosing and designing the random number generator offered by the 
3W-ADA sentry system are as follows: 
The pseudo-random number generator model used is efficient, easier and cheap to 
implement. 
Method has high speed and low entropy, but random number generated is aligned or 
joined in multiples to increase the entropy. 
The pseudo-random number generator communication or notification process can be 
both an electronic and non-electronic procedure. 
 It can be used anywhere and on all technology environments. 
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3.2.1 An overview of coordinate or analytic geometry 
Rene Decartes was a great mathematician, philosopher and scientist from France who 
made a novel contribution to science. His views about relationship, knowledge, and credit 
for discovering analytic geometry have been very influential over the past three centuries 
and in one of his publications and study of geometry he showed how to systematically 
apply algebra in geometry leading to the discovering of Cartesian or coordinated 
geometry (Sharma, 2005). 
Coordinate geometry - also called analytic or Cartesian geometry - is the study of 
geometric figures on a flat surface that stretches in both ways endlessly - known as the 
plane. The plane comprises the “X” axis which stretched parallel, and the “Y” axis which 
stretched perpendicular over the “X” axis and the point where the “X” and “Y” axes 
intersect is called the origin and a right angle is formed at this point (Schultz, et al., 2007). 
Coordinate geometry has long been an important concept in the location of unique points 
and positions, the concept is used in the development of the Global Positioning System 
or GPS which today offers great advantage to car navigation systems to locate streets and 
roads in a city. It is used for mapping by calculating the Latitude (North - South or “Y” 
axis) and Longitude (East-West or “X” axis) of a location on the Earth known as the 
geographic coordinate system. 
 
Figure 27: Coordinate geometry on a plane 
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3.2.2 Concept of Coordinate geometry plane in 3W ADA Sentry 
According to (Schultz, et al., 2007), in coordinate geometry, the “X” axis is horizontal 
and the “Y” axis is vertical, and because they are perpendicular they meet to form a right 
angle. Where this intersects, four quadrants are formed, and since these intersection points 
can be identified by the calculation of the “X and “Y” axis, the 3W-ADA Sentry concept 
adopted the framework of representing each intersection point with a random-generated 
numbers to form its personal authentication code (PAC), and during each authentication 
3W-ADA Sentry system will ask for the numbers in two or more randomly selected 
intersection points, and these numbers are placed in an order in which they were asked to 
form the personal authentication code for a transaction section authentication. 
Each set of coordinate plane has a serial number which acts as an identifier and is used to 
link the plane to an account to enable a personal access code authentication or it can be 
unlinked or disabled to remove the 3W-ADA sentry authentication to make it more 
flexible for users to choose when and where not to use the authentication depending on 
the environment. 
3.2.3 Random Number generator for the 3W-ADA Sentry PAC 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system approach to Random Number Generation is the Pseudo 
Random Number Generation model.  
A PHP programming language function is used to generate cryptographically secure 
pseudo-random integer. A range of available functions includes:  
int random_int ( int $min , int $max )    
string openssl_random_pseudo_bytes ( int $length [, bool &$crypto_strong ] ) 
string random_bytes ( int $length ) 
Every other type of programming or scripting language has its own method for this 
purpose. Additional logic was formed by placing each pseudo random number generated 
in an intersection of a coordinated plane and randomly using the intersection point to form 
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a new unique random number known by the system and the user and also to make it 
unpredictable. 
 
 
Figure 28: PAC Request and Response Architecture 
 
3.2.4 How the 3W-ADA Sentry System Works 
The investigation and analysis described in this research project revealed that the focal 
cause of card-not-present fraud is the constant use of static card details and password to 
authenticate cardholders during card-not-present transaction. This includes the most 
popular authentication solution known as Verified by Visa and MasterCard secure code 
or collectively known as the 3D Secure introduced by Visa and MasterCard. 
This makes the static information valid and useful within a considerable period if captured 
by criminals and this time allows criminals to impersonate the cardholders by using the 
captured card details to place fraudulent orders on the internet. 
 98 | P a g e  
 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system addresses this vulnerability using a non-electronic and low-
cost tokenization mechanism introducing the framework of coordinated geometry, or 
Cartesian coordinates, to obfuscate personal details during card-not-present transaction 
making each transaction unique.  
This process adopted the two-factor authentication with mixed static and dynamic 
information. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system is not limited to providing dynamic authentication to online 
card-not-present transactions, it is also an invaluable authentication system for access to 
online member only or restricted areas, for instance online banking systems. However, 
for the purpose of this research, the illustration described in this document will be limited 
to card-not-present payment or electronic commerce environment. 
During checkout from an e-commerce shopping cart, user is redirected to a payment page 
where summary of shopping cart value will be displayed and available payment method, 
customer select Paymenex as the payment method, enter his account or card serial no and 
proceed, the integration done at merchant shop will send required information to the 
gateway through the 3W-ADA Sentry system. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system will use the submitted serial number to identify linked 
coordinate plane from the plane directory and a corresponding session identification code 
generated. When the customer inputs his PAC response, this will be checked against the 
stored numbers and session identification code to identify match. 
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Figure 29: 3W-ADA Sentry dynamic authentication 
 
The illustration above shows a page schematic of the proposed user interface of the 3W-
ADA Sentry system in an online payment environment where four unique questions 
marked in red are used to form the authentication token. 
Two random digits of the Webkey, for instance, the third and fourth digits of a six digits 
integer – 812698 were asked and which resulted in 2 and 6. The six digits integer known 
as the Webkey is a security code linked to a card account and only known by the card 
holder. 
Each set of Webkey are not known in advance by the cardholder same way they know 
their PIN, and are different in each transaction session, the 3W-ADA Sentry has inbuilt 
logic of presenting each set of random Webkey digits combination questions during each 
transaction section. 
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Figure 30: 3W-ADA Sentry coordinate plane 
 
The diagram above shows the coordinate plane used for the dynamic authentication token 
known as Personal Authentication Code or PAC. 
Calculation of the PAC does not require any electronic device but it is done by the manual 
calculation of the point where the “X” axis intersects the “Y” axis known as the origin.  
Two random PAC questions are also uniquely asked and not repetitive.  
 
Therefore, our calculation for the 3W-ADA Sentry dynamic authentication code for this 
transaction is as follows: 
a) Third Digit of Webkey = 2 
b) Fourth Digit of Webkey = 6 
c) PAC E7 or E7 of XY Coordinate = 509 
d) PAC C4 or C4 of XY Coordinate = 237 
 
3W-ADA Sentry dynamic token = abcd (26509237), hence, in this transaction the code 
26509237 is the dynamic authentication code and will never be repeated in the life history 
of the account used. 
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Whether the 3W-ADA Sentry is implemented as a standalone system or integrated into 
an existing system, the card-not-present authentication follows the same process. The 
software produced by this research project was developed using the framework of the 
integrated model of 3W-ADA Sentry system development. 
The purpose of choosing the integrated model is because the project sponsor is a payment 
network with an existing card account management system and has provided their 
development platform for the necessary modification to suit the requirements of the 3W- 
ADA Sentry system framework, and also for testing and implementation. 
 
 
Figure 33: 3W-ADA Card-not-present Transaction flowchart 
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The sequential flow of event as illustrated in Figure 34, is described in the following 3W-
ADA transaction table. 
 
No Origin Destination Value Action Details 
1 Cardholder Merchant Serial No Cardholder Input Card serial no at 
checkout of merchant’s shop 
2 Merchant Acquirer Serial No,  Merchant route serial no, shopping cart 
information, (i.e. amount, currency, and 
order no) to Acquirer for processing. 
3 Acquirer 3W-ADA Serial No, Acquirer forward the data supplied by 
merchant to 3W-ADA to delegate 
authentication of cardholder. 
4 3W-ADA Cardholder Webkey, 
PAC, Card 
No, Exp 
Date,  
3W Sentry identify cardholder with the 
Serial No, and send out Webkey & PAC 
query to cardholder (Only at this time will 
cardholder know the three-factor 
authentication token, which he can 
compute using his PAC card, or received 
the token by SMS. 
5 Cardholder Merchant Cart Info, 
Webkey, 
PAC, Card 
No, Exp. 
Date 
 
Cardholder input new variables on step 
two at merchant shop. 
6 Merchant Acquirer Cart Info, 
Webkey, 
PAC, Card 
No, Exp. 
Date 
 
Merchant forward same information to 
Acquirer. 
7 Acquirer 3W Sentry Cart info, 
Webkey, 
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PAC, Card 
No, Exp. 
Date 
Acquirer routes same information to 3W 
Sentry 
8 3W Sentry Card 
Manager 
Cart info, 
Card No, Exp 
Date 
3W Sentry finally sends cart info, card 
account no to be debited to card manager 
for processing. 
9 Card 
Manager 
 
Acquirer 
Serial No, 
Status, 
Merchant ID, 
amount, 
transaction 
ID 
 
Card manager log entry, and send 
complete transaction information to 
Acquirer. 
10 Acquirer Merchant Serial No, 
Status, 
Merchant ID, 
amount, 
transaction 
ID 
 
Acquirer Log entry and send transaction 
report to merchant 
11 Merchant  Cardholder Order ID, 
Transaction 
ID, 
Transaction 
Status 
Merchant process order and send email to 
cardholder 
 
Table 14: 3W Sentry transaction flowchart  
 
Though the PAC can be communicated through the short message services of a mobile 
operator to the registered mobile number of the account, the PAC card is provided to 
increase the service availability, for instance if the mobile network is not reachable. 
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Figure 34: Sample PAC card (Plane) 
 
3.2.6 SWOT Analysis of the 3W-ADA Sentry system 
The following analysis presents the 3W-ADA Sentry system using the framework of 
SWOT analysis. 
3.2.6.1 Strengths - 3W-ADA Sentry system 
 Tokenization of the payment information to make each card-not-present or online 
authentication unique. 
 Obfuscation of cardholder personal information to prevent identity theft. 
 Can be offered as a standalone or third-party security authentication service or 
integrated into an existing system. 
 Low-cost to implement and easy to manage. 
 Platform independent. 
 Non- electronic. 
 Cross-platform and can integrate seamlessly with all systems. 
3.2.6.2 Weaknesses - the 3W-ADA Sentry system 
 Vulnerable to identity theft if PAC Card is lost or stolen with the card. 
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 GSM network through which the PAC is delivered to the cardholder’s mobile 
phone might not be reachable and hence PAC will not be delivered or the delivery 
will be delayed. 
 The security solution is introduced by a source that is not well known in the 
payment industry; hence adoption of solution might be difficult to some extent. 
 Since it’s an optional additional security measure to protect account holders in 
card-not-present environments, some customers may not like to experience 
additional steps to pay online and so may not enroll on the security program. 
3.2.6.3 Opportunities - the 3W-ADA Sentry system 
 The 3W-ADA Sentry system was developed for a leader in alternative payment, 
and with the trend of alternative payment and the adoption especially in African 
countries, the 3W-ADA sentry system stands a good chance to gain market and 
awareness in areas were alternative payment methods are used. 
  This research has tried to prove the concept and feasibility of 3W-ADA sentry 
system, if the authentication can feasibly protect card-not-present fraud, and 
conceal cardholder’s personal information, merchants and payment service 
providers will be attracted to a solution that works. 
3.2.6.4 Threats - The 3W-ADA Sentry system 
 Tokenization devices used by banks may be restructured to work in card-not-
present environments, and this will cause the banks to promote their own product 
over any other third-party security systems. 
 Adoption of 3W ADA sentry system by the leading card association for instance 
Visa and MasterCard may not be possible, because they are currently promoting 
their own solution known as 3D Secure, even though this solution has significant 
vulnerabilities, they might choose to upgrade their existing system instead of 
implementing entirely new solution. 
 The project owner may not want to commercialize the solution. 
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3.2.7 Justification of 3W-ADA Sentry 
This research presents a justification for the use of the 3W-ADA Sentry system as a 
feasible solution to prevent card-not-present fraud, via the following main points: 
3.2.7.1 Research Findings 
The investigative research carried out during this research discovered that the obvious 
problem of the existing card-not-present solutions is the static nature of data used to 
authenticate the cardholders over the insecure internet network, and this further exposes 
the card details and customers’ personal data to the vulnerability of internet threats, for 
instance, identify theft. Not only are customers’ cards used fraudulently online but at most 
times their personal information are also stolen and used in other fraudulent activities, but 
the solution proposed in this research solved the problems in the following ways: 
Enhancement of the SMSV Scheme 
The main problem of the SMSV is its reliance on mobile phone which has cost and 
network availability implications. The 3W-ADA sentry system presents an enhanced 
scheme that modified this process by using an analytical geometry model which allows 
to maintain an offline random number generator, this process removed the mandatory 
requirement to deliver the random number through the user’s mobile phone. 
Dynamic authentication in card-not-present transaction 
The 3W-ADA sentry system proposed a dynamic authentication process in card-not-
present transaction. 
The dynamic concept used in developing the 3W-ADA Sentry system makes each 
transaction over the internet a unique cardholder’s experience using an instantly generated 
unique token, and the corresponding transaction session identification code is valid only 
for a payment transaction requested. The token is compared with the stored transaction 
session identification code before authentication can be approved. 
When a cardholder requests to make payment online, the 3W-ADA Sentry gateway 
returns a Personal Access Code (PAC) questions to the cardholder’s user interface or 
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environment, and a copy of the transaction session identification code interpreting the 
personal access code. 
When the personal access code is submitted by the cardholder, the 3W-ADA Sentry 
system compares and validates the personal access code input with the transaction session 
identification code to make sure both matched. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry uses a dual session based authentication process by firstly 
comparing the transaction session identification submitted by the customer’s browser to 
make sure it is submitted by the same person, and the authentication of the personal access 
code on the second phase only takes place if the first phase is completed successfully. 
This concept of dynamic process incorporated in the 3W-ADA Sentry system’s payment 
process algorithm makes it difficult for fraudsters to re-use the data stolen from card-not-
present payment transaction in future and as such will counter the motivation of identity 
theft because it will be same as useless data. 
Concealing of personal information 
The current card payment method practiced by Visa and MasterCard asks customers to 
input their personal information in an online webpage, but with the concept of the 3W- 
ADA Sentry system customers do not need to enter their names, addresses, in some cases, 
name of issuing bank and date of birth to pay online, the use of personal and billing 
information during payment is replaced with the dynamic token and transaction session 
identification code. 
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3.3 3W-ADA Sentry Software Requirements Specification (SRS) 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the requirement specifications of the 3W-ADA Sentry system and 
provides a blueprint for its development. The role of this software requirements 
specification (SRS) section is to provide a description of the 3W-ADA Sentry system as 
a software, the basis for developing its architectural design either as an integrated or a 
stand-alone model of 3W-ADA sentry system, and to act as the reference point to verify 
that the completed software satisfies the requirements. 
3.3.1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this part of the document is to define the requirements specification and 
architectural design of the 3W-ADA Sentry system and provides a coherent guideline and 
plan for its development phases and process cycle. It also delivers a clear documentation 
of its compositions, functionalities, limitations and specifies the necessary operational 
sequences to be carried out in functional terms.  
To enable a detailed understanding for the Paymenex technical team and the project 
supervisors about how to develop the accurate software that meets the requirements 
specifications and enable the supervisor to make analyses of its adaptability to the 
requirements document or the solution proposed. 
Nevertheless, this software requirement specification describes the complete 
requirements of both integrated and standalone model of 3W-ADA sentry system to give 
developers varieties of choice to choose according their requirement. 
3.3.1.2 Project Scope 
The software system to be produced is an online account dynamic authentication system 
that uses the Cartesian two-dimensional coordinate system to establish a non-electronic 
dynamic authentication token used for its real time authentication branded as the WHO-
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WHERE-WHEN Account Dynamic Authentication System or simply the 3W-ADA 
Sentry system. 
The token is generated by the calculation of the intersection of the X, Y axes and it enable 
Paymenex Limited to alternate the use of account holders’ personal information online, 
for instance, asking for the individual account holder’s name and billing address in online 
card-not-present payment authentication, which expose the account holder to identity 
theft threats and to strengthen the current static details used for online Paymenex card 
payment with a dynamic token which reassures customer’s protection from threats of 
online identity theft. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system is also invaluable to other online service providers, payment 
networks and payment processors faced with similar card-not-present fraud problem as 
Paymenex, this includes Visa and MasterCard and their related participants. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system is middleware and intermediates between the Paymenex 
merchant’s payment system and the Paymenex payment processing gateway or the 
Paymenex card management system. The level of integration depends on the Paymenex 
technical team. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system is designed to be a low-cost, flexible and effective non-
electronic dynamic system that can integrate seamlessly into Paymenex xTransNET 
system or any other payment processing gateway or used as ‘software as a service’ 
(SAAS) that offers on-demand verification and dynamic authentication solution. 
The dynamism in 3W-ADA Sentry system makes it suitable to wither the threats of 
identity theft and prevent card-not-present fraud. 
The concept of the 3W-ADA Sentry system can be developed and implemented as an 
external or third-party middleware system or developed and implemented as an internal 
module which seamlessly integrates with existing card management and interchange 
platform. 
However, the scope of this project is limited to the development and implementation of 
the 3W-ADA Sentry System as an internal module that will serve as add-on or plug-in to 
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Paymenex xTransNET and can be adopted by similar systems who want to leverage 3W-
ADA Sentry system to counter card-not-present fraud. 
3.3.1.3 Definitions, Acronyms and Abbreviations 
The definition and abbreviation used in this specification requirement document is 
provided in the glossary table. 
3.3.1.4 References 
The specifications requirements section is prepared according to the recommendation of 
IEEE and ISO standards (Systems and software engineering, 2011). 
3.3.2 Overview 
This section of the document is grouped in sub-sections with each sub-section providing 
a detailed description to support the development of the 3W-ADA Sentry systems. 
Introduction: Provides a summary of the 3W-ADA Sentry Specification 
documentation, its purpose and scope. 
Overall Description: provides summary of the high level functional requirements of 
the 3W-ADA Sentry system, including product perspective and high-level 
functionalities, User classes and characteristic, general constraint, documentation, 
assumptions and dependencies. 
Specific Requirements: this section describes all required interfaces, including 
external interface, user interface, communication interface, hardware and software 
interfaces. 
Functional Requirements: This section describes the detailed functionalities of the 
3W-ADA Sentry system divided in categories and sub-sections, detailed functional 
description of setting up the payment networks and card account management 
systems, setting up SMS and Email communication gateways, functional 
requirements for enrolling cards. 
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Use Cases: This section describes a detailed Use Cases of the system and all sub-
systems as a flowchart to illustrate how to develop the sequence of event. 
Non-Functional Requirements: Finally, this is not a functional requirement, but 
provides additional requirements that support the effective operation of the system, it 
describes guidelines necessary to ensure that the developed system is secure, reliable, 
available to use, safe and performs at an acceptable level.  
3.3.3 Overall Description 
This section describes the 3W-ADA Sentry system and its operational functions, usages, 
and environments. 
3.3.3.1 Product Perspective 
Card present transaction is attributed to using physical object for identification and 
verification because making card present payment involves the cardholder physically 
presenting the card to the merchant who will insert the physical card into a payment 
acceptance device for validation and authentication with personal identification number 
(PIN), this process is called the “chip and pin technology” which is fundamentally 
preferred by merchants as a safer method for card payment acceptance. 
Generally, using physical objects for identification is expensive to replicate, less 
vulnerable to fraud threats, and difficult to reproduce by third-parties or criminals because 
any added secret by the original producer or owner may not be easy to replicate or cloned, 
and face-to-face identification also gives more credibility, trust and opportunity to 
physically examine and identify the object. However, this is not the case for remote 
identifications such as card-not-present transactions when no physical object is involved, 
because it uses static card and personal information to complete payment online giving 
rise to card-not-present fraud and the existing solutions developed to prevent the fraud 
also could not resolve the problem because most solutions use static passwords which can 
be stolen by criminals. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system replaces the existing system by introducing a new model 
which eliminates the use of vulnerable static data during online card-not-present payment 
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authentication and replaces the process with a low-cost, non-electronic and dynamic 
authentication token to make each card-not-present authentication a unique experience 
and prevent the customer from entering personal details each time payment is made 
online. 
3.3.3.2 Product Functions 
This research identified the causes of card-not-present fraud to be the exploitation of a 
flawed payment process that uses static data to complete online payment, motivation to 
steal for financial gain, and identity theft practices. 
The success rate recorded in this type of payment is attributed to the fact that the data 
remain static and can be reused over and over again for a certain period. 
However, the 3W-ADA sentry system removed some of the non-effective static data 
requirements and replaced it with a non-reusable and dynamic token that stands as 
additional factor to protect cardholders’ personal information. The following table 
presents the comparison between data used by existing systems and 3W-ADA sentry 
system. 
 
Data Description Data Type Existing Solutions 3W-ADA Sentry 
Card Serial/Reference No static Not Used YES 
Card No static YES  YES/NO 
Card Expiry Date static YES YES/NO 
Card Start Date static YES/NO Not used 
CVV (security code on back) static YES Not used 
Name of Customer static YES Not used 
Customer’s Address static YES Not used 
Customer’s City static YES Not used 
Customer’s Country static YES Not used 
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Customer’s Post Code static YES Not used 
3D Secure Password static YES Not used 
3W-ADA Sentry PAC dynamic NO YES 
 
Table 15: 3W-ADA Sentry system data requirement relationship 
 
All the static information contained on the 2nd to 4th rows on Table 13, even though are 
vulnerable to identity theft, cannot be used to complete a card-not-present payment on 
their own merit. The information contained on the 5th to 12th rows are also vulnerable to 
identity theft and adding these information to the previous can successfully complete a 
card-not-present transaction and at the same time expose personal information to other 
types of identity theft fraud and this is the main point of the problem. 
 The 3W-ADA Sentry system avoided all static data requirements that expose personal 
details to identity theft threats and replaced them with a one-time dynamic token called 
personal authentication code or PAC, using a low-cost and non-electronic authentication 
mechanism as indicated on the 13th or last row. 
During a card-not-present transaction powered by 3W-ADA Sentry system, a customer 
is required to enter his account’s serial no on the first step, this will enable 3W Sentry to 
validate the enrolment of an account with the given serial no in the enrolment directory, 
and identify its aligned PAC account. 
At this point, the process is still at 3W-ADA Sentry system, the card issuer has not been 
contacted. To validate that the serial no is submitted by the legitimate cardholder, 3W-
ADA Sentry will respond with further authentication questions including two dynamic 
and four static data. The dynamic data in some cases is communicated to the legitimate 
cardholder using the mobile number enrolled in 3W-ADA Sentry system, or the 
cardholder will manually identify the answer using his PAC Card. 
The Cardholder must present the correct responses to both static and dynamic data 
question to complete the payment. 
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3.3.3.3 User Characteristics 
The users of 3W-ADA Sentry system are classified into the following classes; 
Technical User 
This class of users includes the technical team and software engineers at Paymenex 
Limited or a related company using the 3W-ADA sentry who already have knowledge of 
their platform and the available application programming interfaces; 
Class: Developer, Software Engineers, Software programmers. 
Frequency: During new integration, implementation and day to day technical support. 
Area and Function: Application programing interface to integrate and implement the 
system and the graphical user interface to manage the system. 
Technical Knowledge: Experience in Advance Encryption standard protocol, XML and 
general programming.  
Non-Technical User 
This class of user includes customers wishing to make payment online or, he is the 
vulnerable user whose card and personal information needed to be protected from identity 
theft. And also includes the merchant, payment service provider and payment network 
operator who will implement the 3W-ADA sentry system at their online payment 
gateway, they are also vulnerable to card-not-present fraud. 
Class: Business, Merchant, Cardholder, Manager, Administrator and General Staff. 
Frequency: Day to day management and usage of the system 
Functions: Graphic user interface to enable cardholder’s verification and payment from 
the merchant’s online shop, and graphic user interface to enable business administrators 
to manage the system, including enrolling new account and general system monitoring.  
Technical Knowledge: Not required. 
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3.3.3.4 General Constraints 
Paymenex Limited failed to approve our request to integrate the 3W-ADA sentry system 
directly to its TransNET platform, however, this project presented a useful guideline 
sufficient for a normal programmer to integrate the 3W-ADA sentry system. 
HTML codes shall meet at least the version 4.0 standard and server side scripting 
language for the merchant extension shall be PHP. 
Other classified constraints includes; 
 Compatibility and Compliance Constraints. 
 Deployment Constraints.  
 Quality and grade of System. 
 Government legislation and Policy. 
3.3.3.5 User Documentations 
Handbook or Manual for Administrators who will be using the graphical interface for 
general operation and management of the 3W-ADA sentry system. 
Technical documentation for the application programming interface for merchants to 
enable them to integrate the 3W-ADA sentry authentication interface within their 
shopping cart environment.  
3.3.3.6 Assumptions and Dependencies 
 Linux Server (LAMP) running PHP 5 or higher for the merchant extension. 
 Paymenex TransNET system’s language and Database version or type. 
 Good internet connection between personal computer and server. 
 Short Message Services HTTP gateway to enable SMS communication. 
 mCrypt module for PHP installed on the merchant’s server and similar 
orientation on Paymenex TransNET. 
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3.3.3.7 Deliverables 
The deliverables of this project are divided into two parts. The first part is the 3W-ADA 
Sentry merchants’ interface, which is designed to be installed and used at the merchant 
shopping cart. The second part is a design and illustration of required update and changes 
designed to be carried out by the technical team at Paymenex Limited to meet up with the 
requirements. 
3.3.4 Functional Requirements 
The functional requirements include all related functions of the 3W-ADA sentry system 
and its related API function implemented at the merchant shop.  
Graphic User Interface – Web-based 
This includes all administrative, customer service and cardholder interfaces that provides 
graphic user interface to the account enrolment and management features, merchant 
registration, key management and PAC management modules, and card authentication 
interface for cardholders, which provides the interface for cardholders to enter their card 
details and PAC information for authentication and payment. 
Application Programming Interface 
The application programming interface is based on NVP and XML technology and works 
as a machine-to-machine interface without human intervention. It enables 3W-ADA 
sentry to communicate with the merchant system to authenticate account holder directly 
at the merchant shop and if the development is using the standalone model, additional 
interface with the payment network to pass verified payment transactions for processing 
will be required. 
3.3.4.1 3W-ADA Sentry System functional requirements 
 Setup Payment Network and Setting 
Before a card issued by a network can be enrolled in the 3W-ADA sentry system the 
network configuration is required, and its communication pathway setup to enable the 
3W-ADA sentry system to request validation and submit payment messages. 
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 The system shall enable the listing of all integrated Networks and Payment 
systems. 
 The system shall enable the ability to modify, edit, suspend, cancel or delete any 
network. 
This component is required if the development is using the framework of the standalone 
model where the 3W-ADA sentry system will be external to the card account management 
system or payment network. 
Setup SMS Gateway 
3W-ADA Sentry requires SMS gateway to enable its short messages services 
communication and all integrated SMS gateways shall appear in SMS Gateway listing. 
 System shall be able to add new or remove existing of SMS gateways. 
 System shall allow for the setting of SMS gateway credentials. 
 System shall be compatible with common SMS gateways. 
 System shall allow adding multiple SMS gateways. 
This component is required if the development is using the framework of the standalone 
model where the 3W-ADA sentry system will be external to the card account management 
system or payment network. 
Setup Email Gateway 
3W-ADA sentry system requires Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) settings to 
enable it send out email messages to recipients. 
 System shall allow the settings of SMTP host address and port. 
 System shall allow the setting of email account username and password. 
 System shall allow sending email using both external and internal mail servers. 
 System shall allow adding multiple mail server accounts. 
This component is required if using the standalone model because the 3W-ADA sentry 
do use email as part of its communication method during authentication. 
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Authentication Settings and Configurations 
Authentication credential and key management functionalities are required because the 
3W-ADA sentry system stands in the middle of external third-party system and 
communicates over either internet or relevant networks, it uses authentication credentials 
provided by the network, and also provides credentials to merchants, this enable a 
communication flow between the three systems. 
 System shall enable to setting of network credentials through the graphic user 
interface. 
 System shall be able to provide authentication credentials to merchants connecting 
to it. 
 System shall be able to allow the reset of the authentication credentials. 
 System shall enable the ability to disable the credentials. 
This component is fully required in the standalone model because key management is 
required for both merchants and payment networks, but if development is following the 
integrated model, only the merchant key management is necessary. 
Card Enrolment 
All qualifying cards with its card management system or payment network connected to 
the 3W-ADA sentry system can be enrolled in the security program after successful 
validation from their provider. 
 System shall allow the enrolment of card after it has been validated from the card 
provider using its identification number and a password or Webkey from the 3W 
ADA sentry public interface. 
 System shall allow the manual enrolment of card with only the serial no by an 
Administrator or Customer Service. 
 Card can only be enrolled once and assigned to a unique primary identification 
number. 
 Enrolled card shall be stored in the database as encrypted data. 
 Only the card details required for enrolment shall be used. 
 System shall allow for re assigning or change of PAC serial no. 
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 System shall have option to enable SMS communication of PAC details to 
customer’s mobile number held at payment network. 
This is a mandatory component for both models. 
Enrolled Card Directory 
 Successfully enrolled cards are added in enrolment directory. 
 Card enrolment directory graphic user interface shall list all enrolled cards in a 
table showing columns of related card parameters, for instance, unique primary 
identification, card serial no, date enrolled, PAC serial no, and current status. 
 Each row shall have option to disable, delete and re-activate enrolment. 
 System shall have separate interface for the listing of disabled and active cards. 
This is a mandatory component for both models. 
Authentication History 
Aim of the authentication history is to store and list a history of all authentication queries, 
sessions and their status. 
 Each time an authentication request is submitted from merchant shop, the system 
shall store detailed information of the request in session before starting the PAC 
authentication process, and after the process, it shall also store all information in 
database including, session id, serial no, date and time, request identification 
number, merchant identification number and PAC coordinate question, status of 
the authentication, and number of attempts. 
 System shall store and be able to provide as export all relevant trails of 
authentications. 
 System shall store and be able to provide as export or web view all relevant trails 
of its communications with the payment network. 
This is a mandatory component for both models. 
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Merchant application programming interface 
The merchant application programming interface shall interface with merchant shop front 
and be able to receive and respond to requests from the merchant’s application. 
 Merchant interface shall be able to post card details to 3W-ADA sentry system 
matching the correct parameters supplied by the 3W-ADA sentry system operator. 
 Merchant interface shall be able to receive and parse the XML response nodes and 
parameters into the merchant shop’s graphic user interface with form fields to 
enable the collection of card details for authentication. 
 Merchant interface shall be able to accept input from customers using form field 
and be able to convert the data received into the acceptable format of the 3W-
ADA sentry system’s application programming interface, the data input includes 
card serial no, card no, expiry date, Webkey, and answers to personal access code 
questions. 
This is a mandatory component for both models. 
Payment Network application programming interface 
The payment network application programming interface shall be an interface between 
payment networks or card account management systems and the 3W-ADA sentry, this 
will be a channel through which the 3W-ADA sentry system can be able to pass 
authenticated and verified payment message to the payment network to obtain a decision. 
 The 3W-ADA sentry system shall be able to authenticate the payment network 
using its settings and keys. 
 The 3W-ADA sentry system shall be able to identify the payment network when 
it receives verification and authentication request from the merchant. 
 The 3W-ADA sentry system shall be able to validate the payment network and 
route the payment authorisation request. 
 The 3W-ADA sentry system shall be able to receive response from the payment 
network and pass it on to the merchant to enable decision making. 
 The 3W-ADA sentry system shall be able to store history of this communication. 
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This component is required if the development is a standalone model where the payment 
network is external from the 3W-ADA sentry system.  
Integrated and Standalone models comparison  
The following table describes the comparison of the components necessary for the 
development of each model. 
 
Component Integrated  Standalone  
Setup Payment Network and Setting NO YES 
Setup SMS Gateway NO/YES YES 
Setup Email Gateway NO YES 
Authentication Settings and Configurations Merchant Merchant/ 
Payment 
Network 
User Profile Management NO YES 
Card Enrollment YES YES 
Enrolled Card Directory YES YES 
Authentication History YES YES 
Merchant application programming interface YES YES 
Payment Network application programming interface NO YES 
 
Table 16: 3W ADA Sentry System Model Components 
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3.3.4.2 Use Cases 
The 3W-ADA Sentry will have three users: the Administrator who will have root access 
and will configure all payment and card networks using the system; the Customer Service 
who manages the enrolment of card and; the Cardholder who accesses the system through 
a public graphic user interface to validate and enrol his personal card.  
3W-ADA Sentry Use Case 
 
 
Figure  35:  3W ADA Sentry system Use Case 
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Merchant interface Use Case 
 
 
Figure 36: Merchant interface Use Case 
 
3.3.4.3 Non-Functional Requirements 
Usability and Navigability  
 The system shall be user-friendly, easy to navigate and find ways around it, 
intuitive graphic user interface that will be easy to access, and menus positioned 
in visible locations of the interface. 
 Menus shall be relative to the page content or function. 
 Font sizes, colours and images shall be structured in the look and feel of the whole 
system and where necessary cascading style sheet (CSS) shall be used to give a 
perfect finish. 
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Accessibility 
 The system shall have provision for disabled users. 
 The system shall support multi languages. 
 The system shall be accessible through common web browsing applications, for 
instance, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Google Chrome and Safari. The accessibility 
may be extended to mobile devices using a responsive HTML technology. 
Performance 
 System shall be compatible with most browsers or mobile sites, running from both 
web, mobile and application servers. 
 System should be able to process over 100 simultaneous requests from merchant’s 
shop and be able to respond within one second in peak time without getting 
overload. 
 System shall be able to deliver response received from card network within 5 
seconds or before the set session expires. 
 Simultaneous customer service users can be performing enrolment of different 
accounts. 
Reliability 
 System shall be able to handle errors and report bug to Administrators. 
 System shall be easy to recover with adequate backup plan in place. 
 System shall be free from bug, virus, malfunctions and errors. 
 System shall maintain redundant servers, failover sites, and load balancer where 
necessary.  
Availability 
 The 3W-ADA Sentry system shall maintain at least 99.9% uptime 24 hours a day; 
this is necessary because it is the gateway to payment. 
 The 3W-ADA must be enabled on the Account  
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Safety 
 No safety requirements have been identified between the merchant system and the 
3W-ADA sentry system. 
Security 
 All transaction data and communications between merchant systems to the card 
network through the 3W-ADA sentry system shall be encrypted using any 
cryptographic standard, for instance the Advance Encryption Standard (AES) of 
at least 128 bits and cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. 
 System Administrators and Customer Service users with access to enrolment 
process, or enrollment directory or any interface used to manage enrolled cards 
requires strong login authentication system. 
 System shall be able to kill session and logout user if system is idle for a certain 
time. 
 Cardholder enrolling by himself through the public shall be authenticated with his 
card credentials before enrolment. 
 After receiving three failed authentication attempts from merchant’s shops, 3W 
sentry shall automatically suspend card’s enrolment. 
 System Administrators shall maintain security policy that covers the 3W-ADA 
sentry system. 
 All access over hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) shall be secured with Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL). 
 Access to hosting server shall be well managed and controlled to make sure only 
the authorized users can access the server. 
 Database shall be designed with security in mind to prevent unauthorised injection 
or modification of data. 
 System production server shall be PCI compliant and vulnerability scan shall be 
performed at least once per quarter. 
 Personal computers used by system administrators and customer service agents 
shall be free from virus and spyware, for instance, care shall be taken to scan the 
personal computers as often as possible. 
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Maintainability 
 System shall not be ambiguous or depend on any specific user, it shall be easy to 
be managed by any professional in a related field and shall be cross-platform. 
 System shall be cost effective to manage and resources can be easily sourced 
locally. 
Design Constraint  
 System shall be developed using a software development model and shall observe 
all standards. 
 Coding shall be well commented to support the easy understanding and follow up 
by future programmers. 
3.3.4.4 Interface Requirements 
User Interface 
 The system shall support or be compatible with common web and mobile 
browsing applications, for instance, Internet Explorer, Netscape, Firefox, Google 
Chrome and Safari.  
Hardware Interface 
There is no hardware interface identified for the 3W ADA Sentry system. 
Software Interface 
 The System shall be able to communicate with the database system using 
structured query language (SQL). 
 The System shall be able to communicate with the Enrollment Directory 
 The System shall be able to communicate with the personal authentication code 
system. 
 The System shall be able to communicate with the active SMS gateway. 
 The System shall be able to communicate with the active mail server. 
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 The System shall be able to communicate with the merchant’s systems through 
the application programming interface. 
 The System shall be able to communicate with the payment network system 
through the application programming interface to request payment authorisation 
and receive response. 
 The System shall be able to communicate with any cryptographic module that will 
enable it to decrypt or encrypt data. 
Communication Interface 
The System shall be compatible with HTTP over internet, TCP/IP over intranet or 
dedicated line communication protocol. 
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3.4  3W-ADA Sentry System Design 
3.4.1 Introduction 
This section describes the integrated model of the 3W-ADA sentry system design 
requirements, environment, system and subsystem architecture of the modules, files and 
database design, input and out formats, application programming interfaces, processing 
logic, and external interfaces. 
3.4.1.1 Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this section is to describe the architectural and technical design of the 
integrated model of the 3W-ADA Sentry to give a blueprint of how to develop software 
that meets the description of the 3W-ADA sentry system’s software requirement 
specification using any choice of programming language. 
The design described in this section is limited to the integrated model of 3W-ADA sentry 
system because this project aims to solve a problem of existing payment network with 
card account management system already in place. It serves as a guide to the programmers 
and software engineers at Paymenex Limited to enable them implement the required add-
on on Paymenex TransNET since the researcher is not allowed to access the xTransNET 
platform. 
3.4.1.2 Audience 
This section is intended for administrators, development engineers and program managers 
at Paymenex Limited and anyone who wants to develop software that meets the software 
requirement specifications or to understand the system architecture. 
3.4.1.3 Project design executive summary 
This document section described the software design of the integrated model of a 3W-
ADA Sentry system, a system that act as an enhancement or add-on module to an existing 
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card management and payment network by enabling a low-cost authentication features 
using the coordinated geometry.  
The card management and payment network assigns a personal authentication code card 
or plane containing a layout of a coordinated geometry system extending vertically with 
Alphabets A – J, and horizontally with numbers 1 – 0 forming a 10 x 10 or 100 
intersection points represented by randomly generated numbers, and standby to dynamic 
authenticate the card remotely using a unique randomly selected pair of the vertical and 
horizontal intersection points before granting access to payment. And the main objective 
is to prevent remote authentication vulnerabilities caused by using static authentication 
data.  
It illustrates and describes the structural and behavioural components and tools required 
and provides a programming guideline in such a way that programmers can work with it 
to build a feasible prototype and main system, the component and guideline covered in 
this design section includes; system architecture, system database design, human – 
machine interface design, detailed software design, interface design. 
3.4.1.4 3W-ADA Sentry system design overview 
The system design overview described in the following diagram illustrates the design 
layout of an integrated model of 3W-ADA sentry and the Paymenex xTransNET. 
The 3W-ADA sentry system sits between Paymenex TransNET and all third-party 
systems connecting to it through an application programming interface. However, this 
design section is limited to a third-party connections for online payment and data that 
passes the 3W-ADA Sentry to the payment network as illustrated in Fig.3.3-1 below and 
a connector. 
The online payment section represents the merchant’s system connecting over an insecure 
internet network using the application programming interface. 
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Figure 37: Integrated 3W-ADA Sentry environment in Paymenex TransNET 
 
3.4.1.5 3W-ADA Sentry System design constraints 
 Limited access to personally inspect the Paymenex TransNET platform. 
 Limited access to the Card management system of Paymenex xTransNET. 
 No access to the current database structure of Paymenex xTransNET. 
 No access to modify codes in Paymenex TransNET. 
3.4.1.6 Point of Contact 
The point of contact for this project is Kingsley Chibuzor Aguoru, ACE Graduate School, 
University of East London, Docklands. London, United Kingdom. 
Email: kcaguoru@bcs.org Web: www.kingsley.pro or u0840551@uel.ac.uk . 
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Alternatively, contact the ACE Graduate School of the University of East London – 
United Kingdom www.uel.ac.uk  
3.4.1.7 Project References 
Section 3.3 The 3W-ADA Sentry system software requirements specification.  
3.4.1.8 Project Document Overview 
 
Section Title Description 
3.3.1 Introduction The purpose and scope of this project, as well as 
information about this document. 
3.3.2 3W-ADA Sentry system 
Architecture and design 
The system and/or subsystems architecture. 
3.3.3 3W-ADA Sentry System 
Database design 
The final design of all database management 
system (DBMS) files and the non-DBMS files 
associated with the system. 
3.3.4 Detailed software and interface 
design 
The information needed for a system development 
team to build and integrate the hardware 
components, to code and integrate the software 
modules, and to interconnect the hardware and 
software segments into a functional product. 
 
Table 17: Project design document overview 
 
3.4.2 3W-ADA Sentry system architecture and design 
The software architecture and design is divided into two sections, the Paymenex 
TransNET section and the Merchant or Third-party section, both sections reside in 
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Figure 39: TransNET and Merchant’s Systems communication flowchart 
 
 
 
Figure 40: 3W-ADA Sentry dataflow 
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3.4.2.1 Design of 3W-ADA Sentry system on Paymenex TransNET  
The description of the 3W-ADA sentry integration to Paymenex TransNET is presented 
using several unified modelling language (UML) diagrams and sample codes to provide 
a concept guideline to enable programmers at Paymenex Limited to complete the required 
update and integration at their end. 
 
 
Figure 41: 3W-ADA Sentry Sequence diagram 
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Figure 42: 3W-ADA Sentry Statechart diagram 
 
3.4.3 3W-ADA Sentry System database design 
The 3W-ADA Sentry integration requires 3 basic database tables. 
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a) Batch Table (ev_cord_batch), this table contains the PAC batch grouping 
information according to the quantity, group, date, starting and ending, status of 
download and entire batch history. 
b) PAC Serial No (ev_cord_serial), this table contains serial numbers of the PAC 
Cards and their individual status. 
c) Account Users (ev-cord_accuser), this table contains information about Card 
Accounts and their linked PAC card, including the status of the PAC card on a 
given card Account. 
d) PAC Card (ev_cordinate), this table contains the information about the PAC 
coordinated values, including information about used values and active values. 
 
 
Figure 43: 3W-ADA Paymenex TransNET Entity Relationship Diagram 
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3.4.3.1 Database dictionary  
The database dictionary of the sample entity relationship diagram (ERD) above is 
presented in appendix A. 
3.4.4 Detailed Software design 
3.4.4.1 3W-ADA Sentry Paymenex module software design 
The following wireframe, design and the pseudocode described in Appendix A presented 
a blue print of how to integrate the 3W-ADA Sentry system in Paymenex TransNET. 
Wireframe UI design for the PAC Card production and initialization  
The following wireframe design illustrates the user interface used for PAC card 
production and management features. 
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Figure 44: PAC Card Production and Management Wireframe design 
 
Wireframe UI Design for Link a PAC Card to a Paymenex Account  
The following wireframe illustrates how to design the user interface used for linking a 
PAC card to a Paymenex card or Account. 
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Figure 45: PAC Card Link wireframe design 
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3.4.4.2 3W-ADA Sentry merchant module software design 
The implementation at merchant’s shopping cart is done using a set of application 
programing languages as described below. 
3.4.4.3 Merchant authentication parameter 
The following table describes the merchant authentication parameters required to identify 
the merchant, its encryption keys on Paymenex TransNET, the values used within the 
parameters are configured and provided by Paymenex TransNET team. 
 
Param Keys Type Values Description 
p_merchant_id Number(10)  8-10 digit value 
Paymenex TransNET’s Merchant 
ID 
p_local_curr_code Varchar(3) 
ISO Currency 
Code, i.e. GBP 
Merchant Country Local ISO 
Currency Code 
p_country_name Varchar(30) 
United 
Kingdom 
Merchant Country Full Name 
izenid Number(10) 10 digit  Merchant’s AES key identifier 
enc Varchar (3) enc Encryption data container 
Encryption Parameters [ Advanced Encryption Standard – 128 bit Method ] 
cipher Varchar 
rijndael-
128 
3W-ADA Sentry uses Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES – 128 bit) and 
AES (Rijndael) is new generation 
symmetric block cipher. 
mode Varchar(3) cbc 
Mode of operation is the procedure of 
enabling the repeated and secure use of 
a block cipher under a single key. 
cipher-block chaining (CBC). 
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Table 18: Merchant 3W Sentry authentication parameter and description 
 
The above data table is used to handle the merchant identification, key identification, 
encryption and decryption processes. 
Sample folder containing an AES decryption and encryption coding in PHP language is 
provided in Appendix B. 
3.4.4.4 Requesting transaction session ID 
The following table contains parameters required to initiate the first step of card 
authentication processing from the merchant’s shop. 
 
Parameter Type Description 
p_merchant_id Integer(10) Merchant ID  
p_serial_no Number(10) Paymenex Card or Account Serial No 
p_act_id VarChar(10) Action Code, MTCON  
p_trans_cur Char(3) the transaction currency 
p_order_no VarChar(25) Order No generated from your system 
p_remark VarChar(25) Any other remark  
p_country_name Char(20) Full Name of Merchant’s country of location 
secret_key Number 16 digit 
Encryption Secret Key for merchant 
issued by Paymenex 
iv_key Number 16 digit 
Encryption IV Key or (Initialization Vector 
Key) issued by Paymenex. 
 144 | P a g e  
 
P_local_curr_code Char(3) Merchant Local Currency in ISO standard, i.e. 
GBP or USD. 
Table 19: Merchant Interface step one parameter and description 
 
The Serial No parameter will be an input from the customer at merchant’s checkout page. 
 
 
Figure 46: Merchant interface – step one wireframe 
 
When “Confirm Order” is clicked, the merchant system should be able to collect required 
values and parameters relevant to the post and for an NVP string as 
shown below in 3.4.4.5. 
3.4.4.5 Parameter string  
p_serial_no=11124711&p_amount=10.57&p_trans_cur=GBP&p_order_no=563734&p_rema
rk=ACEUEL&p_merchant_id=100000155&p_local_curr_code=GBP&p_country_name=Unit
ed Kingdom&p_act_id=MTCON 
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The next step is to encrypt the above string using the AES encryption values, mode, keys, 
in HEX format. And when encrypted the result will be a mixture of lowercase alphabets 
and numbers similar to the following; 
d9134cba1f2609a8cc85d38eabb01c2c2070c05be8ec3fe4b5b64ae7a69b8ee1f17ec3a5f3
6233980d07a7a1528239b062de598caaeafe823b3649c4a8b2d73ac9ab6f770ee2bd6ff89
0112257cc60078e645f6e2b 
Now we are ready to post the encrypted data to Paymenex TransNET by forming an NVP 
string in an URL POST using the “izenid” as the identifier and the parameter “enc” as the 
encryption data container. 
https://paymentURLPath/processingfile?izenid=1234567890&enc=9134cba1f2609a8cc
85d38eabb01c2c2070c05be8ec3fe4b5b64ae7a69b8ee1f17ec3a5f36233980d07a7a15282
39b062de598caaeafe823b3649c4a8b2d73ac9ab6f770ee2bd6ff890112257cc60078e 
3.4.4.6 Response from Paymenex TransNET 
Paymenex TransNET will use the “izenid” received to search the key directory for 
matching secret and IV keys, and will attempt to decrypt the encrypted data in the 
container, if successful, then, it will proceed to read the string for the “p_merchant_id”, 
and will again match the value contained in the decrypted file with that stored against the 
keys in the key directory. 
Next is to process the request and return the following sample of XML back to merchant’s 
system. 
 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> 
<TRANS_NET> 
<REQUEST_ID>13897</REQUEST_ID> 
<REQUEST_DATE>2013-09-29 15:08:35.0</REQUEST_DATE> 
<RESPONSE_CODE>001</RESPONSE_CODE> 
<RESPONSE_REASON> 
<SUCCESS>100</SUCCESS> 
</RESPONSE_REASON> 
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<CATALOG> 
<CARDDATA> 
<P_MODE>L</P_MODE> 
<P_PIN_ONE><![CDATA[First]]></P_PIN_ONE> 
<P_PIN_TWO><![CDATA[Fifth]]></P_PIN_TWO 
><P_PAC_CODE_ONE><![CDATA[G7]]></P_PAC_CODE_ONE> 
<P_PAC_CODE_TWO><![CDATA[B1]]></P_PAC_CODE_TWO> 
<TRANS_SESSION_ID><![CDATA[zlkzwtbcl73XO6nh]]></TRANS_SESSION_ID> 
<VAL_CARD_EXP>Y</VAL_CARD_EXP> 
<TRANS_AMOUNT>17.820</TRANS_AMOUNT> 
<PROCESS_AMOUNT>10.570</PROCESS_AMOUNT> 
<TRANS_CURR><![CDATA[GBP]]></TRANS_CURR> 
<PROCESS_CURR><![CDATA[GBP]]></PROCESS_CURR> 
<CONVER_RATE>1.000</CONVER_RATE> 
</CARDDATA> 
</CATALOG> 
</TRANS_NET> 
 
Table 20: Merchant interface step one response XML 
 
Merchant system will parse the XML into an html form for the customer, the form will 
be similar to the following user interface. 
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Figure 47: Merchant interface – step two wireframe 
 
The customer is expected to enter his card number, Webkey, PAC answers, expiry date 
and submit the form to complete his transaction.  
When the form is submitted, the merchant system should form the second string as 
follows using the information submitted by the customer. 
p_serial_no=11124711&p_card_no=6001110232933158&p_pin_one=8&p_pin_two=5&p_pa
c_code_one=309&p_pac_code_two=921&p_card_exp_month=12&p_card_exp_year=2017&p
_trans_session_id= 
zlkzwtbcl73XO6nh&p_merchant_id=100000155&p_local_curr_code=GBP&p_country_name
=United Kingdom&p_act_id=MTPAY 
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To complete the transaction, the above string should be encrypted and posted to 
Paymenex URL, this will enable 3W-ADA sentry to validate the card holder for 
legitimacy, if it went well, the 3W-ADA sentry will pass the payment instruction over to 
payment network or processor for processing. 
3.4.4.7 Database design 
The merchant’s module of the 3W-ADA Sentry system requires no database element, 
however, the existing database of the shop should be used to store payment transaction 
details, for instance, payment status, amount, time and date paid, and payment method 
used. 
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3.5 3W-ADA Sentry User Acceptance Test (UAT) 
3.5.1 Introduction 
This section of this research document presents a descriptive plan of the user acceptance 
testing of the 3W-ADA Sentry System by the software testers in real world with all 
business representatives to verify that the system actually solved the problem to an 
acceptable level in accordance with the business requirement and fit for purpose.  
3.5.2 Purpose 
The aim of this User Acceptance Test is to ascertain that the 3W-ADA Sentry system 
meets the owner’s business requirement as outlined in the problem statement provided. 
The purpose of the user acceptance testing is to measure if the 3W-ADA sentry system 
can support day-to-day business and prevent card-not-present fraud or abuse and ensure 
the system is fit for business usage. 
3.5.3 Role and Responsibilities 
Position Responsibilities Name Company 
Project 
Manager 
Communication with user to agree 
on format and scope of UAT. 
Agreement of acceptance criteria 
with the users prior to commencing 
UAT. 
 
Philip Oscar 
 
Paymenex Limited  
Management Responsible for allocating 
sufficient resources, experienced 
personnel, infrastructure, time and 
budget 
 
Jennifer Ijeoma 
Vikram Bawne 
(1)  
 
Paymenex Limited 
Administrator Administration Alharazi Moe Paymenex Canada 
Inc. 
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Test Lead Ensure that the full detailed test 
plan is available for test users. 
Ensure that any bugs identified 
during UAT are recorded properly. 
Ensure testing takes place within 
agreed timeframes. 
Administers the deployment of 
resources to provide the best 
recommendation to Paymenex 
management or Board. 
 
Kennedy 
Richard 
 
Jennifer Ijeoma 
 
Kingsley Aguoru 
 
 
Paymenex Limited 
 
 
Paymenex Limited 
 
ACE University of 
East London 
 
 
 
Testers 
Execute test cases to ensure the 
application performs at an 
acceptable level and in line with the 
SRS. Documentation of all testing 
results.  
Raphael Tawiah 
Kwaku 
Ofosuhene 
Michael 
Kwablah 
Tabiri Boakye 
Sydney 
Mathabatha 
Vodafone Ghana 
Vodafone Ghana 
 
Vodafone Ghana 
 
Vodafone Ghana 
Multichoice South 
Africa 
 
 
Developer 
Responsible for supporting UAT 
with resources, infrastructure and 
correction of errors and fix bug 
 
Kingsley Aguoru 
 
ACE University of 
East London 
 
Table 21: UAT role and responsibilities 
 
3.5.4 Testers and Participants 
It is fundamental that the testing participants or testers should include representatives 
from all areas involved in the card-not-present systems at Paymenex Limited and its 
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member Acquirers or Issuers to validate the system’s functions before going live in 
production, based on this requirements, the best personnel for the UAT testing are: 
 Personnel at Paymenex Limited who are directly impacted by the upcoming 
system and business process changes. 
 Proposed frequent users of the 3W-ADA sentry solution.  
 Selected individuals with a sound understanding of business processes in the areas 
they represent. 
 Individuals with the necessary time to commit to this endeavour. 
 Willing to experiment (to try various methods to see what works and what does 
not work). 
 Patient and have a tolerance for ambiguity. 
 
Participant/Tester Name Company/Department Area of testing 
Tabiri Boakye Vodafone Ghana Merchant’s shopping cart 
implementation, Testing as 
legitimate Cardholder. 
 
Raphael Tawiah 
 
Vodafone Ghana 
Merchant’s shopping cart 
implementation, Testing as 
legitimate Cardholder. 
 
Kwaku Ofosuhene 
Vodafone Ghana Merchant’s shopping cart 
implementation, Testing as 
illegitimate Cardholder. 
 
Michael Kwablah 
 
Vodafone Ghana 
Merchant’s shopping cart 
implementation, Testing as 
illegitimate Cardholder. 
Sydney Mathabatha MultiChoice South Africa Merchant’s shopping cart 
implementation, Testing as 
both legitimate and illegitimate 
Cardholder. 
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Moe Alharazi Paymenex Canada Inc. Paymenex TransNET 3W-ADA 
Sentry Card enrollment and 
management module 
Loius Ruggier UseMyServices Inc. 
Canada 
Merchant’s shopping cart 
implementation, Testing as 
both legitimate and illegitimate 
Cardholder. 
Vikram Bawne 
Mangesh Regundawar 
 
Paymenex Limited 
Paymenex TransNET 3W-ADA 
Sentry Card enrollment and 
management module. 
 
Della Porbley 
 
Paymenex Ghana Limited 
Paymenex TransNET 3W-ADA 
Sentry Card enrollment and 
management module. 
Table 22: Testers and Participants  
 
3.5.5 Testing Schedules 
Activity /Operation Lead Responsibility Date 
Testers Identification and Select for 
UAT. 
Kingsley Aguoru 15 /05/ 2012 
Establish/Develop test scenarios and 
script/cases. 
Kingsley Aguoru 15/ 05/ 2012 
Validates participant’s availability for 
testing. 
Kingsley Aguoru 15/05/2012 
Review scenarios/scripts for 
accuracy, completeness and 
sequence (confirm test data is 
correct) 
Kingsley Aguoru/ Paymenex 
Technical Team 
15/05/ 2012 
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Ensure all software/hardware and 
other resources required for UAT 
environment are configured for 
testing. 
Kingsley Aguoru / Paymenex 
Technical Team 
15/05/2012 
UAT Environment validation Kingsley Aguoru / Paymenex 
Technical Team 
15/05/2012 
Testing by UAT Participants Testing Participants 15/05/2012 
Recording and Documentation or 
reports 
Testing Participants 15/05/2012 
 
Table 23: Testing Schedule 
 
3.5.6 Test Requirements 
 Testing of the 3W-ADA sentry system will initially be carried out at Paymenex 
head office and Vodafone Ghana head office, alternatively, some testers may 
choose to perform some testing from their regular personal computers where 
possible. Test results must still be coordinated with others. 
 The date of the User Acceptance Test will be 18/05/2012 and shall be 
communicated to all parties.  
 Identified testing participants shall receive all testing instructions prior to the start 
of testing. 
 Testing materials, for instance, card, mobile phone shall be provided and 
organizers shall make sure that are in working condition. 
3.5.6.1 Types of Testing 
The testing carried out in this research is to show the functionalities and sequential 
process of the 3W-ADA sentry system on a system prototype, since the prototype is not 
designed for a production environment, the testing will be a ‘Black-Box’ type of testing 
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which directs its testing activities on the functionalities of the solution as oppose to 
‘White-Box’ testing which looks into the internal structure of the solution.  
However, while developing and implementing 3W-ADA sentry system for production 
the ‘Gray-Box’ testing should be used to make sure both functionalities and codes are 
securely and adequately implemented, the gray-box testing means testing both the 
functionalities and codes of the 3W-ADA sentry system. 
3.5.7 Test Environments 
The testing environment for the 3W-ADA sentry system is online, and the 3W -ADA 
sentry merchant module. 
3.5.8 Test Perspectives 
Testers shall also test in both legitimate and illegitimate perspectives. The legitimate 
perspective will act as a legitimate owner of the payment card, and the mobile no linked 
to it. The illegitimate perspective will act as fraudsters who will be in possession of the 
card details only but without the mobile phone and or PAC card of the account. 
3.5.9 3W-ADA Sentry Test Cases 
3.5.9.1 3W-ADA Sentry Paymenex TransNET Module Test Cases 
 
I. Paymenex card Enrolment 
TEST CASE  Paymenex Card Enrolment to 3W-ADA Sentry program 
Test Case ID TC-01 
 
Purpose /Feature 
Enrolling Paymenex card to the 3W-ADA Sentry system for dynamic 
authentication during card-not-present transaction. 
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Pre-Condition 
The Paymenex card must be validated, activated, active, and not 
expired. 
Mobile phone number is registered with the card. 
Flow of Event/Process 1) Enter the serial number of payment card and fetch account 
status. 
2) Enter PAC serial number and click align to Link PAC to Payment 
card serial number. 
Expected Result PAC card is successfully linked to enter payment card serial number. 
Result (Tick as 
applicable) 
Passed YES Failed NO Incomplete No 
Remark/Reason / 
Comment 
(attach extra sheet if 
applicable) 
 
 
 
 
Table 24: Test Case - Paymenex card enrolment 
 
II. Disable PAC feature on a card 
TEST CASE Disable PAC feature on a card 
Test Case ID TC-02 
 
Purpose /Feature 
Disable PAC feature on a Paymenex card. 
 
 
Pre-Condition 
The Paymenex card must be validated, activated, active, and not 
expired. 
PAC card is already linked to the payment card’s serial number. 
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Flow of Event/Process 1) Enter serial number of payment card and fetch account status. 
2) On the Turn Off/On column, uncheck the checkbox to disable 
PAC feature. 
3) Click on ON/OFF to save changes. 
Expected Result PAC card features are successfully disabled from payment card. 
Result (Tick as 
applicable) 
Passed YES Failed NO Incomplete No 
Remark/Reason / 
Comment 
(attach extra sheet if 
applicable) 
 
 
 
Table 25: Test Case – Disable PAC feature on a card 
 
III. Re-enable PAC feature on a Card 
TEST CASE Re-enable PAC feature on a card 
Test Case ID TC-03 
 
Purpose /Feature 
Re-enable PAC feature on a Paymenex card. 
 
 
Pre-Condition 
The Paymenex card must be validated, activated, active, and not 
expired. 
PAC card is already linked to the payment card’s serial number. 
Flow of Event/Process 1) Enter Serial Number of payment card and fetch account status. 
2) On the Turn Off/On Column, Check the checkbox to re-enable 
PAC feature. 
3) Click on ON/OFF to save changes 
Expected Result PAC card features are successfully re-enabled from payment card. 
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Result (Tick as 
applicable) 
Passed YES Failed NO Incomplete No 
Remark/Reason / 
Comment 
(attach extra sheet if 
applicable) 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: Test Case – Re-enable PAC feature on a card 
 
3.5.9.2 3W ADA Sentry Merchant interface Test Case 
 
TEST CASE  Payment with a Paymenex card 
Test Case ID TC-02 
 
Purpose /Feature 
Using Paymenex card to make payment online on the merchant 
interface with 3W-ADA Sentry solution. 
 
 
Pre-Condition 
The Paymenex card must be validated, activated, active, with 
sufficient balance, and not expired. 
Mobile phone number must be able to receive SMS or customer is 
holding the corresponding PAC card. 
Flow of Event/Process 1) Open the merchant payment interface. 
2) Enter your card’s Serial number or mobile number. 
3) On the next page, enter your card details as asked, including 
card No, Webkey, Expiry Date, PAC response and submit 
payment. 
 
Expected Result The expected result is divided into two sections. 
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1) Legitimate Tester Result 
When Serial number is submitted, the 3W-ADA sentry 
system module installed in Paymenex TransNET will identify 
the enrolled PAC card and send two random PAC question 
by SMS to the mobile number registered with the card Serial, 
And when the cardholder enters the card details and PAC 
response on step two, if they are valid, the 3W-ADA Sentry 
module in Paymenex TransNET will validate the account 
and pass it on to Paymenex TransNET for authorisation. 
 
2) Illegitimate Tester Result 
When Serial Number is submitted, the 3W-ADA sentry 
system module installed in Paymenex TransNET will identify 
the enrolled PAC card and send two random PAC questions 
by SMS to the mobile number registered with the card serial, 
and because the illegitimate tester is not in possession of 
the mobile number or the PAC card registered with the card 
Serial no, he cannot be able know the PAC response, and 
he try to guess the PAC response, but the 3W -ADA sentry 
system module cannot be able to validate the response, and 
on third attempt, the 3W-ADA sentry will lock the account for 
suspicion of fraud, Transaction will not be completed. 
 
Result (Tick as 
applicable) 
Passed YES Failed NO Incomplete No 
Remark/Reason / 
Comment 
(attach extra sheet if 
applicable) 
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Test Case – 3W Sentry Merchant interface 
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3.5.10 Test Assumptions 
 The User Acceptance Test environment will be available. 
 Personal Computers with internet access and good browser will also be available. 
 Mobile phone number with mobile network connection available in country of 
testing. 
 Paymenex card, duly validated, with expiry date valid until after the testing 
schedules. 
 All Paymenex cards to be used for testing are correctly enrolled in the 3W-ADA 
sentry system with assigned PAC serial numbers. 
 All Paymenex cards have sufficient balance for related testing. 
 The business team has reviewed and accepted functionalities identified in the 
business requirements and software requirements documents. 
 Code walkthroughs and reviews will be completed by the development team, 
though this will serve as guide for production related development. 
 Unit testing will be completed by the development team prior to release to the test 
team. 
 Testers will test what is documented in the software requirements specifications. 
 All Servers and networks related to the Paymenex TransNET and 3W-ADA sentry 
systems are running at least 99% uptime. 
 All changes to software requirements specifications shall be communicated to the 
test team. 
3.5.11 Test Risks 
There is no risk identified for this user acceptance testing, this is because all testing will 
be carried out on Paymenex TransNET demonstration server. 
3.5.12 Acceptance and Acknowledgments 
During the testing, recommendations were presented which specifically relates to the 
incorrectness, or incompleteness of the 3W-ADA Sentry system, but the only concern 
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with its enhancement and updated responses to this recommendation is presented on 
Appendix C, and the Acceptance Matrix on Appendix D. 
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4. PART 4 – 3W-ADA VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
4.1 Introduction 
This section describes the verification and validation of the 3W-ADA Sentry system.  
The verification phase carried out checks to confirm that the system developed fulfils or 
is in line with the software requirements specification through the evaluation of the 
development lifecycle drawn from feasibility, specification requirements, design, coding, 
testing and implementation organized using a checklist or walkthrough document. 
The validation phase presents the strategies used to confirm that the project meets user’s 
requirement and accepted by the client as a solution to the reported problem. 
4.1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of the verification and validation of this project is to confirm that the system 
developed and delivered is in line with the software specification requirements and also 
meets the use’s requirements or is fit for purpose. 
4.2 3W-ADA Sentry System Verification 
4.2.1 System Feasibility 
The appropriateness and feasibility of the 3W-ADA Sentry System was checked through 
the analysis and evaluation of the problem reported by the stakeholder and compared 
against the discoveries of this research, this helped to identify the causes of the problem 
and provided a blueprint of the framework used to produce the solution. 
In a follow up, feasibility study was carried out on the proposed solution to confirm the 
suitability, possibility and relevance of the system and the outcome reveals that, since the 
problem is majorly caused by using static information for payment in card-not-present 
environment, and the system proposed to use a known analytical geometry concept to 
apply dynamism into the process, it is then evidential that this process will remove the 
causes of the problem. 
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4.2.2 System development cycle 
The development process of the 3W-ADA Sentry System was carried out using the 
waterfall system development model comprising series of sequential development phases 
and iteration to maintain a check throughout the process, the development process was 
monitored with the system development checklist. 
 
 
Figure 48: Waterfall Development process with iteration (Aguoru, 2007) 
 
Requirement Analysis  
Analysis of the problem statement and review of literatures, journals, empirical 
investigation to establish a clear understanding of the problem and requirement.  
Specification  
Documentation of the requirements specification including the functional and system 
requirements, design and relevant information to support development. 
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Design  
Documentation of the architectural design diagrams, including user interfaces, usecase, 
flowchart and data structure. 
Coding 
Coding of the merchant module using relevant technologies and environments, and 
providing a development guideline for the enhancement requirements for the 
stakeholder’s system. 
Testing 
Testing of the components and application programming interface using functional type 
of testing. 
Implementation 
Installation of the 3W-ADA Sentry system enhancement and deployment to live system. 
4.2.3 System Development Checklist 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system development checklist is a comprehensive list of predefined 
tasks extracted from the phases of the waterfall model used in system development as a 
guideline of tasks to be checked, noted, implemented or consulted. The system 
development milestone and development checklist are predefined guideline to quality 
because they help in progress monitoring, decision making, prioritization, resources and 
development efforts management as an important tasks throughout the development 
phase. 
The following table describes the sequential activities carried out to support the system 
verification and acceptance processes. 
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Activity Responsible Personnel  
Described the criteria and condition of acceptance. Paymenex Limited Board and Business 
Analyst, QA Staffs 
Identify and plan for verification and validation 
activities necessary to support acceptance criteria 
of the 3W-ADA Sentry System 
 
Paymenex Limited Board and Business 
Analyst, QA Staffs, Researcher, Selected 
Paymenex Members. 
Complete the 3W-ADA Project’s milestone. Paymenex Technical Team and 
Researcher. 
Certify the completion of any required verification 
and validation activities for the project deliverables 
through testing 
 
Researcher. 
Schedule and conduct a User acceptance meeting 
for approvers and testers for a User acceptance 
testing with respect to their acceptance criteria. 
 
 
Paymenex Technical Team, Researcher, 
Administrators 
 
Table 28: 3W-ADA Sentry System checklist roles 
 
4.2.4 System Acceptance Criteria 
The 3W-ADA Sentry system is checked through user acceptance testing to confirm that 
it meets users’ requirement. The acceptance criteria presented in this section describes the 
processes and conditions of reviews carried out to confirm the acceptance of the 3W-
ADA Sentry system. 
 The acceptance criteria described in below table outlined the criteria and conditions 
under which the approval team, the project owner and the researcher agreed to accept that 
the project is complete and business requirement fulfilled. 
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Milestone Deliverable Acceptance Criteria 
Problem 
Statement 
Problem statement 
analysis and 
documentation 
The proposal shall seem feasibly possible and within 
the resources allowance of the company. 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
Complete 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
documentation. 
The Software Requirements Specification describes 
the functionalities of the 3W-ADA Sentry System and 
includes: 
 Business requirements and process 
 Use cases 
 Functional requirements 
 Non-functional requirements 
The Researcher and the sponsor’s business and 
technical team has reviewed the specification and its 
requirements for completeness, feasibility 
correctness, and consistency with the problem 
statement.  
The sponsor’s technical team has reviewed the SRS 
and its integration requirements to Paymenex 
TransNET and crosschecks all necessary possible 
risks involved and analyse the impact of the 
integration to the existing system. 
Software Design 
Specification 
Complete 
Software Design 
Specification 
Documentation 
The design documents describes the architectural and 
technical design of the integrated model of the 3W-
ADA sentry to give a blueprint of how to develop 
software that meets the description of the 3W-ADA 
sentry system’s software requirement specification 
using any choice of programming language. 
The sponsor’s technical team has reviewed the 
specification design to ensure that all requirements 
relating the integrated model of the 3W-ADA Sentry 
system as contained in the SRS documents are 
represented, well understood and the team has the 
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Milestone Deliverable Acceptance Criteria 
expertise to implement the module necessary for 
Paymenex TransNET. 
 
Software Ready 
for Testing and 
Release 
Software User 
Acceptance Testing 
and documentation 
For user acceptance testing, the completed 3W-ADA 
Sentry system software was delivered with all 
recommendations, changes fully completed and it 
passed through all acceptance testing scenarios with 
no severity. 
Acceptance testers agree that the application can 
move into pilot program and provision made for bug 
fixing. 
The 3W-ADA Sentry Paymenex TransNET module 
has been moved from the test environment to the 
production environment with all test data removed and 
is functioning correctly. 
 
Table 29: 3W-ADA Sentry User Acceptance Criteria 
 
4.3 3W-ADA Sentry System Validation 
The validation process of the 3W-ADA Sentry system is divided into three sections of 
authentication criteria. 
4.3.1 Acceptance Validation 
The 3W-ADA Sentry acceptance matrix describes the summary of all phases of the 
acceptance criterion and their results as described in Table 27, and details of the 
Acceptance Matrix document is presented in Appendix D. of this document. 
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4.3.2 Operational Validation 
The operational validation is derived from the user acceptance testing result and the 
approval of the stakeholder and user acceptance team as shown in the sign off document 
of the log of system UAT recommended changes provided in Appendix C. 
4.3.3 Performance Validation 
Since completion of the user acceptance testing and the acceptance of the solution by 
Paymenex Limited, the 3W-ADA Sentry system has been their main card-not-present 
solution recommended for Paymenex members worldwide. Since then, a popular 
implementation was done for Vodafone Ghana for their Airtime Swipe Card project 
which enables customers to buy airtime and also shop online with their airtime swipe 
card.  
According to (Vodafone Ghana, 2012) “All Vodafone Cards are enabled for the 3W 
Sentry Card security, this means at each authentication session, you will be asked some 
information from your PAC Card, this information can also be sent to your registered 
mobile phone no. This security technology increases the chance of protecting your card 
from un-authorized access. Paymenex strongly recommends all Cardholders to use this 
FREE service. Fraudulent activities or loss arising in an account that would have been 
avoided by the use of the 3W Sentry Card security tool will be entirely the responsibility 
of the cardholder”. A business case study of Vodafone Ghana which includes how the 
3W-ADA Sentry supported their operations is presented in Appendix E of this document. 
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5. PART 5 – CONCLUSION 
5.1 Thesis Summary 
This research project described the process and scenarios of an investigation and research 
carried out to establish the causes and consequences of card-not-present fraud, its impact 
and a solution. Systematically organized in five principal parts as follows: 
Part One: This part covers the introduction of the research context. After reading this 
chapter, reader will be equipped with the research question, purpose scope and approach, 
including the overview of the research motivation, what others has done in this research 
area, and what this research will contribute to the knowledge. 
Part Two: This part described the background of this research and information from the 
literature review concerning what people have written about this research area. It further 
explored the e-commerce technologies and their factors with much focus on card 
payment. After reading this chapter, reader will be able to understand the background of 
the problem this research relied on, the current situation of the problem including the 
causes and consequences, the e-commerce technologies, how they work, their benefits, 
their problems and overview of its development. It further analyzed the context of related 
card fraud, the infiltration processes and their consequences. 
Part Three: This chapter presents the 3W-ADA Sentry system as a low-cost and non-
electronic solution built using the framework of the Cartesian coordinate system to add 
additional dynamic authentication method during card-not-present transaction. After 
reading this chapter, reader will be able to understand what 3W-ADA Sentry system is 
all about, its concepts, process and benefits, it further covers the development process and 
cycle, design and user acceptance test. 
Part Four: This chapter validates and evaluates the 3W-ADA Sentry system for its 
suitability and fit for the purpose. After reading this chapter, reader will be able to 
understand the validation process and acceptance criteria used to validated the 3W-ADA 
Sentry system before acceptance. 
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Part Five: This chapter refreshes the reader’s memory about the content and limitation 
of this research. After reading this chapter, reader will be able to understand the content 
of this thesis and its limitations, solution provided, its justifications, strength and 
weaknesses, and direction for future research on this domain. 
5.2 Limitations 
This thesis described the analysis of the card-not-present transaction process, method, 
fraud infiltration processes and the vulnerabilities in existing fraud solutions for card-not-
present transactions, as a means to understand the nature of the business case of Paymenex 
Limited. This also guided the literature review process and area of research, in order to 
understand the causes and consequences of card-not-present fraud, which remains the 
principal and focal topic of this thesis. To provide a comprehensive and sound analysis, 
other types of card frauds or payment methods are used as reference in this research. 
The research outcome provided a blueprint for a feasible solution proposed to solve the 
problem of Paymenex Limited. The solution developed comprises of a pair of system 
modules, one residing on the merchant shopping cart and the other integrated with 
Paymenex TransNET, and both communicate through the application programming 
interface. The researcher designed and implemented the merchant module and the API. 
Because of access restrictions, the researcher could only provide guided descriptions and 
illustrations to enable the technical team at Paymenex to implement the 3W-ADA Sentry 
system functionality on their platform. 
5.3 Contribution summary of this thesis 
Throughout the concept of this thesis, the author identified the following main 
contributions to knowledge as follows: 
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5.3.1 Philosophy of identity theft and card-not-present fraud 
This research project examines the trace of identity theft as the major cause of card-not-
present fraud from a biblical version when physical stealing was virtually the only method 
of identity theft, and how the development of information and communication technology 
and the trend of electronic commerce introduced additional anonymous and low-risk 
routes to identity theft which inspired and led to a significant exploitation of technologies. 
And as the development continues to strengthen, the social engineering technologies used 
to support this crime transforms equally into a sophisticated and flexible tool. 
5.3.2 A framework work for academic scrutiny and future research 
E-commerce technologies is largely software and internet based, and the quality 
assurance of every piece of software developed requires a continuous process of 
monitoring, maintenance and validation throughout its life cycle to remain in compliance 
and fit, additionally, the evolution of e-commerce technologies and its phenomenon is 
becoming more dynamic, complex, and sophisticated, therefore e-commerce technologies 
requires continuous research, evaluation and innovation to update or upgrade previous 
knowledge, results and solutions that may no longer be valid so that they can be current 
and fit for purpose. This piece of research validated the card-not-present fraud causes, 
consequences, and solutions in line with the current technology trend. 
Previous research also showed that card-not-present transaction fraud and its solutions 
escaped academic scrutiny, while it is understood that solutions or clues to solutions to a 
problem is usually the result of an academic research investigation, the card-not-present 
transaction, related fraud and solutions lacks satisfactory knowledge in the academic 
domain and hence stands as a huge problem for new researchers working on this area. 
However, this research incorporated business profession and academic environment into 
its research development and produced a piece of academic research which will serve as 
a background for future academic research on card-not-present transactions fraud, causes, 
and consequences. 
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5.3.3 Introduction of a non-electronic and low-cost CNP Fraud solution 
This research recognised the present of existing solutions, though with significant 
indications why the existing solution could not adequately solve the problem, while some 
of these solutions are effective to certain level, some are also very expensive to 
implement, manage, and cause dissatisfaction to users, but this research proposed the 3W-
ADA Sentry system, a new non-electronic and low-cost account dynamic authentication 
system using the Cartesian two-dimensional coordinate logic to solve the problem of 
card-not-present fraud and it is accepted by the sponsor. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Card-not-present fraud continues to be a serious threat to online merchants and a leading 
security issue among card association, issuers and acquirers. Several solutions have been 
introduced and tested by card associations and different organisations both in and outside 
the card payment industry, however, all approaches could not effectively tackle the fraud 
arising from card-not-present transactions. 
 The more solutions that are developed and introduced, the more technologies to thwart 
and exploit the solutions emerges. Many online merchants have disappeared from e-
commerce business or turned to accept alternative payment methods that eliminates traces 
of card payment because they could no longer tolerate the losses arising from card-not-
present fraud. The issuers and acquirers could not provide a reliable and trusted solution 
that could guarantee and reassure the online merchant’s safety, instead they continue to 
promote and campaign for weak solutions which tends to pass a wrong signal to 
businesses who are planning to introduce electronic commerce in their business offerings. 
Existing merchants are greatly encouraged by leading card association to continue to use 
a weak solution such as 3D secure at the consequences of the merchants. 
Developers of technologies used to thwart or exploit card-not-present fraud prevention 
solutions are as experienced and strong as the developers of the solution and this has led 
to the establishment of a sort of technology competition between both sides. 
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Alternative payment methods are fast growing and substantively competing with card 
payments in the online environment because the merchants have adopted alternative 
payment methods for its assurance of not having any sort of chargeback, while customers 
are happy with alternative payment method because it conceals and protects their personal 
information from online identity theft threats. 
Law enforcement agencies are concentrating more on the drive for arrests and prosecution 
of card-not-present fraud offenders, wide publicity of the fraud threat, education about 
related measures to protect parties online, but they failed to concentrate on the research 
and development of reliable solutions. 
The card association has been happy with a recent reduction in card-not-present losses in 
the last years as they experienced a three consecutive years of fraud reduction in United 
Kingdom which made all involved to relax and believe that finally a solution has been 
discovered, but the fight is still on and getting stronger. However, the recent increase in 
card-not-present fraud report for the year 2012 disappointed all the stakeholders and 
renewed the fear of card-not-present fraud because many now believe that the previous 
information about a solution solved is simply a camouflaged of a weak solution. 
5.5 Future research direction 
This research presented a series of findings about the causes of card-not-present 
transaction fraud and the related consequences to the parties involved as a guide to future 
research in this domain, it also added to current academic knowledge of this problem and 
attempted to solve the problem with a low cost solution. 
The major cause of card-not-present transaction fraud is attributed to identity theft, 
including all motivations of identity theft, because if there is no avenue or method to steal 
personal and card details belonging to others and impersonating them in the card-not-
present environment, there will definitely be no card-not-present transaction fraud, 
therefore, future research in this area will continue to concentrate on more tackling 
identity theft. 
 173 | P a g e  
 
5.5.1 Trend and causes of card-not-present fraud 
Future research at any point in time should consider the evolution of electronic commerce 
technologies, the complexity, the exploitation and its techniques, this is because 
technology is a dynamic innovative tool that changes with the time and human ideas, and 
it is likely that every piece of well researched work will contribute to knowledge and help 
to well inform the stakeholders of the current trend at the time of research. 
5.5.2 Concealing Sensitive information 
Researchers should find more feasible and reputable methods or advance existing 
methods of identifying ourselves online which at the same time will conceal our personal 
and card information. 
5.5.3 More research on dynamic authentication method 
For any future card-not-present transaction fraud solution to be effective and reliable, it 
should continue to prevent the use of only static information for its authentication model, 
because identity theft techniques used on card-not-present transaction environment rely 
on capturing personal and card details as static data and using them to commit card-not-
present fraud since these data can be replicated without losing its reliability.  
It is believed that using a new dynamic keyword for each online transaction will prevent 
the effects of identity theft and will positively disable and renders all methods and systems 
used to steal sensitive information worthless, hence researchers should find more 
effective and universal ways to design unique authentication model for online card 
payment. This research used a non-electronic and low-cost method to determine its unique 
token for each authentication through the implementation of the Cartesian two-
dimensional coordinate system. 
5.5.4 Additional Research Recommendation 
There has been a widespread of tokenization usage in accessing online banking especially 
by financial institutions in United Kingdom, where electronic devices are used to generate 
a one-time token to authorize an online payment or login to an account. Because every 
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bank use and promote their own device, a customer with multiple accounts from different 
bank will have multiple devices to carry along, which makes the concept to be ambiguous, 
dissatisfactory and expensive.  
This research therefore recommends the adoption of the 3W ADA Sentry System and 
moving it to a further research scrutiny and developing it as a membership authentication 
framework allowing financial institutions, card association and payment companies to 
join the network to enable them offer a universal, cross-platform, and low-cost dynamic 
authentication system that will enable customers to maintain only one authentication 
system for all types of payment cards or financial accounts irrespective of number of 
providers. 
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7. APPENDICES 
7.1 Appendix A: TransNET module PseudoCode and Database  
7.1.1 PAC Card Production Pseudocode 
Initialize form 
a) Input Member ID 
b) If Member do not exist or invalid, output error message, 
c) Else, Fetch and display member profile 
d) Input Quantity of PAC Card to be generated 
e) If Quantity is more than permitted integer, output error message, 
f) Else, generate PAC according to input number. 
g) Then, Display summary if generated PAC Card by batch ID 
7.1.2 Link PAC Card to Account Pseudocode 
 
Initialize form 
a) Input Serial No 
b) If Serial No does not exist 
c) Output error “Account does not exist or Account is Invalid” 
d) Else – fetch and display Account information and position PAC Card form. 
 
e) Input PAC Serial No 
f) If PAC Serial No does not exist or is already in use  
g) Output error “ PAC Serial No is invalid or already linked to another Account” 
h) Else check if Account has existing PAC Card linked. 
i) If Account has an existing PAC Card,  
j) Change the existing PAC Card Status to inactive. 
k) While existing PAC Card status is changed to inactive. 
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l) Link the new PAC Card and set it as the Active PAC Card. 
m) And Add entry in DB in descending order 
n) If all OK 
o) Display PAC Status and Information 
p) Else output error 
7.1.3 Database Dictionary 
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7.2 Appendix B: AES Encryption/Decryption in PHP Language 
 
function GetUrlData($strVariables){ 
global $arrParam; 
$cipher = $arrParam["merchant"]["cipher"]; 
$mode = $arrParam["merchant"]["mode"]; 
$izenid  = $arrParam["merchant"]["izenid"]; 
$iv= $arrParam["merchant"]["iv_key"]; 
$secret_key = $arrParam["merchant"]["secret_key"]; 
$strUrl = $arrParam["merchant"]["urlPath"]; 
 
$td = mcrypt_module_open($cipher, "", $mode, $iv); 
mcrypt_generic_init($td, trim($secret_key), $iv); 
$cyper_text = mcrypt_generic($td, $strVariables); 
$szReturn = bin2hex($cyper_text); 
mcrypt_generic_deinit($td); 
mcrypt_module_close($td); 
echo "<br>"; 
echo $encRequest="izenid=".$izenid."&enc=".$szReturn; 
echo "<br>"; 
$chObject =curl_init(); 
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  curl_setopt($chObject, CURLOPT_URL, $strUrl); 
  curl_setopt($chObject, CURLOPT_POST, 1); 
  curl_setopt($chObject, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS,$encRequest); 
  curl_setopt($chObject, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1); 
 curl_setopt ($chObject, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, FALSE); 
  curl_setopt($chObject, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER , 1); 
  curl_setopt($chObject, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 500); 
  $rsOutPut=curl_exec($chObject); 
  $rsOutPut=trim($rsOutPut); 
 
 /* Output Decryption */ 
  $rsOutPut=decryptXmlResult($rsOutPut); 
  $rsOutPut=trim($rsOutPut); 
 /* Ends Here */ 
 
 
 $objXML = xml_parser_create(); 
  xml_parse_into_struct($objXML,$rsOutPut, $vals, $index); 
  xml_parser_free($objXML); 
 return $vals; 
 } 
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 /* GetTreeValues :: This method Retrieve Childs[Keys and values ] of a specific node 
into array From the Return XML */ 
 
function GetTreeValues($szkey,$arrXML){ 
$arrReturn = array(); 
$x=0; 
$blnIsPresent =false; 
$isSkip= false; 
for($p=0;$p<count($arrXML);$p++){ 
if(strtoupper($arrXML[$p]["tag"])==$szkey && 
strtolower($arrXML[$p]["type"])=="open"){ 
$blnIsPresent=true; 
$isSkip=true; 
}else if(strtoupper($arrXML[$p]["tag"])==$szkey && 
strtolower($arrXML[$p]["type"])=="close"){ 
    $blnIsPresent=false; 
    $isSkip=false; 
    if($szkey!="ERROR") 
     $x++; 
 } 
   if($blnIsPresent && !$isSkip){ 
 194 | P a g e  
 
   
 $arrReturn[$x][strtoupper($arrXML[$p]["tag"])]=$arrXML[$p]["value"]; 
    if($szkey=="ERROR") 
     $x++; 
 } 
   $isSkip=false; 
 
} 
return $arrReturn; 
 } 
 
function isValidDate($dt,$dtFormat){ 
$isDateFlag =false; 
$arr=split("/",$dt); // splitting the array 
  if($dtFormat=="MM/DD/YYYY"){ 
   $mm=$arr[0]; 
   $dd=$arr[1]; 
   $yy=$arr[2]; 
 }else if($dtFormat=="DD/MM/YYYY"){ 
   $mm=$arr[1]; 
   $dd=$arr[0]; 
   $yy=$arr[2]; 
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 }else if($dtFormat=="YYYY/MM/DD"){ 
   $mm=$arr[1]; 
   $dd=$arr[2]; 
   $yy=$arr[0]; 
 } 
  If(checkdate($mm,$dd,$yy)) 
   $isDateFlag=true; 
 return $isDateFlag; 
 } 
 
function decryptXmlResult($strEncXMLOutPut){ 
global $arrParam; 
 
$cipher = $arrParam["merchant"]["cipher"]; 
$mode = $arrParam["merchant"]["mode"]; 
$iv= $arrParam["merchant"]["iv_key"]; 
$secret_key = $arrParam["merchant"]["secret_key"]; 
 
$strEncXMLOutPut = hex2bin($strEncXMLOutPut); 
$td = mcrypt_module_open($cipher, "", $mode, $iv); 
mcrypt_generic_init($td, trim($secret_key), $iv); 
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$decrypted_data = mdecrypt_generic($td, trim($strEncXMLOutPut)); 
mcrypt_generic_deinit($td); 
mcrypt_module_close($td); 
echo $decrypted_data; 
return $decrypted_data; 
 } 
 
function hex2bin($hexdata) { 
$bindata = ""; 
 for ($i = 0; $i < strlen($hexdata); $i += 2) { 
$bindata .= chr(hexdec(substr($hexdata, $i, 2))); 
  } 
  return $bindata; 
 } 
 
?> 
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7.3 Appendix C: Log of System UAT Recommended Changes 
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7.4 Appendix D: 3W-ADA Sentry Acceptance Matrix 
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7.5 Appendix E: Case Study of Vodafone Ghana 
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